Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

Utah Department of Transportation v. Joseph Val
Ray Roberts and Verle H. Roberts : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephen C. Ward; Attorney for Appellee.
J. Val Roberts; Attorney for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah Department of Transportation v. Roberts, No. 950305 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6643

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

ADDENDUM

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
JOSEPH VAL RAY ROBERTS and
VERLE H. ROBERTS,

Case No. 9D0136-CA
Priority #15

Defendants and Appellants.

<-*n Appeal from Second District Court
of Davis County
The Honorable Rodney S. Page, Judge

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
E lllfcr
UTAH
Kr U
50
DOCKET NO.

J. VAL ROBERTS
Attorney at Lavi
P. 0- Bo?i £>66
Centerville, Utah 84014
Attorney for Appellants

STEPHEN C. WARD
Assistant Attorney General
State Attorney General
4120 State 0+tice Building
Salt L3re City, Utah 84114
Attorney -or Appellee

BlfrD
0Cr

2 7 1995

COURT OF APPEALS

FILED
OCT i 2 1995
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

—--00O00

Utah Department of
Transportation ,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 950136-CA

v.
Joseph Val Ray Roberts and
Verle H. Roberts,

F I L E D
(October 12, 1995)

Defendants and Appellants.

Second District, Davis County
The Honorable Rodney S. Page
Attorneys:

J. Val Roberts, Centerville, for Appellants
Jan Graham and Stephen C. Ward, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Wilkins (Law and Motion)•
PER CURIAM:
Appellants J. Val Roberts and Verle H. Roberts appeal from a
judgment awarding damages for condemnation of real property.
This appeal is before the court on appellee's motion to dismiss
the appeal or affirm the judgment and motion to strike
appellant's docketing statement and on appellant's motion for
partial summary reversal. Appellant's request for oral argument
is denied on thefo*s*sof our determination that lf[t]he facts and
legal arguments are adequately represented in the [memoranda] and
record and the decisional process would not be significantly
aided by oral argument.11 Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in limiting
the issues at trial to the value of the property taken and
severance damages, if any, based upon the parties' stipulation.
Under the facts of this case, where the stipulation does not
expressly reserve for trial the issue of the necessity of the
taking, and the evidentiary hearing on the issue was vacated and
an order of immediate occupancy issued based on the stipulation,
the trial court did not err in limiting the scope of the issues
for trial to the value of the property taken. See Cornish Town

v, Roller, 817 P.2d 305, 309 (Utah 1991); Redevelopment Agency v.
Tanner. 740 P.2d 1296, 1299-30 (Utah 1987)- The trial court's
order of immediate occupancy, in reliance upon the stipulation,
made the required findings as to public purpose and need for the
property. Having made those findings, the trial court did not
err in placing the burden of proof on appellants to show the
value of the property taken. See Utah State Road Comm. v.
Fribera, 687 P.2d 821, 832 (Utah 1984). Appellants' claim that
appellee lacked authority to use eminent domain proceedings to
obtain property for sidewalk construction is without merit. See
Utah Code Ann. S 27-12-96(9) (1995). Finally, appellants have
failed to demonstrate that the trial court's findings of fact in
support of its judgment on the value of the property taken are
clearly erroneous, gee St^tfeJk^Ean^, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah
1994) .
Appellants seek summary reversal of the trial court's order
requiring appellee Mto install fill so the distance from the top
of the retaining wall to the ground level is no greater than 2
feet 6 inches in the area immediately west of the retaining
wall,11 to slope the area three feet to the west, and to install
sod. The trial^^ourt^spacif icailx^JEflUIMl I\Q sS¥§rance damaaes
**#\*4^S$ £vo* tha manner *n whijp& the v^ll'yag cpns^ruct^T^*
Appellant seeks jreversal?of this ruling and a determination by
this court th^tl §ppallaa must^install % safety railinjg or pay for
taking an additional three feet of appellants' property.
Although there-may be 5Q&9 question about whether tjxg trial courts
had authority to fashion an equitable remedy in this condemnation
easily appellants' request for a safety railing*also assumes that
the court had this authority. Appellants did not preserve the
issue that the remedial measures constituted an additional taking
in the trial court. Under the facts of this case, appellants
have demonstrated no basis for reversal of the ruling. The
remaining issues raised on appeal are without merit.
The judgment is affirmed.

Gregory K^x<fene7"tresiSing Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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[424 US 295]

ALAMO LAND & CATTLE CO., INC., Petitioner,
v
STATE OF ARIZONA
424 US 295, 47 L Ed 2d 1, 96 S a 910
[No. 74-125]
Argued October 14 and 15, 1975. Decided February 24, 1976.
SUMMARY

In federal condemnation proceedings involving lands which, under the
New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act (36 Stat 557), were held in trust by
Arizona for school purposes under federal grants, and which had been
leased by Arizona to a private party under a 10-year grazing lease as
authorized by the Act, the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona held that the lessee was entitled to share in the compensation
award to the extent of both its leasehold interest at the time of condemnation and its improvements on the lands. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recognized that the lessee was entitled to compensation for the improvements, but held that under the Enabling Act, Arizona
had no power to grant a compensable property right to the lessee (495 F2d
12).
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
In an opinion by BLACKMUN, J., expressing the view of six members of the
court, it was held that (1) nothing in the Enabling Act, apart, possibly, from
the extent it might incorporate Arizona law by reference, prevented the
usual application of Fifth Amendment protection of an outstanding leasehold interest, and thus Arizona could execute a grazing lease in such a
manner that the lessee would be entitled to just compensation for the value
of the unexpired leasehold interest upon federal condemnation, and (2) on
remand, the Court of Appeals should determine various questions, including
whether under state law and the lease provisions, the lessee could not
possess a compensable leasehold interest upon federal condemnation.
WHITE, J., joined by BRENNAN, J., dissented, expressing the view that
Briefs of Counsel, p 839, infra.
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U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

47 L Ed 2d

under the Enabling Act, the lessee was entitled to compensation only to the
e x t e n t of the improvements.
STEVENS, J., did not participate.
HEADNOTES
Classified to U. S. Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers' Edition
Public Lands § 26 — federal grants to Eminent Domain § 108 — federal constate — sale
demnation — Arizona trust lands
la, lb The full value provision of the
— right* of lessee
New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act (36
**• 2 b ' * • Nothing in the New MexicoStat 557), which provides that no lands A r i z o n a Enabling Act (36 Stat 557),
held in trust by Arizona under federal a p a r t ' P ° f ^ly, from the extent it may
, „ , , , , .
incorporate Arizona law by reference,
grants shall be sold for less than their p r e v e n t a t h e mt&
application of Fifth
appraised value, does not exclude an Amendment protection of an outstandappropriate deferred payment arrange- i n g leasehold interest, and Arizona may
ment
execute a 10-year grazing lease of lands
T O T A L C L I E N T - S E R V I C E LIBRARY® R E F E R E N C E S
27 A M J U R 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 250, 352-355; 63 A M J U R
2d, Public Lands §§ 23, 107
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Practice and Procedure, Forms 2001-2011
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L E D INDEX TO A N N O S , E m i n e n t Domain; Public Lands
ALR QUICK INDEX, Eminent Domain; Public Lands
FEDERAL QUICK INDEX, Eminent Domain; Public Lands
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Measure of damages payable on condemnation of real property by federal
government 19 L Ed 2d 1361.
Elements and measure of lessee's compensation for taking leasehold in eminent
domain. 94 L Ed 826; 3 ALR2d 286.
Federal courts: federal or state law as applicable in determining what is
property for which compensation must be paid upon its taking by the federal
government 1 ALR Fed 479.

ALAMO LAND & CATTLE CO. v ARIZONA
424 US 295, 47 L Ed 2d 1. 96 S Ct 910
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tled to just compensation for the value of
the unexpired leasehold interest.
Eminent Domain § 108; Public Lands
§ 26 — federal grants to Arizona
Public Lands § 26 — federal grants to
— lease — condemnation
state — disposition of state's in7. Under the New Mexico-Arizona Enterest
3. The New Mexico-Arizona Enabling abling Act (36 Stat 557), if a lease is
Act (36 Stat 557) requires that when made by Arizona of land held in trust
Arizona disposes of its interest in lands under a federal grant for a rental of
held in trust under federal grants, the substantially less than the land's fair
trust is to receive, at the time of disposi- rental value, the lease is null and void,
tion, the then full value of the particular and the holder of the claimed leasehold
interest is not entitled to compensation
interest which is being dispensed.
upon condemnation of the land by the
Eminent Domain § 108 — just com- United States.
pensation — leasehold interest
4. The holder of an unexpired lease- Public Lands § 26 — Arizona trust
lands — grazing lease
hold interest in land is entitled, under
8. Under the provision of the New
the Fifth Amendment, to just compensation for the value of that interest when Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act (36 Stat
it is taken upon condemnation by the 557) that no "mortgage or other encumbrance" of trust lands held by Arizona
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under federal grants shall be valid, a
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abling Act (36 Stat 657), the trust must
receive from the lessee the then fair
9a, 9b. Upon holding that a United
rental value of the possessory interest States Court of Appeals erred in concludtransferred by the lease, and upon a ing that under the New Mexico-Arizona
subsequent condemnation of the land by Enabling Act (36 Stat 557), a lessee of
the United States, the trust must receive school-trust lands held by Arizona under
the then full value of the reversionary federal grants was not entitled to cominterest that is subject to the outstand- pensation for the unexpired leasehold
ing lease, plus the value of the rental interest upon federal condemnation of
rights under the lease; the trust is not the lands, the United States Supreme
entitled, in addition, to receive the com- Court will remand the case for the Court
pensable value, if any, of the leasehold of Appeals' determination of the quesinterest, which if it exists and if the
tions, not initially determined by the
lease is valid, is the lessee's.
Court of Appeals, (1) whether, under
state law and the lease provisions, the
Damages § 122 — condemnation of lessee could not possess a compensable
leasehold interest
leasehold interest upon the federal con6. Ordinarily, upon condemnation of a demnation, (2) if the lessee did possess
leasehold interest by the United States, such an interest, how it is properly to be
the leasehold interest has a compensable evaluated and calculated (with the subvalue whenever the capitalized fair sidiary questions of the relevance of pos3

10a, 10b. Under the New Mexico-Arisible lease renewals and of possible value
additions by reason of the lessee's devel- zona Enabling Act (36 Stat 567), rentals
opment of adjoining properties), and (3) under a grazing lease of lands held in
if such interest proves to be substantial, trust by Arizona under federal grants
whether it is permissible to find from
must be adjusted to reflect current fair
such fact a violation of the Enabling
Act's requirement that a lease, when rental value before any renewal of the
offered, shall be appraised at its true lease, and thus upon federal condemnavalue and be given at not less than such tion of the lands, the calculation of the
value.
lessee's compensable leasehold interest
Damages § 122; Public Lands § 26 — cannot include the prospect of renewing
Arizona trust lands — leasehold the lease at less than fair rental value.
interest
SYLLABUS BY REPORTER OF DECISIONS
In 1962 Arizona, as lessor, and pe- the usual application of Fifth Amendtitioner, as lessee, executed a 10-year ment protection of the outstanding leasegrazing lease of certain tracts of land hold interest whereby the holder of such
which had been granted to Arizona to be an interest is entitled to just compensaheld in trust under the New Mexico-Ari- tion for the value of that interest when
zona Enabling Act. In 1966 the United it is taken upon condemnation by the
States filed a condemnation complaint in United States.
2. To be determined on remand are (1)
connection with a flood control dam and
reservoir which included the leased whether, under state law and the provitracts. In allocating the stipulated com- sions of the lease, petitioner could not
pensation payable by the United States possess a compensable leasehold interest
for the tracts the District Court awarded upon the federal condemnation; (2) if
Arizona a certain amount for its fee petitioner did possess such an interest,
interest and petitioner one amount for how it is properly to be evaluated and
the improvements and another amount calculated (with the subsidiary questions
for "its leasehold interest at the time of of the relevance of possible lease renewtaking and its reasonable prospective als and of possible value additions by
leasehold interest." The Court of Ap- reason of petitioner's development of adpeals, while recognizing that petitioner joining properties); and (3) if that interest proves to be substantial, whether it is
was entitled to compensation for the permissible to find from that fact a violaimprovements, and finding it unneces- tion of the Enabling Act's requirement
sary to determine petitioner's rights that a lease, when offerod, shall be apbased upon the provisions of the lease or praised at its "true value" and be given
upon state law, held that under the at not less than that value.
Enabling Act Arizona, as trustee, had no 495 F2d 12 reversed and remanded.
power to grant a compensable leasehold
Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of
interest and that petitioner therefore
the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and
never acquired a property right for Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnwhich it is entitled to compensation. quist, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a disHeld:
senting opinion, in which Brennan, J.,
1. Nothing in the Enabling Act, apart, joined, post p 311, 47 L Ed 2d, p 13.
possibly, from the extent it may incorpo- StevenB, J., took no part in the considerrate Arizona law by reference, prevents ation or decision of the case.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

J. Gordon Cook argued the cause for petitioner.
Peter C. Gullato argued the cause for respondent.
Briefs of Counsel, p 839, infra.
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424 US 295, 47 L Ed 2d 1, 96 S Ct 910
OPINION OF THE COURT

Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered
the opinion of the Court.

were granted to Arizona "for the
support of common schools." By § 282

This case presents an issue of federal condemnation law—as it relates
to an outstanding lease of trust
lands—that, we are told, affects substantial acreage in our Southwestern
and Western States.

of the same Act, 36 Stat 574, as
amended by the Act of June 5, 1936,
c 517, 49 Stat 1477, and by the Act
of June 2, 1951. 65 Stat 51, the lands
transferred "shall

I
Under § 24' of the New MexicoArizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat 572
(1910), specified sections of every
township in the then proposed State
1. "Sec. 24. That in addition to sections
sixteen and thirty-six, heretofore reserved for
the Territory of Arizona, sections two and
thirty-two in every township in said proposed
State not otherwise appropriated at the date
of the passage of this Act are hereby granted
to the said State for the support of common
schools . . "
2. "Sec. 28. That it is hereby declared that
all lands hereby granted, including those
which, having been heretofore granted to the
said Territory, are hereby expressly transferred and confirmed to the said State, shall be
by the said State held in trust, to be disposed
of in whole or in part only in manner as
herein provided and for the several objects
specified in the respective granting and confirmatory provisions, and that the natural products and money proceeds of any of said lands
shall be subject to the same trusts as the
lands producing the same.
"Disposition of any of said lands, or of any
money or thing of value directly or indirectly
derived therefrom, for any object other than
for which such particular lands, or the lands
from which such money or thing of value
shall have been derived, were granted or
confirmed, or in any manner contrary to the
provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a
breach of trust.
"No mortgage or other encumbrance of the
said lands, or any part thereof, shall be valid
in favor of any person or for any purpose or
under any circumstances whatsoever . . .
Nothing herein contained shall prevent (1)
the leasing of any of the lands referred to in
this section, in such manner as the Legislature of the State of Arizona may prescribe,
for grazing, agricultural, commercial, and
homesite purposes, for a term of ten years or

[424 US 2971

[424 US 298]

be by
the said State held in trust, to be
disposed of in whole or in part only
in manner as herein provided and
for the several objects specified . . .
less;
or (4) the Legislature of the State of
Arizona from providing by proper laws for the
protection of lessees of said lands, whereby
such lessees shall be protected in their rights
to their improvements (including water
rights) in such manner that in case of lease or
sale of said lands to other parties the former
lessee shall be paid by the succeeding lessee
or purchaser the value of such improvements
and rights placed thereon by such lessee
"All lands, leaseholds, timber, and other
products of land, before being offered, shall be
appraised at their true value, and no sale or
other disposal thereof shall be made for a
consideration less than the value so ascertained .
"No lands shall be sold for less than their
appraised value
"A separate fund shall be established for
each of the several objects for which the said
grants are hereby made or confirmed, and
whenever any moneys shall be in any manner
derived from any of said land the same shall
be deposited by the state treasurer in the
fund corresponding to the grant under which
the particular land producing such moneys
was by this Act conveyed or confirmed. No
moneys shall ever be taken from one fund for
deposit in any other, or for any object other
than that for which the land producing the
same was granted or confirmed
"Every sale, lease, conveyance, or contract
of or concerning any of the lands hereby
granted or confirmed, or the use thereof or
the natural products thereof, not made in
substantial conformity with the provisions of
this Act shall be null and void, any provision
of the constitution or laws of the said State to
the contrary notwithstanding "

5
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and . . . the . . . proceeds of any of
said lands shall be subject to the
same trusts as the lands producing
the same." Arizona, by its Constitution, Art 10, § 1,* accepted the lands
so granted and its trusteeship over
them.
Among the lands constituting the
grant to Arizona were two parcels
herein referred to as Tract 304 and
Tract 305, respectively.4 On February 8, 1962, Arizona, as lessor, and
petitioner Alamo Land and Cattle
Company, Inc. (Alamo), as lessee,
executed a grazing lease of
[424 US 299]

these
tracts for the 10-year period ending
February 7, 1972. App 6-14. By Arizona statute, Ariz Rev Stat Ann 37281D (1974), incorporated by general
reference into the lease, App 7,
Alamo may not use the lands for
any purpose other than grazing.
On May 31, 1966, while the two
tracts were subject to the grazing
lease and were utilized as part of
Alamo's larger operating cattle
ranch, the United States filed a complaint in condemnation in the
United States District Court for the
District of Arizona in connection
with the establishment of a flood
control dam and reservoir at a site
on the Bill Williams River. The
S. "All lands expressly transferred and confirmed to the State by the provisions of the
Enabling Act approved June 20, 1910, including all lands granted to the State and all
lands heretofore granted to the Territory of
Arizona, and all lands otherwise acquired by
the State, shall be by the State accepted and
held in trust to be disposed of in whole or in
part, only in manner as in the said Enabling
Act and in this Constitution provided, and for
the several object* specified in the respective
granting and confirmatory provisions The
natural products and money proceeds of any
of said lands shall be subject to the same
trusts aa the lands producing the same "
4. "Tract 304

6

tracts in their entirety were among
the properties that were the subject
of the complaint in condemnation.
The District Court duly entered the
customary order for delivery of possession.5
Thereafter, the United States and
Arizona and, separately, the United
States and Alamo, stipulated that
"the full just compensation" payable
by the United States "for the taking
of said property, together with all
improvements thereon and appurtenances thereunto belonging" was
$48,220 for Tract 304 and $70,400
for Tract 305, and thus a total of
$118,620 for the two. 1 Rec 156, 162.«
At a distribution hearing held to
determine the proper allocation of
the compensation amounts, the only
parties claiming an interest in the
awards for the two tracts were respondent Arizona, asserting title
through the federal grants to it, and
petitioner Alamo, asserting a compensable leasehold interest in the
lands and a compensable
[424 US 300]

interest in
the improvements thereon. The
State conceded that Alamo was entitled to receive the value of the improvements, but contested Alamo's
right, as lessee, to participate in the
"All of Section 2, Township 10 North,
Range 13 West, Gila and Salt River Base and
Meridian, Yuma County, Arizona."
"Tract 306
"All of Section 36, Township 11 North,
Range 13 West, Gila and Salt River Base and
Meridian, Yuma County, Arizona " App 1-2.
5. No question is raised as to the propriety
or effectiveness of the condemnation procedure
6. These figures were also the compensation
estimated for the respective tracts in the
declaration of taking and paid into court. 1
Rec 15

portion of the award allocated to
land value. The District Court, with
an unreported opinion, App 1-5,
awarded Arizona $57,970 for its fee
interest, and awarded Alamo $3,600
for the improvements and $57,050
for "its leasehold interest at the
time of taking, and its reasonable
prospective leasehold interest." 1
Rec pp 227-228. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, while recognizing
that Alamo was entitled to compensation for the improvements, held
that under the Enabling Act Arizona
"had no power to grant a compensable property right to Alamo," and
that "Alamo therefore never acquired a property right for which it
is entitled to compensation." United
States v 2562.92 Acres of Land, 495
F2d 12, 14 (1974). The Court of Appeals thus reversed the judgment of
the District Court insofar as it concerned the leasehold interests. It remanded the cause for the entry of a
new judgment in accordance with its
opinion. Id., at 15. Because the
Ninth Circuit's decision appeared to
implicate this Court's decision in
Lassen v Arizona ex rel. Arizona
Highway Dept. 386 US 458, 17 L Ed
2d 515, 87 S Ct 584 (1967), and because it was claimed to be in conflict
with Nebraska v United States, 164
F2d 866 (CA8 1947), cert denied, 334
US 815, 92 L Ed 1745, 68 S a 1070
(1948), we granted Alamo's petition
for certiorari. 420 US 971, 43 L Ed
2d 650, 95 S Ct 1390 (1975).
II
The Lassen case was an action
instituted by the Arizona Highway
Department to prohibit the application by the State Land Commissioner of rules governing the acquisition of rights-of-way and material
sites in federally donated lands held

by Arizona in trust pursuant to the
provisions of the Enabling Act. What
was involved,
[424 US 301]

therefore, was the acquisition of interests in trust lands
by the State itself. The Supreme
Court of Arizona held that it could
be presumed conclusively that highways constructed across trust lands
always enhanced the value of the
remainder in amounts at least equal
to the value of the areas taken and
therefore refused to order the Highway Department to compensate the
trust. State v Lassen, 99 Ariz 161,
407 P2d 747 (1965). This Court unanimously reversed. In so doing, it observed that the more recent federal
grants to newly admitted States, including Arizona, "make clear that
the United States has a continuing
interest in the administration of
both the lands and the funds which
derive from them." 385 US, at 460,
17 L Ed 2d 515, 87 S Ct 584.
The Court read §28 of the Enabling Act with particularity. It emphasized the Act's requirements that
trust lands be sold or leased only to
" 'the highest and best bidder' "; that
no lands be sold for less than their
appraised value; that disposal of
trust lands be " 'only in manner as
herein provided'"; that disposition
in any other way " 'shall be deemed
a breach of trust' "; and that every
sale or lease " 'not made in substantial conformity with the provisions
of this Act shall be null and void.' "
385 US at 461-462, 17 L Ed 2d 515,
87 S Ct 584. The Court then examined the purposes of the Act and
concluded that the grant "was
plainly expected to produce a fund,
accumulated by sale and use of
the trust lands, with which the
State could support the public institutions designated by the Act."
Id., at 463, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 87
7
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S Ct 584 Sales and leases were intended The "central problem" was
"to devise constraints which would
assure that the trust received in full
fair compensation for trust lands."
Ibid. The Court concluded, for reasons stated in the opinion, that the
Act's procedural restrictions did not
apply when the State itself sought
trust lands for its highway program.

compensate the trust in money for
the full appraised value of any material sites or rights-of-way which it
obtains on or over trust lands." Id.,
at 469, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 87 S a 584.7
(footnotes omitted) This standard, it
was said, "most consistently reflects
the essential purposes of the grant."
Id., at 470, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 87 S Ct
584.

[424 US 302]

Much of what was said in Lassen
had also been said, several decades
earlier, in Ervien v United States,
251 US 41, 64 L Ed 128, 40 S a 75
(1919), when the provisions of the
same Enabling Act were under consideration in a federal case from
New Mexico. The Court's concern for
the integrity

[1a] The Court then turned to the
standard of compensation Arizona
must employ to recompense the
trust for the interests the State acquired It concluded that the terms
and purposes of the grant did not
permit Arizona to diminish the actual monetary compensation payable
to the trust by the amount of any
enhancement in the value of remaining trust lands The Court emphasized that the Enabling Act "unequivocally demands both that the
trust receive the full value of any
lands transferred from it and that
any funds received be employed only
for the purposes for which the land
was given " Id , at 466, 17 L Ed 2d
515, 87 S Ct 584 It again stressed
the requirements of the Act and
noted that "these restrictions in
combination indicate Congress' concern both that the grants provide
the most substantial support possible
to the beneficiaries and that only
those beneficiaries profit from the
trust " Id., at 467, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 87
S Ct 584. All this was confirmed by
the background and legislative history of the Enabling Act. Accordingly, it held that even where the
State itself is the acquisitor, the
Act's designated beneficiaries were
to derive the full benefit of the
grant Thus, "Arizona must actually
7. [ l b ] The full-value provision does not
exclude an appropriate deferred-payment arr a n g e m e n t Lassen v Arizona ex rel Arizona
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of the conditions imposed by the Act, therefore, has long
been evident.
[2a, 3] But to say, as the Court did
in Ervien and in Lassen, that the
trust is to receive the full value of
any lands transferred from it is not
to say that the Act requires, in every
Arizona case where a leasehold is
outstanding at the time of the federal condemnation, that the trust is
to receive the entire then value of
the land and the possessor of the
leasehold interest is to receive nothing whatsoever. What the Act requires—and we think that this is
clear from Ervien and Lassen—is
that the trust is to receive, at the
time of its disposition of any interest
in the land, the then full value of
the particular interest which is being dispensed.
[4, 5] It has long been established
that the holder of an unexpired leasehold interest in land is entitled,
Highway Dept 386 US 468, 469, n 21, 17 L Ed
2d 516, 87 S Ct 684 (1967)

under the Fifth Amendment, * to
just compensation for the value of
that interest when it is taken upon
condemnation by the United States
United States v Petty Motor Co 327
US 372, 90 L Ed 729, 66 S Ct 596
(1946); A. W. Duckett & Co. v United
States, 266 US 149, 69 L Ed 216, 45
5 Ct 38 (1924). See United States v
General Motors Corp. 323 US 373,
89 L Ed 311, 65 S Ct 357, 156 ALR
390 (1945); Almota Farmers Elevator
6 Warehouse Co. v United States,
409 US 470, 35 L Ed 2d 1, 93 S Ct
791 (1973); 2 P. Nichols, Eminent
Domain § 5.23 (Rev 3d ed 1975); 4 id.
§ 12.42 [1]. It would therefore seem
to follow that when a lease of trust
land is made, the trust must receive
from the lessee the then fair rental
value of the possessory interest
transferred by the lease, and thatj
upon a subsequent condemnation by
the United States, the trust must
receive the then full value of the
reversionary interest that is subject
to the outstanding lease, plus, of
course, the value of the rental rights
under the lease. The trust should
not be entitled,

"The measure of damages is the
value of the use and occupancy of
the leasehold for the remainder of
the tenant's term, plus the value
of the right to renew . ., less the
agreed rent which the tenant
would pay for such use and occupancy." United States v Petty Motor Co 327 US, at 381, 90 L Ed
729, 66 S a 596.
See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v United States, supra.
A number of factors, of course, could
operate to eliminate the existence of
compensable value in the leasehold
interest Presumably, this would be
so if the Enabling Act provided, as
the New Mexico-Arizona Act does
not, that any lease of trust land was
revocable at will by the State, or if it
provided that, upon sale or condemnation of the land, no compensation
was payable to the lessee The State,
of course, may require that a provision of this kind be included in the
lease. See United States v Petty Motor Co. 327 US, at 375-376 and, n 4,
90 L Ed 729, 66 S Ct 596; see also 4
Nichols, supra, § 12.42 [1], pp 12-488
and 12-489.
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in addition to
all this, to receive the compensable
value, if any, of the leasehold interest. That, if it exists and if the lease
is valid, is the lessee's. See State ex
rel. La Prade v Carrow, 57 Ariz 429,
433-434, 114 P2d 891, 893 (1941).
[6] Ordinarily, a leasehold interest
has a compensable value whenever
the capitalized then fair rental value
for the remaining term of the lease,
plus the value of any renewal right,
exceeds the capitalized value of the
rental the lease specifies. The Court
has expressed it this way:
8. "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation "

[7] A difference between the rental
specified in the lease and the fair
rental value plus the renewal right
could arise either because the lease
rentals were set initially at less than
fair rental value, or because during
the term of the lease the value of
the land, and consequently its fair
rental value, increased The New
Mexico-Arizona Enabling
[424 U S 306]

Act has
a protective provision against the
initial setting of lease rentals at less
than fair rental value This is specifically prohibited by § 28 The prohibition is given bite by the further
very drastic provision that a lease
9
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not made in substantial conformity
with the Act "shall be null and
void *' Thus, if the lease of trust
lands calls for a rental of substantially less than the land's then fair
rental value, it is null and void and
the holder of the claimed leasehold
interest could not be entitled to compensation upon condemnation.
[2b] On the other hand, the fair
rental value of the land may increase during the term of the lease.*
If this takes place, the increase in
fair rental value operates to create a
compensable value in the leasehold
interest It is at this point, we feel,
that the Court of Appeals erred
when it held that the Act by its
terms, and apart from the extent to
which it incorporated Arizona law
by reference, barred Arizona from
leasing trust land in any manner
that might result in the lessee's becoming constitutionally entitled to
just compensation for the value of
its unexpired leasehold interest at
the time of the federal condemnation. Instead, the Act is completely
silent in this respect.
Ill
[8] Arizona, however, suggests
that this usually acceptable analysis
may not be applied under the New
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act. It argues, as the Court of Appeals held,
495 F2d, at 14, that under that Act
the State, as trustee, has no power
to grant a compensable property
9. The Arizona statutes governing grazing
leases of trust lands recognize this possibility
and provide for adjustment of rent at specified
times to account for fluctuations in fair rental
value Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§37-283, 37 286
(1974) Indeed, under § 28 of the Enabling Act,
at the termination of a lease, a re-evaluation
would appear to be required before release or
renewal
10. The Supreme Court of New Mexico long

10
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interest to Alamo, as lessee. It bases
this thesis on the Enabling Act's
provision in § 28 that no "mortgage
or other encumbrance" of trust land
shall be valid, and it claims that a
lease is an encumbrance, citing,
among other cases, Hecketsweiler v
Parrett, 185 Or 46, 52, 200 P2d 971,
974 (1948) (agreement to sell real
estate free and clear of encumbrances), and Hartman v Drake, 166
Neb 87, 91, 87 NW2d 895, 898 (1958)
(partition). One seemingly apparent
and complete answer to this argument is that § 28 goes on to authorize specifically a lease of trust land
for grazing purposes for a term of 10
years or less, and further provides
that a leasehold, before being offered, shall be appraised at "true
value." See n 2, supra. These provisions thus plainly contemplate the
possibility of a lease of trust land
and, in so doing, intimate that such
a lease is not a prohibited "mortgage
or other encumbrance."10 Furthermore, Arizona statutes in other contexts specifically protect the lessee's
interest. Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 41511.06, 37-291 (1974). See Ehle v
Tenney Trading Co 56 Ariz 241, 107
P2d 210 (1940). To this the State responds that, while a lease is possible,
it falls short of being a compensable interest when the property is sold
because the Act prohibits the sale
unless the trust receives the full apago ruled that a grazing lease of state lands is
not a "mortgage or
encumbrance," within
the meaning of the identical prohibition, applicable to New Mexico, in § 10 of the New
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat 563
American Mortgage Co v White, 34 NM 602,
605-606, 287 P 702, 703 (1930) See United
States v 40,021 64 Acres of Land, 387 F Supp
839, 848-849 (NM 1975), State ex rel State
Highway Comm'n v Chavez, 80 NM 394, 456
P2d 868 (1969)

praised value of the land. The argument assumes that such compensation is to be measured by the entire
land value despite the presence of
the outstanding lease That approach overlooks the actuality of a
two-step disposition
[424 US 307]

of interests in
the land, the first at the time of the
granting of the lease, and the second
at the time of the condemnation.
Full appraised value is to be determined and measured at the times of
disposition of the respective intere s t , and if the State receives those
values at those respective times, the
demands of the Enabling Act are
met. The State's argument would
serve to convert and downgrade a
10-year grazing lease, fully recognized and permitted by the Act, into
a lease terminable at will or into
one automatically terminated whenever the State sells the property or
it is condemned. The lessee is entitled to better treatment than this if
neither the Enabling Act nor the
lease contains any such provision.
We have noted above that the Act or
the lease, or both, could provide for
that result. The Act, however, does
not specifically so provide Whether
either the Act or the lease does so
through incorporation of state law is
an issue not addressed by the Court
of Appeals, and it is to be considered
on remand We merely note that the
fact that it is within Arizona's power
to insert a condemnation clause in a
lease it makes of trust land does not
mean that the State may claim the
same result when its lease contains
no such clause
IV
Alamo suggests that the Court of
Appeals' decision is at odds with the
above-cited case of Nebraska v
United States, 164 F2d 866, cert de-

nied, 334 US 815, 92 L Ed 1745, 68 S
Ct 1070 There, in the face of a
totality claim like that made by Arizona here, the Eighth Circuit ruled
that trust lands in Nebraska were to
be treated as any other property and
that condemnation proceeds were
subject to allocation between the
State as trustee and the holder of an
outstanding agricultural lease. The
Nebraska Enabling Act of April 19,
1864, c 59, 13 Stat 47, was an earlier
edition of this type of statute, and
was adopted
[424 US 308]

more
than four decades before the New
Mexico-Arizona Act It did not contain the detailed restrictive provisions that appear in the 1910 Act
and that were developed and utilized
as passing years and experience
demonstrated a need for them. Because of this, one may say, as Arizona does, that the Nebraska case is
distinguishable from the present
one But the decision is not devoid of
precedential value, for it is consistent with our analysis of the New
Mexico-Arizona Act in its recognition of the possibility of a compensable leasehold interest in trust land
upon federal condemnation, and it
demonstrates that the existence of
that interest is not incompatible
with the trust land concept. See also
United States v 78 61 Acres of Land,
265 F Supp 564 (Neb 1967), a postLassen case; United States v
40,021.64 Acres of Land, 387 F Supp
839, 848-849 (NM 1975).
V
[9a] Finally, the Court of Appeals
observed, but only in passing, 495
F2d, at 14, that the lease recited
that it was made subject to the laws
of Arizona; that if the State "relinquished" the property to the United
States, the lease "shall be null and
11
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void as it may pertain to the land so
relinquished"; and that no provision
of the lease "shall create any vested
right in the lessee " The court also
observed, ibid., that Ariz Rev Stat
Ann §§37-242 and 37-293" restrict a
lessee's participation in the
[424 US 309)
11.5 37 242
"A When state lands on which there a r e
improvement* for which the owner thereof is
entitled to be compensated are offered for
sale, and the purchaser is not the owner of
the improvements, the purchaser shall pay
the person conducting the sale ten percent of
the appraised value of the improvements and
the balance within thirty days thereafter If
the state land department determines that
the amount at which the improvements are
appraised is so great that competitive bidding
for the land will be thereby hindered, the
department may sell the improvements on
installments payable ten per cent upon announcement of the successful bidder, fifteen
per cent thirty days thereafter, and fifteen
per cent annually thereafter for five years,
together with six per cent interest on the
balance remaining unpaid, which amount,
until paid, shall be a lien upon the land The
purchaser shall at all times, keep the insurable improvements insured for the benefit of
the state Payments shall be made at the time
and in the manner prescribed for payments
on the land, and any default in the payments
for improvements shall be deemed a default
in the payments for the land.
"B When improvements are sold on installments, the first twenty five per cent, after
deducting all rents, penalties and costs owing
to the state on account of the land, shall be
paid to the owner of the improvements, and
the balance shall become a legal charge
against the state
"C Upon surrendering possession of any
such land, the owner of the improvements
thereof shall file with the commissioner of
finance his claim for the balance on t h e improvements remaining unpaid, and if the
claim bears the approval of the d e p a r t m e n t as
to correctness, and a certificate t h a t possession of the lands and improvements has been
surrendered by all persons having lawful
claims for improvements on the land, it shall
be paid by the state treasurer on the warrant
of the commissioner of finance from any fund
in which there is money subject to investment As payments for the improvements are
made by the purchaser, they shall be depos-

12

proceeds
of a sale of public land to the value
of improvements. Having made
these observations, however, the
court thereupon concluded that it
did not find it necessary
[424 US 310]

"to determine the
ited with the state treasurer and both principal and interest shall be returned by him to
the fund from which they were taken.
"D Failure to pay the balance of the purchase price or the fifteen per cent within
thirty days after the announcement of the
successful bidder shall constitute a forfeiture
of all rights to the land and all payments
made."
§ 37-293:
"A. A lessee of state lands shall be reimbursed by a succeeding lessee for improvements placed on the lands which are not
removable. If the retiring lessee and the new
lessee do not agree upon the value of the
improvements, either party may file with the
state land department an application for appraisal of the improvements. Thereafter an
appraisal of the improvements shall be made
in the same manner and subject to the same
conditions as appraisals of improvements are
made when state lands are sold
"B. Upon making the appraisal, the department shall give notice of the amount thereof
by registered mail to each person interested
in the appraisal The notice shall require t h a t
the new lessee pay to the department for the
prior lessee the entire amount of the appraisal within thirty days from the date of
t h e notice, or the department, when the value
is greater than the rental for the period of
the lease, may require that payment of ten
per cent of the appraised value be made
within thirty days, fifteen per cent within
sixty days, twenty-five per cent at the end of
the first year of the new lease, and twenty-five
per cent at the end of each year thereafter
until the entire balance is paid
"C If the improvements are not paid for as
required in the notice, the succeeding lessee
shall not be permitted to sell, assign, or transfer his lease, nor sell, assign or remove any
improvements whatever from the land until
the entire amount of the appraised value of
the improvements has been paid Upon default he shall be subject to the same penalties
and liabilities as provided by § 37-288 for
failure to pay rents, including a cancellation
of the lease "

rights of Alamo based upon these
lease provisions or the state law."
495 F2d, at 14.
The significance of the provisions
referred to and of the cited statutes
will now be for determination upon
remand. We note only that the land
in question was condemned and thus
does not appear to have been technically "relinquished" by Arizona to
the United States; that we are not at
all sure that there is language of
restriction in §§37-242 and 37-293;
and that Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§37288 and 37-290 respectively permit
forfeiture for violation of the conditions of a lease or for nonpayment of
rent, and cancellation of a lease if
the leased land is reclassified to a
higher use, and thus could explain
the lease's provision against vesting
in the technical sense that it is not
subject to any contingency whatsoever.
[424 US 311]

[2c, 9b, 10a] To repeat: we hold
that nothing in the Enabling Act
apart, possibly, from the extent it
may incorporate Arizona law by reference, prevents the usual application of Fifth Amendment protection
of the outstanding leasehold interest.

We leave for determination on remand the following: (1) whether, under state law and the lease provisions, Alamo could not possess a
compensable leasehold interest upon
the federal condemnation; (2) if
Alamo did possess such an interest,
how it is properly to be evaluated
and calculated (with the subsidiary
questions of the relevance of possible
lease renewals12 and of possible
value additions by reason of Alamo's
development of adjoining properties,
cf. United States v Fuller, 409 US
488, 35 L Ed 2d 16, 93 S Ct 801
(1973)); and, (3) if that interest
proves to be substantial, whether it
is permissible to find from that fact
a violation of the Enabling Act's
requirement that a lease, when offered, "shall be appraised at [its]
true value" and be given at not less
than that value.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part
in the consideration or decision of
this case.

SEPARATE OPINION

Mr. Justice White with whom Mr.
Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.
The question in this
whether, under § 28 of the

case

is

[424 US 312]

New Mexico-Arizona Enabling
Act (Act), 36 Stat 574, the State of
Arizona had the power to grant to
12. [ 1 0 b ] We note in regard to the possible
value of renewal rights that leases of the kind
in issue here are limited by statute to 10
years in duration, and that the Act requires
that rentals be adjusted to reflect current fair
rental value before any renewal See n 9,

petitioner a compensable leasehold
interest in the property in issue. The
question is solely one of statutory
construction. As I agree with the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that Congress intended that lessees of land covered by the Act
should acquire a compensable interest in leased land only to the extent
supra Therefore, although we do not foreclose
the relevance of possible renewals, the ca\cu| a tion of the lessee's interest cannot include
the prospect of renewing the lease at less
t h a n fair renta, vaJue

13
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f " i m p r o v e m e n t s . . . placed
hereon by such lessee," United
;tntos v 2562**2 Acre* of Land, 495
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)r condemnation, is clearly an "enrumbrance" 7 G. Thompson, Real
Property § 3 1 8 3 , p 277 (1962); 2 Bou/ier's Law Dictionary 1530 (8th ed
1914). A lease not so terminable is,
therefore expressly prohibited by the
Act. The majority opinion, however,
finds implicit in the Act an exception to the express ban on encumbrances in the case of leases for
terms of 10 years or less. It points to
the fact that 10-year leases of school
trust lands are expressly permitted
by the Act and states that to treat a
lease as an "encumbrance" under
the circumstances would be to
"downgrade a 10-year grazing lease,
fully recognized and permitted by
the Act, into a lease terminable at
will or into one automatically terminated whenever the State sells the
property or it is condemned." Ante,
at 307, 47 L Ed 2d 11. Treating the
lease as an encumbrance would certainly have the effect which the majority says it would. The majority
does not disclose, however, why such
an effect is contrary to the intent of
the Act. Apparently, it simply finds
illogical
[424 US 313]

the notion
that a lease could be terminable on
sale or condemnation and still be a
"10-year" lease, notwithstanding the
fact that treating 10-year leases as
being so terminable is the only way
14
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leases terminable at will or by sale
or condemnation. In 1888 Congress
provided, with respect to school trust
lands granted to Wyoming, that the
lands could be leased for 5-year periods but that such leases could be
annulled at will by the Secretary of
the Interior. 25 Stat 393. Of far
more significance to this case was
Congress' treatment of the lands
granted to Oklahoma—the State to
enter the Union most recently prior
to the entry of Arizona and N e w
Mexico—in the Oklahoma Enabling
Act. C 3335, 34 Stat 267. In that Act,
Congress expressly provided Oklahoma with the authority to lease
school trust lands for 10-year periods
while also clearly providing that
upon sale of the lands during the
period of the lease, the lessee would
receive only the value of its improvements. That Act states with respect
to sales of lands subject to a lease
that "preference right to purchase at
the highest bid [is] given to the lessee at the time of such sale," ibid,
(emphasis added); and then provides:
"fl]n case the leaseholder does not
become the purchaser, the purchaser at said sale shall, under
such rules and regulations as the
legislature may prescribe, pay to
or for the leaseholder the appraised value of . .
improvements, and to the State
the
amount bid for said lands, exclu-

sive of the appraised

value
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islative history shedding any light
on" the relevant portion of the Act,
the Senate sponsor of the Act—Senator Beveridge—spoke approvingly of
the restrictions placed on Oklahoma
in dealing with school trust lands
granted to it in the Oklahoma Enabling Act and indicated his belief
that the restrictions on Arizona and
N e w Mexico were more stringent.
H e stated:
"We took the position [in drafting
the Act] that the United States
owned this land, and in creating
these States we were giving the
lands to the States for specific purposes, and that restrictions should
be thrown about it which would
assure its being used for those
purposes." 45 Cong Rec 8227
(1910).

"We have thrown conditions
around land grants in several
States heretofore, notably in the
case of Oklahoma, but not so thorough and complete as this."
The Oklahoma Enabling Act prevents the creation of a compensable
interest in a lessee of school trust
lands except to the extent of improvements placed thereon by him.
A literal application of the New
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act at issue here reaches the s a m e result.

The latter Act, passed only four
years after the Oklahoma Enabling
Act
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discernible horn the Act and its legislative history. Congress anticipated
that the value of the school trust
lands would increase over time and
it intended that the schools, not leaseholders, benefit from this increase.
Pursuing this end, the Act set a
minimum sales price for school trust
lands of $3 per acre, 36 Stat 574, the
House committee report explaining.
"The bill fixes a minimum price
at which the lands granted for
educational purposes subject to
sale may be sold. . . .
"It is recognized by the committee as well as by other earnest
advocates of a minimum price,
that practically none of these
lands are worth now anything like
the minimum price fixed. . . It is
believed, however, that the advance of science, the extension of
public and private irrigation projects, and the tendency toward the
higher development of smaller
holdings will, in the case of Arizona and New Mexico, as in the
case of other States, result in a
sure, although possibly
slow, increase of land values.
"The educational lands which
are subject to sale would probably
not bring on the market now
much more than 25 cents an acre,
but if the history of other states in
15

which minimum prices, which at
the time were considered prohibitive, were fixed shall be repeated
in Arizona and New Mexico, it is
of the utmost importance that
some restriction be placed upon
the sale of these lands.
"The experience of other States
and the importance of fixing a
minimum selling price for educational lands is indicated in the
following extract
[424 US 316J

from a letter
from former Secretary of the Interior Garfield addressed to the
chairman of the committee in the
last Congress:

sections. Colorado seems to have
an exceedingly low minimum,
$2.50; and nevertheless it has administered its land grants unusually well, securing from them very
large returns, both from sales and
from leases. For these reasons, I
urge that a minimum price be
fixed for these proposed new
States. They will be able to lease
most of their land, if it is not
worth to-day the minimum price,
and will thereby obtain an
income.'" HR Rep No. 152 61st
Cong, 2d Sess, at 2-3 (1910).
If leases were permitted to encumber school trust lands
[424 US 317]

ing by proper laws for the protection of lessees of said lands,
whereby such lessees shall be protected in their rights to their improvements (including water
rights) in such manner that in
case of lease or sale of said lands
to other parties the former lessee
shall be paid by the succeeding
lessee or purchaser the value of
such improvements and rights
placed thereon by such lessee." 65
Stat 52.
The Act provides
of compensation
lands sold. Under
ion a lessee could,

for no other kind
to the lessee of
the majority opinif the value of the

lands increased after the lease was
entered into, and if the lease had
not expired at the time of any sale
or condemnation, receive
[424 US 318]

a portion of the sale or condemnation price over and above the value
of any improvements. In Lassen v
Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway
Dept. 385 US 458, 466, 17 L Ed 2d
515, 87 S Ct 584 (1967), we said that
Act "unequivocally demands . . .
that the trust receive the full value
of lands transferred from it." The
majority now construes the Act to
authorize a result contrary to the
Act's "unequivocal demand" and, accordingly, I dissent.

at a time
" T h e history of the public-land
States in the matter of the dis- -when they were worth less than the
posal of granted school lands has minimum sales price, then when the
convinced me that those States land rose in value—as Congress anwhich have a minimum price fixed ticipated it would—and was sold for
on their lands granted for educa- the minimum price or more, the
tional purposes get a much larger State would have to give part of
return from their lands. I am in- such sales price to the lessee. Such a
formed that most States with no result is utterly irreconcilable with
minimum have not disposed of the reasons for setting minimum
their lands to the best advantage, sales prices. Plainly, Congress inthus seriously failing to derive the tended the school trust to receive
full benefit to which the schools the full sales price and to prevent
are entitled. The States of North the States from disposing of the
and South Dakota, Montana, Wyo- lands in any fashion which would
ming, Idaho, and Washington have result in its receiving any less. Lesa $10 minimum fixed on their sees were to receive none of the
lands, and I am informed that proceeds of sale of the land itself
none of these States, unless it is even if the land had appreciated in
Wyoming, feels that this high min- value subsequent to the creation of
imum is harmful.
the lease.
" 'On the contrary, I find that
officials of these States are zealous
and proud of the splendid school
funds which they are creating
from the sale of school lands.
North Dakota, which a few years
ago seemed to contain immense
areas of poor land, is, I am informed, obtaining in many cases
$15 or $20 per acre for its school
6

To make its purpose even clearer,
Congress, in dealing with the very
question of whether the lessee
should share in the proceeds when
lands subject to the lease are sold,
provided.
"Nothing herein contained shall
prevent . . . (4) the Legislature of
the State of Arizona from provid17
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a dispute, however, over whether Malnar
had notice of the amendment at the time of
SAM Oil's ratification. In its findings of
fact, after discussing the transmission of
the ratification documents to be signed by
SAM Oil and Robertson, the Board states,
"SAM Oil maintains that the April 27,1983
amendment to the Unit Operating Agreement was not included with these materials.^ BHP maintains that it was standard procedure to include all amendments/' 8 Over the dissent of one member,
the Board's conclusions of law state, "SAM
Oil is subject to the 300% nonconsent penalty provided in the Unit Operating Agreement, as amended." We cannot find a
logical connection between the Board's
findings of fact and its conclusion of law.
The Board's findings of fact do not expressly state whether SAM Oil received
notice of the amendment prior to executing
the ratification agreement; yet implicit in
its conclusion of law is the premise that
Malnar did have notice of the amendment
We are unable to review the amount of
the penalty imposed by the Board without a
further finding.of fact regarding whether
SAM Oil, through Malnar, had notice of the
amendment Because this is a question
depending in part on credibility, we remand
for clarification. Depending on its finding
regarding notice, the Board should enter an
order holding that SAM Oil is subject to its
proportionate share of the costs and the
risk penalty (at either the 150 or the 300
percent level) described in section 9 of the
unit operating agreement The order
should further provide that SAM Oil's
working interest share of production from
the well began to accrue on the first day of
the month following the filing of the appropriate papers with the Bureau of Land
Management pursuant to section 27 of the
onshore, and the depth to which it is to be
drilled. The well at issue in this case was a
relatively deep, exploratory well. The 300 percent risk compensation was therefore reasonable under the circumstances, and at the hearing, there was expert testimony to this effect,
7. Although there is evidence that Malnar was
subsequently made aware of the amount of the
amended penalty, BHP presented no evidence to
the Board that he knew of the amendment at
the time of the ratification. The cover letter

unit agreement Finally, based on the revised date of accrual, the Board will need
to reconsider whether the well has yet paid
out the appropriate* costs and penalty and
therefore whether SAM Oil is owed any
proceeds from production to date.
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate CJ., and
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
[O | KEY NUMMI SYTOM>

CORNISH TOWN, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.

Evan O. KOLLER and Marlene B.
Roller, husband and wife, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 880121.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 1, 1991.
Town brought condemnation action to
create protection zones around springs on
landowners' property, which springs were
source of water for town's culinary system.
The First District Court, Cache County,
VeNoy J. Christoffersen, J., rendered judgment on special jury verdict for landowners
and they appealed. The Supreme Court,
Howe, Associate CJ., held that (1) court
was not obligated to allow landowners to
relitigate issue of necessity of proposed
taking; (2) landowners were not entitled to
jury determination of public necessity of
dated January 4, 1984, does not refer to the
1983 amendment.
8. The weight of this allegation is misleading
because it was not BHP who corresponded with
Malnar concerning SAM Oil's joinder of the
unit; it was the unit operator, Rio Bravo.
While perhaps enlightening on the subject of
industry practice, BHP*s standard procedure
does not have any direct relevance to the question in this case.

306

Utah

817 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

proposed taking; (3) landowners were not
entitled to valuation of land as of date of
first ordinance enacted to protect town's
water supply; (4) court erred in refusing to
admit evidence of existence of mineral deposits and their enhancement of value of
land; and (5) town did not abandon condemnation action for purposes of award of attorney fees when it amended complaint to
seek only perpetual easement
Remanded.
1. Eminent Domain <*=>195
Where trial court permitted both landowner and town to fully present and litigate issue of necessity of proposed taking
of landowner's property at hearing on motion for order of immediate occupancy and
court entered written findings of fact sustaining town's right to condemn, court was
not obligated to allow parties to again litigate that issue at trial, even though order
of immediate occupancy was interlocutory
in nature.
2. Jury «=>19<11)
Landowner whose property was subject of condemnation action was not entitled to jury determination of public necessity of proposed taking. U.C.A.1953, 7&-3410.
3. Jury <*»19(11)
Under federal law, there is no constitutional right to trial by jury in condemnation
cases.
4. Eminent Domain <*»124
Landowners whose property was subject of eminent domain action by town for
purpose of creating protection zones
around springs on property to reduce high
nitrate level in spring water were not entitled to have land valued as of effective date
of first town ordinance enacted to protect
town's culinary water supply, inasmuch
neither ordinance nor its successors
amounted
to
regulatory
taking.
U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11.
5. Eminent Domain «»2(1)
For purposes of recovering compensation for "regulatory taking" of one's prop-

erty, even "temporary" regulatory taking
requires denial of all uses of property.
& Eminent Domain $=>2(1)
Mere diminution in property value is
insufficient to meet burden of demonstrating taking by regulation.
7. Eminent Domain «=>202(1)
Trial court in condemnation action
erred in refusing to admit evidence of existence of mineral deposits and their enhancement of value of land sought to be condemned on basis that there had been no
extraction of minerals to that date; court
should have determined at time of trial
whether deposits could be removed later by
landowners without being impeded by easement taken by town, rather than requiring
landowners to litigate question later, if and
when they attempted to remove any mineral deposits.
8. Eminent Domain <*=»131
Generally, existence of mineral deposits in or on land is element to be considered
in determining market value of such land
for condemnation purposes.
9. Eminent Domain <*»317(2), 319
Only perpetual easement may be taken
over surface of land sought to be condemned when land is underlaid with minerals sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, and in those instances, landowner retains right to underlying minerals which
condemning agency has not sought or cannot afford to buy, and landowner is entitled
to later recover those minerals.
10. Eminent Domain «»131
Where landowner will be unable to later remove mineral deposits underlying
land sought to be condemned because operation of condemnor impedes their removal,
value of minerals left in place should be
considered in determining compensation to
which landowner is entitled.
11. Eminent Domain <*=»265(5)
Landowners whose property was subject of condemnation proceeding were not
entitled to attorney fees and costs on basis
of abandonment of action when town
amended its complaint to seek only perpetual easement over property, inasmuch as
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town's condemnation action was not both
totally abandoned and dismissed prior to
conclusion. U.C.A.1953, 78-34-16.
12. Eminent Domain *»134
Landowners whose property was subject of condemnation proceeding were not
entitled to valuation of the use of the property for hunting access permits independently of, and as a separate calculation
from, the land of which it was a part
13. Eminent Domain «=>202(4)
Evidence comparing business potential
for hunting permits on property that was
subject of condemnation with nearby landowner's use of hunting permits on its property was properly excluded in condemnation action due to dissimilarities in properties.
14. Eminent Domain *=»265(3)
Trial court in condemnation action did
not abuse its discretion in determining that
expenses for preparation and presentation
of photographic maps, graphic exhibits and
transcripts of pretrial hearings that were
used at trial were not taxable as costs.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 54(dXD; U.C.A.1953,
21-5-8.
M. Byron Fisher, Michelle Mitchell, Salt
Lfcke City, for the Rollers.
George W. Pratt, Jody K. Burnett, Salt
Lake City, for Cornish Town.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
Defendants Evan 0. Roller and Marlene
B. Roller, his wife, appeal from a judgment
for $59,670 entered on a special jury verdict in their favor and against plaintiff
Cornish Town.
FACTS
Cornish Town commenced this action in
July 1986 to condemn approximately one
hundred acres pf Rollers' land for the purpose of creating protection zones around
Griffiths and Pearson Springs, which are
on Rollers' property. The springs are a
source of water for Cornish Town's culinary system as well as for Rollers' house-
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hold. Cornish sought protection zones
which cover a 1,500-foot radius around the
springs in an attempt to reduce the high
nitrate level in the water. Cornish also
sought rights-of-way and access to the
springs over another seven acres of Rollers' land. State water quality officials had
advised Cornish that agricultural fertilization contributed to the high nitrate level.
In response, commencing on September 24,
1981, Cornish enacted a series of ordinances authorizing the creation of these
protection zones and prohibiting within
them the use of pesticides and fertilizers,
the keeping or grazing of animals, and
human habitation.
After commencing the action, Cornish
filed a motion for an order of immediate
occupancy. After a three-day hearing
where both parties presented evidence, the
trial court granted the motion, concluding
that there was competent evidence that it
was "necessary and essential" that Cornish
acquire the protection zones. The court
further found that Cornish had not acted in
bad faith and had not abused its discretion
in bringing its action. Rollers filed a motion for partial summary judgment to fix
the date of the taking of the property at
September 24, 1981, when the first ordinance, No. 81-1, took effect The motion
was denied.
At the outset of the trial, Cornish moved
to amend its complaint to seek only a perpetual easement over the one hundred
acres after Rollers disclosed that they were
going to claim that mineral deposits underlay the land. The amendment was granted.
Rollers proffered evidence that deposits of
zeolite underlay 94 acres of the property
sought to be condemned, but the court
would not admit that evidence or evidence
that the estimated value of the deposits
was $38 million, opining that their claim of
mineral deposits was speculative. The
court ruled that the issue of whether Rollers had a right to extract the minerals
should be determined if and when they
decided to mine the zeolite. Rollers also
presented evidence as to wildlife resources
on the land, specifically, a deer herd protected by them. However, they were not
allowed to present a mathematical calcula-
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tion of the potential monetary loss of future sales of hunting access permits.
Kollers attempted to present evidence
that the taking would not improve the quality of the spring water. The trial court
refused to hear the evidence, stating that
public use and necessity had already been
determined at the hearing on the motion
for an order of immediate occupancy. The
jury returned a special verdict in favor of
Kollers for $59,670; they appeal.
I
[1] Kollers contend that the trial court
erred in denying them the opportunity to
present evidence at trial on the question of
whether the taking by Cornish was necessary and that they were entitled to have
the jury determine that issue. Cornish responds that at the hearing on the motion
for an order of immediate occupancy, the
court properly determined, as a matter of
law, that public use and necessity had been
established by Cornish and that no showing
had been made of bad faith, fraud, or
abuse of discretion on its part
A
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 provides in
part
Before property can be taken it must
appear.
(1) That the use to which it is to be
applied is a use authorized by law;
(2) That the taking is necessary to
such u s e . . . .
Kollers' contention that they were entitled to a trial on the issue of necessity is
based upon Utah State Road Commission
v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 832 (Utah 1984).
In that case, this court primarily addressed
the issue of the effect of delay in the
prosecution of a condemnation action on
the valuation of the property. We also
determined that the hearing on the motion
for an order of immediate occupancy was
not a trial on the merits and thus res
judicata did not operate. Id. at 833.
An order of immediate occupancy is
entered pendente lite and only authorizes the State to take immediate posses-

sion until a final adjudication of the merits....
The State's right to condemn, if challenged, can finally be determined only
after a trial on the merits, not at a hearing on the motion for immediate occupancy. Since an order of immediate occupancy only requires prima facie proof of
the right to condemn, that order is not a
final adjudication on the merits. Res
judicata has no application in the absence
of a final adjudication.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
There are important differences between
the procedure followed by the trial court in
Friberg and that followed by the trial court
in the instant case. First, it appears that
in Friberg, the state, the condemnor,
presented only prima facie proof of the
right to condemn at the hearing on the
motion for an order of immediate occupancy. It does not appear that the condemnee
presented any evidence. However, at the
hearing in the instant case, both Kollers
and Cornish Town introduced testimony
and evidence in a three-day hearing, with
Kollers vigorously challenging the necessity for the proposed taking. Second, following the hearing in Friberg, the order of
immediate occupancy contained no findings
or conclusions on the state's authority to
condemn. The order stated that issues relating to the state's authority to condemn
were to be decided in a "further hearing"
and that the order was issued "pending
further hearing and trial on the issues that
may be presented in the action." Id. In
contrast, in the instant case the trial court
made and entered written findings as to
the state's authority to condemn:
6. Although some experts may differ
as to both the source of the nitrate contamination and the recommendations
with respect to action which should be
taken to alleviate the problem, that is not
for the court to decide and there is substantial support in the record for the
conclusions reached by Cornish town
based on valid recommendations in doing
the best they could to protect and improve the water supply. The Town has
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acted reasonably and in good faith in its
plan to improve the System as outlined to
the Court
7. In order to carry out its plan for
improving the water supply, it is necessary and essential that Cornish acquire
the protection zones in the watershed of
the Griffiths Spring and Pearson Spring.
We therefore conclude that under the
facts of this case, where the trial court
permitted both parties to fully present and
litigate the issue of the necessity of the
proposed taking at the hearing on the motion for an order of immediate occupancy
and entered written findings of fact sustaining the condemnor's right to condemn,
the trial court was not obligated to allow
the parties to again litigate that issue at
trial. While it is true as pointed out in
Friberg that an order of immediate occupancy is interlocutory and is subject to
change should the trial court become convinced of the nefed to do so, it would be a
waste of judicial resources to require a
trial court to allow the condemnee to represent his evidence and arguments at trial. Id.

(2) to determine the respective rights
of different parties seeking condemnation of the same property.
Only section 7&-84-10 specifically mentions the jury:
The court, jury or referee must hear
such legal evidence as may be offered by
any of the parties to the proceedings, and
thereupon must ascertain and assess:
(1) the value of the property sought to
be condemned and all improvements
thereon appertaining to the realty, and of
each and every separate estate or interest therein.
Some jurisdictions specifically provide for
jury trial of the issue of necessity. 1A J.
Sackman & P. Rohan, Nichols' The Law of
Eminent Domain § 4.11[4] (3d ed. 1990).
Generally, however, the only question an
owner is entitled to try to a jury is the
amount of his compensation or damages,
and he has no right to be heard by the jury
on the necessity of the taking, which is a
question of law for the court 27 Am.
Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 408, at 292
(1966); see also Coachella Valley Water
Dist v. Western Allied Properties, Inc.,
190 Cal.App.3d 969, 235 Cal.Rptr. 725
(1987) (pursuant to Cal. Const art I, § 19,
the property owner in an eminent domain
B
action is entitled to a jury trial on the
[2,3] Rollers contend that they are en- question of just compensation; all other
titled to a jury trial on the issue of necessi- issues of fact and law must be decided by
ty of the proposed taking. Utah's statutes the court).1
on eminent domain, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78It does not appear that the precise ques34-1 to -20 (1987), are silent regarding the
tion
which confronts us has been heretomanner of determining necessity, i.e.,
fore
presented
to this court for determinawhether it is done by the court or the jury.
tion.
However,
dicta in two cases give
Section 78-34-8 specifically mentions the
support
to
the
proposition
that a landowner
powers of "the court or the judge thereof."
is
not
entitled
to
a
jury
determination
on
Notably, the jury's power is not mentioned:
the question of the necessity for a proposed
The court or judge thereof shall have taking. In Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82
power:
Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 (1933), we stated,
(1) to hear and determine all adverse '"Whether the property is being taken for a
or conflicting claims to the property use authorized by law, that is a public use,
sought to be condemned, and to the dam- is by statute in this state, and by the general rule of law, a judicial question and may
ages therefor, and
1. Under federal Jaw, there is no constitutional
right to a trial by jury in condemnation cases.
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3051, rule 71A, at 120 n. 41 (Supp.1991). "Under rule 71A(h) as finally adopted, therefore,
trial of all issues is by the court, except for the

issue of just compensation." Wright & Miller,
§ 3051, at 122 n. 46; see also United States v.
105.40 Acres of band, 471 F.2d 207, 212 (7th
Cir.1972); United States v. 21.54 Acres of band,
491 F.2d 301, 304 (4th Cir.1973).
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be inquired into by the courts." 82 Utah at
165-66, 22 P.2d at 346 (citations omitted).
Later, in Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236
(Utah 1975), we stated, "The trial judge,
among other things, is given the power to
hear and decide if the conditions precedent
to taking are met" Id at 1238. In both
cases, we found support for those statements in a former subsection of section 7834-8 which provided that the "court or
judge thereof" shall have power to determine if the conditions precedent to taking
contained in section 78-34-4 have been
met, including whether the use to which
the property is to be applied is a use authorized by law. That subsection was deleted
from section 78-34-8 in 1981. See 1981
Utah Laws ch. 161, § 2. No reason for the
deletion is apparent, but we have no reason
to think that there was any legislative intent that the question of public use and
necessity should be determined by a jury.
We therefore conclude that based on what
appears to be the majority rule in this
country, on section 78-34-10, which limits
the jury's role in condemnation cases, and
dicta in former cases of this court, a landowner is not entitled to a jury determination of the public necessity of a proposed
taking.
II
[4] Rollers next contend that the date
of taking for purposes of assessing just
compensation should be the effective date
of Cornish's original ordinance, No. 81-1,
which was September 24, 1981. Cornish
counters that the date of the taking was
appropriately held to be the date of service
of summons, July 29, 1986, and that the
enactment of town ordinances, including
ordinances No. 81-1, No. 83-1, and No. 851, which it argues were never enforced, did
not rise to the status of a regulatory taking.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11 (1987) provides that the right to damages is deemed
to accrue at the date of the service of
summons:
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto
shall be deemed to have accrued at the

date of the service of summons, and its
actual value at that date shall be the
measure of compensation for all property
to be actually taken, and the basis of
damages to property not actually taken,
but injuriously affected, in all cases
where such damages are allowed
See City of South Ogden v. Fujiki, 621
P.2d 1254, 1255 (Utah 1980); State v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d 167 n. 1, 397 P.2d 463 n. 1
(1964) (service of summons is controlling
date for valuation purposes); State ex rel
Eng'g Comm'n v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265
P.2d 630 (1953); Oregon Short Line R.R.
v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732 (1905).
Rollers rely on Friberg, 687 P.2d at 833,
to support their contention. They argue
that the presumption—that the date to determine valuation shall be the date of service of process—is rebutted here "by a
showing that a valuation as of the date of
service of summons would result in an
award that would not provide 'just compensation' to a landowner." Id. However, the
trial court specifically found that the special circumstances and factors of Friberg
were not present here. It also determined
that the enactment of ordinance No. 81-1
did not prohibit the use of Rollers' proper*
ty, but rather attempted to control pollution of the town's water supply and was
therefore not a regulatory taking.
In Friberg, the property owners argued
that they were entitled to compensation
and damages based on the value of their
condemned property as of the date on
which the state's right to condemn was
finally determined—which was over seven
years after service of summons. There
was a substantial delay in the entry of a
final decree, and the property had appreciated in value in the interim. It was stated
in part III of the plurality opinion that the
delay in the condemnation proceedings,
which was caused by suits in the federal
court to enforce compliance with federal
law, should not work a penalty on the
owners by denying them the appreciated
value of their property. Friberg, 687 P.2d
at 835. In part II of the Friberg opinion,
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Durham,
stated:
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We are, of course, constrained to conAt trial, the court permitted Evan Roller
strue § 78-34-11 within the limitations to testify that crop production declined durof constitutional requirements. When ing the post-ordinance years but before the
valuation is fixed at a date prior to the service of summons. He also testified that
actual taking and the value of the prop- there had been times when the Pearson and
erty increases during a prolonged con- Griffiths zones yielded as much as 100
demnation proceeding so that the valua- bushels of wheat per acre, but this retion does not reflect a fair valuation of quired application of 200-plus pounds per
the property and does not therefore con- acre of nitrogen, which he was prohibited
stitute "just compensation," the statute from doing. Nevertheless, Roller admitted
fixing the time of valuation is unconstitu- that he continued to fertilize with nitrogen
in the Pearson and Griffiths protection artional as applied.
eas from 1981 to 1986, with the exception
Id. at 829. Justice Oaks, concurring spe- of 1982, when he applied none. In fact,
cially, disagreed with the necessity of a Rollers' appraiser testified that their farm
constitutional discussion in part II, but had one of the highest agricultural yields in
nevertheless concluded that the date of val- Utah during that five-year period.
uation was the later date.
Rollers rely on First English EvanIn the instant case, ordinance 81-1 was gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
effective immediately upon posting on Sep- Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96
tember 24, 1981. Subsequent ordinances, L.Ed.2d 250 (1987), to support their claim
all to protect Cornish's culinary water sup- that they are entitled to be compensated
ply, were enacted in succeeding years based on the September 1981 value of the
through 1988. Upon the passage of each property. First English involved a "temnew ordinance, the prior ordinance was re- porary regulatory taking" in which a subpealed. There is no evidence in the record sequently invalidated county ordinance dethat Cornish enforced any of these ordi- prived a property owner of all uses of his
nances against Rollers prior to 1985. Evan land.2 The court held that the landowner
Roller was contacted directly by letter dat- was entitled to compensation for the taking
ed June 11, 1985, and notified that he must in that interim period of years before invalcomply with all terms of ordinance 85-1. idation. 482 U.S. at 319, 107 S.Ct. at 2388,
However, not until July 29, 1986, was a 96 L.Ed.2d at 266-67. The Court stated:
summons and complaint in condemnation
We merely hold that where the governserved on Rollers and the motion for an
ment's activities have already worked a
order of immediate occupancy filed with
taking of all use of property, no subsethe court.
quent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensaRollers point to numerous restrictions
tion
for the period daring which the takput upon their use of the land under each
ing
was
effective.
of the ordinances. They argue that the
We also point out that the allegation of
value of the property in 1981 was signifithe complaint which we treat as true for
cantly greater than its value in 1986, bepurposes of our decision was that the
cause Cornish first devalued the property
ordinance in question denied appellant all
by regulatory restrictions and then five
use of its property.
years later commenced this condemnation
482
U.S. at 321, 107 S.Ct at 2389, 96
action. This contention is without merit
L.Ed.2d
at 268.
Despite Rollers' argument, ordinance 81-1
and the succeeding ordinances had little, if
[5] That case can easily be distinany, effect on Rollers until the service of guished. Although Rollers point to ordisummons.
nance 81-1, which authorized the town to
2. The appellant was unable to rebuild Lutherglen, a retreat center and recreational area for

handicapped children.
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restrict their use of their property, they extraction of minerals to that date. Howcontinued their farming practices—albeit in ever, the judge commented that Rollers
apparent violation of that OI^WTC. r*ven retained the right to extract any minerals
a "temporary" regulatory taking would re- and, should that right ever be denied them
quire a denial of "all uses1' of their proper- because of the perpetual easement taken
ty. First English, 482 U.S. at 318, 107 by Cornish, they would have tfie right to
S.Ct at 2387, 96 LEd2d at 265-66. We return to court to seek further damages.
agree with the trial court that such a denial
[8-10] As a general rule in this country,
did not occur here.
the existence of mineral deposits in or on
Rollers also rely on Nollan v. California land is an element to be considered in deCoastal Commission, 483 U.S. 826, 107 termining the market value of such land. 4
S.Ct 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), to argue J. Sackman & P. Rohan, Nichols' The Law
that ordinance 81-1 amounted to a taking of Eminent Domain § 13.22, at 13-119 (3d
in denial of all beneficial and economically ed. 1990); see also State v. Noble, 6 Utah
viable use of 86 percent of their total prop- 2d 40, 44, 305 P.2d 495, 499 (1957) (it is
erty and decreased the value of their prop- proper to admit evidence that the land conerty by 85-90 percent Nollan is unsup- tains valuable mineral deposits). Utah
portive of that argument because the ma- Code Ann. § 78-34-2 provides special projority opinion did not address whether the tection to a landowner whose land containordinance denied the owners any economi- ing valuable minerals is condemned:
cally viable uses of their land. 483 U.S. at
The following is & classification of the
841-42, 107 S.Ct at 3151, 97 L.Ed2d at
estates and rights in lands subject to
691-93.
being taken for public use:
(1) a fee simple, when taken for public
[6] In other case law on the subject, for
buildings or grounds or for permanent
there to be a taking under a zoning ordibuildings, for reservoirs and dams and
nance, the landowner must show that he
permanent flooding occasioned thereby,
has been deprived of all reasonable uses of
his land. See C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for
P.2d 834, 838 (10th Cir.1974). For example,
the deposit of debris or tailings of a
almost all zoning decisions have some ecomine, mill, smelter or other place for the
nomic impact on property values. Howreduction of ores, or for solar evapoever, mere diminution in property value is
ration ponds and other facilities for the
insufficient to meet the burden of demonrecovery of minerals in solution; providstrating a taking by regulation. See Penn
ed that where surface ground is underCentral Transp. Co. v. New York City,
laid with minerals, coal or other depos438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct 2646, 57 LEd.2d 631
its sufficiently valuable to justify ex(1978); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty traction, only a perpetual easement
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 may be taken over the surface ground
(1926); Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239
over such deposits.
U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct 143, 60 L.EA 348 (1915). (Italics added.) Thus, only a perpetual
easement may be taken over the surface
Ill
when it is underlaid with minerals "suffi[7] Rollers next contend that the value ciently valuable to justify extraction/9 In
of zeolite deposits allegedly underlying 94 those instances, the landowner retains the
acres should have been considered by the rights to the underlaid minerals which the
jury in determining just compensation. condemning agency has not sought or canTheir counsel proffered evidence of the de- not afford to buy, and the landowner is
posits and that they had an estimated value entitled to later recover those minerals.
of $38 million. The trial court denied Rol- However, where the landowner will be unlers the right to present this evidence to able to later remove the mineral deposits
the jury, opining that the evidence was because the operation of the condemnor
speculative inasmuch as there had been no impedes their removal, the value of the

CORNISH TOWN v. ROLLER
Chew817 P2d 309 (Utah 1991)

minerals left in place should be considered
in determining the compensation to which
the owner is entitled. 4 J. Sackman & P.
Rohan, Nichols* The Law of Eminent Domain § 13.22[1], at 13-144 (3d ed. 1990).
In Lomax v. Henderson, 559 S.W.2d 466,
467 (Tex.Ct.App.1977), evidence was admitted on the diminution of the mineral owner's estate due to the taking of an easement which restricted the recovery of oil
and gas on the condemned land. The court
stated Texas law to be that "the ownership
of minerals in place carries with it, as a
necessary appurtenance thereto, the right
to reasonably use so much of the surface
as may be necessary to enforce and enjoy
the mineral estate." Id. The proper measure of loss of use of the surface of the
land in question is the diminution in value
of the landowner's mineral estate by the
taking.
The trial court denied the admission of
evidence of minerals because of the speculative nature of Rollers' counsel's offer of
proof. Portions of the trial transcript show
the discussion between counsel and the
court on this issue:
Mr. Preston [Rollers' counsel]: If the
court feels this is speculative, let me
redefine our offer of proof. We're going
to prove that we've drilled test holes in
this property under the protection zone
and the test holes go down through the
topsoil, go into bentonite soil which holds
water, as the court Veil knows and then
it goes into the zeolite in the bottom.
Everything is wet all the way down to
the bentonite because it holds the water.
When you hit the zeolite, all of a sudden
it's dry powdery just like the rock we've
shown here. We drilled five holes in the
subject property in the Pearson Spring
area. In every case the hard rock surface underneath was hit indicating that
there is in fact throughout this area the
zeolite that has been mentioned.
We h^ve taken samples and we have
had the samples tested and the samples
show that they are of commercial quality
where they have been selected in the
protection zone.
UtahRcp 818-410
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Mr. Fisher [Rollers' «HH>unsel]: When
the mine can't be built because the surface will be destroyed by the taking, then
you must compensate for the mineral.
The Court But how do you know you
must compensate him for mineral until
you know whether it's going to do something to their rights?
Mr. Fisher: Because he has told me I
cannot enter the property except the
three locations that are shown on that
map. He told me that himself, the mayor on the stand yesterday. I cannot enter the property except at those three
locations.
The Court I think it's a question to be
decided if and whenever this should come
up. I don't see any of us will in our
lifetime ever see any bulldozer or anything out there.
Mr. Fisher: I beg to differ, your Honor.
I've already had two.
The Court: That's my opinion.
Mr. Fisher We've already had two mineral companies approach us to mine that
product after they have known of the
quality of the product that's there, two
of them.
The Court Okay. I'll believe it when I
see it
The trial court noted but distinguished William Russell Coal Co. v. Board of County
Commissioners, 129 Colo. 330, 270 P.2d
772, 775 (1954), where condemnation of an
easement across realty underlaid with coal
was sought Removal of the coal would
allegedly impair support of the surface.
The court held that the amount of damages
sustained by the owner because coal was
left in place was a question for a jury or a
commission to determine, and the trial
court had erred in refusing to admit such
evidence. The trial court in the instant
case distinguished William Russell Coal
Co. because the extraction there was ongoing, whereas no extraction had yet occurred on Rollers' property. Such a distinction is unhelpful in light of Montana
Railway Co. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348, 35253, 11 S.Ct. 96, 98, 34 L.Ed. 681, 683 (1890),
in which the Court held that evidence of "in
place" minerals is admissible to determine
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land value. The Court commented as follows with regard to a claim that the existence of minerals was "speculative":
Until there has been full exploiting of the
vein its value is not certain, and there is
an element of speculation, it must be
conceded, in any estimate thereof. And
yet, uncertain and speculative as it is,
such "prospect11 has a market value; and
the absence of certainty is not a matter
of which the Railroad Company can take
advantage, when it seeks to enforce a
sale. Contiguous to a valuable mine,
with indications that the vein within such
mine extends into this claim, the Railroad
Company may not plead the uncertainty
in respect to such extension as a ground
for refusing to pay the full value which it
has acquired in the market by reason of
its surroundings and possibilities.
137 U.S. at 352-53, 11 S.Ct at 98, 34 L.Ed.
at 683.
This authority was recently noted with
approval in Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605, 628 n. 3, 109 S.Ct 2037, 2051 n. 3, 104
L.Ed.2d 696, 722 n. 3 (1989). The Tenth
Circuit has also held that expert testimony
regarding in-place minerals, limestone preserves, although speculative, was clearly
admissible. United States v. 179.26 Acres
of Land in Douglas County, Kansas, 644
F.2d 367, 372-73 (10th Cir.1981).
It follows from what we have written
that the trial court erred in refusing to
admit evidence of the existence of the zeolite deposits and their enhancement of the
value of the land sought to be condemned
without first determining whether the deposits could be removed later by Rollers
without being impeded by the existence of
the easement taken. The trial court should
have determined that question at the time
of trial rather than requiring Rollers to
litigate it later, if and when they attempt to
remove any of the deposits. The record
before us does not contain any evidence as
to the methods employed in mining zeolite
or whether the mining would interfere with
the utility of the protection zones. The
case therefore must be remanded to the
trial court for a new trial on the issue of
damages if the trial judge preliminarily de-

termines that the existence of the easement
taken by Cornish will either totally prevent
or enhance the cost of removing the zeolite.
The jury will then consider, in fixing Rollers1 damages, the existence of the mineral
deposits. If the trial court finds that the
zeolite may be mined and removed without
being prevented or impeded by the easement, a new trial on the issue of damages
will be unnecessary.
However, preliminary to the determination of the question discussed above and a
new trial, if necessary, the trial court
should determine whether the existing water rights held by Cornish prohibit the extraction of minerals claimed by Rollers in
the area of the protection zones. Both
parties recognize the existence of the legal
question of whether Rollers can, in any
event, extract minerals from their land if in
doing so it would destroy or diminish the
water rights to the springs owned by Cornish. This question will need to be resolved before Rollers can establish an entitlement to extract the zeolite.
IV
[11] When the trial commenced, Cornish moved to amend its complaint to seek
only a perpetual easement over the one
hundred acres instead of a fee simple estate therein. Cornish asserts that it was
prompted to do so because it only then
learned that Rollers intended to claim that
their land was underlaid with valuable mineral deposits. In view of that claim, Cornish decided that it was obligated under
section 78-34-2(1), set out above, to seek
only a perpetual easement. The motion to
amend was granted by the trial court, and
in the final order of condemnation, Cornish
acquired only a perpetual easement. Rollers contended in the trial court that by
amending its complaint, Cornish had abandoned the condemnation and that under
section 78-34-16, they were entitled to an
award of attorney fees, expenses, and
costs. The trial court denied that relief.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-16 provides for
a condemnee's recovery of all damages sustained and reasonable and necessary expenses incurred when the condemnor aban-
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dons the proceedings and causes the action
to be dismissed without prejudice:
Condemnor, whether a public or private
body, may, at any time prior to final
payment of compensation and damages
awarded the defendant by the court or
jury, abandon the proceedings and
cause the action to be dismissed without prejudice, provided, however, that
as a condition of dismissal condemnor
first compensate condemnee for all damages he has sustained and also reimburse
him in full for all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by condemnee because of the filing of the action by condemnor, including attorneys
fees. •
(Italics added.) We applied this statute in
Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d
1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972), where the condemning agency withdrew and dismissed its condemnation action before trial because the
land as appraised was too expensive to
acquire. The plaintiff advised the court
that the defendant's property was no longer needed for public use. Consequently,
the case was stricken from the trial calender, and the court made and entered an
order dismissing the action without prejudice. The defendants were awarded expenses and attorney fees. This court held
that the statute was controlling, and upon
abandonment and dismissal of the action to
avoid a trial, the condemnee was entitled to
recover expenses and attorney fees. 28
Utah 2d at 3, 497 P.2d at 630.
In contrast, Cornish proceeded with its
acquisition and did not move for dismissal
of the condemnation proceedings. We interpret the statute as providing for payment of costs and fees only when the condemnation is totally abandoned and dismissed prior to a conclusion. Although the
gtatute is quite liberal in covering every
conceivable expense, damage, and cost in
order to protect owners of private property
from an unfair burden when the condemnor elects to abandbn the action,3 an actual
abandonment and dismissal must first occur. Although the case authority from other jurisdictions cited by the Rollers allows

recovery of attorney fees and expenses for
partial abandonment or for abandonment in
the absence of a dismissal, those cases are
inapplicable here because the statutory
framework in Utah is different from those
jurisdictions cited.

[12] Rollers contend that they should
have been permitted to introduce evidence
of the value of hunting access permits in
the determination of the value of the highest and best use of their property. Cornish
responds that Rollers were permitted to
present extensive evidence regarding the
wildlife potential of the property, including
evidence that the deer herd on the property
added to its total value and was a factor to
be considered in determining fair market
value.
[13] We find no abuse of discretion.
The trial court excluded only evidence
which compared the business potential for
hunting permits on Rollers' property with
Deseret Land and Livestock's use of hunting permits on its property.4 That exclusion was proper. See State ex reL Road
Comm'n v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 299,
495 P.2d 817, 820 (1972) (court properly
excluded evidence of sales of allegedly
comparable property located on other interchanges of interstate highways because of
dissimilarities in the properties). Cornish's
counsel also objected to the presentation of
Rollers' evidence as a disguised lost profits
claim. See State v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40,
44, 305 P.2d 495, 498 (1957) (courts have
rejected with great unanimity the proposition that just compensation is the equivalent of the total profits which would be
realized from the future operations of the
property; proper measure is the market
value of property and not output thereof);
State v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 449,
491 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1971) (business profits
are not subject of independent compensation aside and apart from market value of
land on which business has been conduct
ed). Rollers are not entitled to a valuation

3, Note, The Condemnors Liability for Damages 4. Deseret Land & Livestock is located in Rich,
Arising Through /nstitu&tg. Litigating or AbanMorgan, Weber, and Summit Counties in Utah
doning Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1967 Utah and in western Wyoming, covering 200,000
LRev. 548, 560.
acres.
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of the use of th* property for hunting
access permits independently, as a separate
calculation, of the land of which it is a part.
The land was properly valued giving the
wildlife resource due consideration as a
component part of the land.
VI
[14] Finally, Rollers contend that they
should have been awarded costs of $2,252
for preparation and presentation of photographic maps, graphic exhibits, and transcripts of pretrial hearings that were used
at trial. The court awarded Rollers only
$74 in taxable costs for the jury fee and a
witness fee. We find no error. In Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah
1980), we held that expenses for a model,
photographs, and certified copies of documents which were necessary for litigation
were not properly taxable as costs. Costs
were defined by the court as "those fees
which are required to be paid to the court
and to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be included in the judgment" Id.; Utah R.Civ.P. 54(dXD; Utah
Code Ann. § 21-5-8. Rollers argue that in
Frampton we approved the costs of depositions in the taxing of costs and that the
costs of transcripts of pretrial hearings
should be similarly treated. In that case,
however, this court warned that the taxing
of costs of depositions is subject to limitations, i.e., depositions must be taken in
good faith and essential for the development and presentation of the case.
Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. Further, the
fact that we approved the taxing of deposition costs "was not intended and should not
be taken as opening the door to other expenses." Id. The trial court may exercise
reasonable discretion in awarding taxable
costs, and we conclude that no abuse of
discretion has been shown here.
This case is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, DURHAM
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent
No. 900228.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 1, 1991.

State Tax Commission issued findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and final decision holding that gas used to fuel pipeline
company's compressors within state of
Utah was subject to state's use tax. Company filed petition for review. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that Commission did not violate commerce clause by
applying use tax to compressor-fuel gas
diverted from flowing gas in company's
pipeline and consumed in fuel in company's
compressors.
Affirmed.

1. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=>316, 796
Constitutional Law <3=>44
Constitutional questions are questions
of law, and agency determinations of general law, including interpretations of State
and Federal Constitutions, are to be reviewed under correction of error standard,
giving no deference to agency's decision.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l to 63-46b-22.
2. Taxation <s=»1294
Utah pipeline company, through its activities in conducting operations of a pipeline and compressors, had substantial aexus with Utah, and thus gas used to fuel
those compressors was subject to Utah's
use tax; company had its corporate offices
in state, owned and operated extensive network of pipelines throughout state and conducted transportation, sales, and storage
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Decision: South Carolina, com t held to have ap^iic.: ' . \ : J U standard
determining whether state beachfront management statute. h\ barring
construction, effected "'taking" of property under Filth Amendiin
•••'
SUMMARY

Under 1,977 legislation, the state of South Carolina required owners of
certain "critical area" coastal-zone land to obtain a permit 'from,, a coastal
council before changing the use of the land. In 1,986, a developer purchased
two lots on a barrier island—which lots did not then qualify as a "critical
area" and were zoned for single-family residential construction—and made
plans to erect such residences on the lots. In 1.988,,. however, the state
enacted a Beachfront Management Act (BMA) which established a new
baseline on the island and prohibited any construction of occupable improvements seaward of a iine parallel to and 20 feet landward of the
baseline, thereby barring the developer's plans. The developer, filing suit
against the council in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, did not
challenge the validity of the BMA as an exercise of the state's police power,
but contended that the BMA's complete extinguishment of the value of his
property effected a "taking"' of the property for which he was entitled to
just compensation. The Court of Common Pleas found that the BM'A decreed
a permanent ban on construction on the developer's lots, where there had
been no restrictions on such use before, and had thereby deprived the
developer of any reasonable economic use of the lots, rendering the lots
valueless; accordingly, the court ordered the council to pay just compensation of more than $1.2 million,,, While the case was pending before the
Supreme Court of South Carolina, the BMA was amended to authorize the
council, in certain circumstances, to issue special permits for construction of
habitable structures seaward, of the baseline.. The Supreme Court of Soi ith
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Carolina, revers.ng the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, held that
< 1) in the absence of an atcack on the validity of the BMA as such, the court
was bound to accept the state legislature's uncontested findings that new
construction in the coastal zone threatened a public resource; and (2) when
a regulation respecting the use of property is designed to prevent serious
public harm, no compensation is owed regardless of the regulation's effect
on the property 5 value '304 SC 376, 404 SE2d 6\)5).
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
In an opinion by SCALIA, J., joined by REHN^UIST, Ch -i , and WHITE,
O'CONNOR, and THOMAS, JJ., it was held that (1) the decision below was ripe
lor review, even though the BMA had been amended to allow the issuance
of special permits and even though Supreme Court precedents reflect an
insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted development
before adjudicating the constitutionality of regulations purpoiting to limit
such development, because although the above considerations would preclude review had the court below rested its judgment on ripeness grounds,
that court had instead disposed of the developer's claim on the merits; (2)
where a state seeks to sustain a regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, the state1 may resist an asserted right to
compensation under the takings clause, on the theory that there has been
no 'taking," only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the
owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of the
owner's title to begin with, so that the severe limitation on property use is
not newly legislated or decreed, but inheres in the title itself through the
restrictions that background principles of the state's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership; \'3) the court below therefore
erred in rejecting the developer's claim on the merits on the basis of the
state legislatures recitation of a noxious-use justification for the BMA; and
>4) the case would be remanded for a determination of the state-law question
whether common-iaw principles would have prevented the erection of any
habitable or productive improvements on the developer's land.
KENNEDY, J , concurred in the judgment, expressing the view that (1) the
issues presented in the case were ready for the Supreme Court's decision; (2)
although the trial courts finding that the developer's property had been
rendered valueless was questionable, the Supreme Court—unlike the court
oeltiw on remand—had to accept the finding as entered; (3) nuisance prevention accorded with the most common expectations of owners who faced
regulation, but was not the sole source of state authority to impose severe
restrictions; and t4> the court below erred by reciting the general purposes
for which the BMA was enacted without a detetmination that those purposes were in accord with the owner's ieusonabi»' expectations, and therefore sufficient to support a severe restriction on specific parcels of propertv.
BLACKMUN, J , dissented, expressing the view ' h a t (1) the case was not
ripe for review; 2^ even if there were no jurisdictional barrier, it was
unwise to decide issues based on the erroneous factual premise that regulation had rendered the subject property entirely valueless; (3) the court's
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decision improperly placed on state legislatures the burden of showing that
their legislative judgments are correct; and (4) previous takings clause
jurisprudence rested on the principle that a state has full power to prohibit
an owner's use of property without compensation if such use is harmful to
the public, with the determination of harmfulness resting on legislative
judgment rather than on common-law nuisance principles.
STEVENS, J., dissented, expressing the view that (1) the developer was not
entitled to an adjudication of the merits of his permanent takings claim
under the amended BMA until he exhausted his right to apply for a special
permit: (2) it was not clear whether the developer had a viable "temporary
taking" claim under the preamendment BMA; (3) the doctrine of judicial
restraint, under which the Supreme Court will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding, properly applied
to the case at hand; (4) a categorical rule that total regulatory takings must
be compensated was unsupported by prior decisions, arbitrary and unsound
in practice, and theoretically unjustified; and (5) the court's nuisance exception unwisely froze state common law and denied legislatures their traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property.
SOUTER, J., would have dismissed the writ of certiorari in the case as
improvidently granted, because the case came to the Supreme Court on an
unreviewable assumption—that the BMA deprived the developer of his
entire economic interest in* the property at issue—that was both questionable as a conclusion of Fifth Amendment law and sufficient to frustrate the
Supreme Court's ability to render certain the legal premises on which the
court's holding rested.
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right to compensation under the takings clause of the Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment, on the theory that there has been no "taking,"
only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's
estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of the owner's title to begin with, so that the
severe limitation on property use is
not newly legislated or decreed, but
Inheres in the title itself through the
restrictions that background principles of the state's law of property
and nuisance already place upon
land ownership—based on an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents, rather than artful,
harm-preventing characterizations—
and is merely duplicated by the regulation at issue; prior United States
Supreme Court takings decisions
which suggested that harmful or
noxious uses of property may be
proscribed by government regulation
without the requirement of compensation were merely an early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain, without
compensation, any regulatory diminution in property value, and "noxious use" logic cannot serve as a
touchstone to distinguish regulatory
"takings," which require compensation, from regulatory deprivations
which do not require compensation;
thus, a atate appellate court—in considering a developer's claim that a
state beachfront management statute, which prohibited any construction of occupable improvements on
certain coastal lands, had deprived
him of any economically viable use
of beachfront lots which he had acquired with the intention of building
single-family residences thereon, and
thereby effected a "taking" of the
land for which he was entitled to
just compensation—errs in rejecting
802
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the developer's claim on the merits,
on the theory that no compensation
is owing under the takings clause
regardless of a regulation's effect on
property values when the regulation
is designed to prevent serious public
harm, for the state legislatures recitation of a noxious-use justification,
in uncontested statutory findings
that new coastal-zone construction
threatened a public resource, cannot
be the basis for departing from the
categorical rule that total regulatory
takings must always be compensated. (Blackmun and Stevens, J J.,
dissented from this holding.)
Appeal §§386, 413; Eminent Domain § 98 — state court decision — review by Supreme
Court — ripeness of federal
question — land-use regulation as taking — pleadings
2a-2c. A state appellate court decision—which held that, since a state
beachfront management statute was
designed to protect a public resource, a developer whose beachfront
property was allegedly rendered valueless by the statute's barring construction of habitable structures
thereon was not entitled to just compensation for an alleged "taking" of
the property—is ripe for plenary review by the United States Supreme
Court on certiorari, even though the
statute was amended after briefing
and argument before the state appellate court to allow the issuance of
special permits for construction of
habitable structures on such property under certain circumstances,
and even though Supreme Court precedents reflect an insistence on
knowing the nature and extent of
permitted development before adjudicating the constitutionality of regulations purporting to limit such development, because (1) although the
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above considerations would preclude
review had the state appellate court
rested its judgment on ripeness
grounds, the court instead disposed
of the developer's takings claim on
the merits; <2) this unusual disposition did not preclude the developer
from applying for a permit under
the amended statute and challenging
any denial under the takings clause
af the Federal Constitution^ Fifth
Amendment, but would practically
and legally preclude any takings
:laim with respect to the loss of
i n s t r u c t i o n rights in the period between the statute's enactment and
amendment; (3> the developer had no
reason to proceed on such a "temporary taking'' claim at trial, or to
seek remand for that purpose prior
:o submission of the case to the state
ippellate court, because prior to the
amendment the taking was uncondi.ional and permanent; (4) given the
)readth of the state appellate court's
\olding and judgment, the developer
vould be unable, absent the Su)reme Court's intervention, to obam further adjudication with respect to the period between enactnent and amendment; and (5) in
hese circumstances, it would not
iccord with sound process to insist
hat the developer pursue the speial permit procedure before his takfigs claim could be considered ripe,
:iven that he had properly alleged
rijury-in-fact under the Constitue n t Article III with respect to both
he preamendment and postamendaent constraints on the use of his
troperty, and given that the state
ppellate court's dismissive foreclos e of further pleading and adjudiation with respect to the preamendaent component of the takings
laim makes it appropriate to adress that component as if the case
rere before the Supreme Court on

the pleadings alone, in which posture nothing more than a proper
allegation of injury-in-fact can reasonably be demanded. 'Blackmun
'and Stevens, JJ., dissented from this
holding; Souter, J., dissented in part
from this holding.)
A p p e a l § 1892.5 — r e m a n d — emin e n t d o m a i n — c h a n g e in law
3a, lib. The United States Supreme
Court—m reviewing on certiorari a
state appellate court decision which
held that, since a state beachfront
management statute was designed to
protect a public resource, a developer whose beachfront property was
allegedly rendered valueless by the
statute's barring construction of habitable structures thereon was not
entitled to just compensation for an
alleged "taking'* of the property—is
not required by "prudence'* or any
other principle of judicial restraint
to vacate the judgment below and
remand for reconsideration in the
light of an amendment to the statute, which amendment allowed the
issuance of special permits for construction ot habitable structures on
such property under certain circumstances, where the state appellate
court rendered its categorical disposition of the case after the statute
had been amended and after the
state appellate court had been invited to consider the effect of the
amendment on the case. (Blackmun,
J., dissented from this holding.)
Eminent Domain §98 — taking —
land-use regulation
4a-4c. The takings clause of the
Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies
an owner economically viable use of
his or her land.
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Eminent Domain § 47 — interests
in land
5a, 5b. There are a number of
noneconomic interests in land whose
impairment will invite exceedingly
close scrutiny under the takings
clause of the Federal Constitution's
Fifth Amendment.
Appeal §§ 1087.5(2), 1088 — issue
not raised in briefs — premise
of certiorari petition
6a, 6b. The United States Supreme
Court—in reviewing on certiorari a
state appellate court decision which
held that a developer was not entitled to just compensation for an alleged "taking" of his beachfront
property by means of a state beachfront management statute, which
had been found by the trial court to
have rendered the property valueless by barring construction of habitable structures thereon—will not
consider the argument in the respondent coastal commission's brief on
the merits that the trial court's finding was erroneous, where the finding
was the premise of the developer's
petition for certiorari and was not
challenged in the commission's brief
in opposition to certiorari.
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Eminent Domain §§ 78, 103 — taking — lakebed — nuclear
plant
9. The owner of a lakebed is not
entitled to compensation, under the
takings clause of the Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment, when the
owner is denied the requisite permit
to engage in a landfilling operation
that would have the effect of flooding
others' lands, nor is the corporate
owner of a nuclear power plant entitled to compensation when the
owner is directed to remove all improvements from the land upon the
discovery that the plant sits astride
an earthquake fault, because such
regulatory action, while it may have
the effect of eliminating the land's
only economically productive use,
does not proscribe a productive use
that was previously permissible under relevant property and nuisance
principles.

Eminent Domain § 105 — remedy
for temporary taking
10a, 10b. Under the takings clause
of the Federal Constitution's Fifth
Amendment, where a regulation has
already worked a taking of all use of
property, no subsequent action by
Eminent Domain § 98 — taking — the government, such as rescinding
the regulation, can relieve the govproperty-use regulation
7a. 7b. The takings clause of the ernment of the duty to provide comFederal Constitution's Fifth Amend- pensation for the period during
ment applies to regulation of prop- which the taking was effective.
erty, as well as to physical deprivaEminent Domain § 98; Nuisances
tion of property.
§ 1 — taking — noxious uses
11.
A "total taking" inquiry under
Eminent Domain § 103 — taking
the
takings
clause of the Federal
— easement
Constitution's
Fifth Amendment—
8. The government may assert a
which
inquiry
implements
the rule
permanent easement that was a prethat,
where
a
state
regulation
deexisting limitation on the landowner's title, without being required to prives land of all economically beneprovide compensation under the tak- ficial use, the state may resist an
ings clause of the Federal Constitu- asserted right to compensation, on
the theory that there is no "taking,"
tion's Fifth Amendment.
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onlv if the proscribed use interests
were noi part of the owner's title t^
begin with due to restrictions im
posed by background principles of
the state's law of property and nuisance—will ordinarily entail, as the
application of state nuisance law ordinarily entails, analysis of, among
other things, (It the degree of harm
to public lands and resources, or
adjacent private property, posed bv
the claimant's proposed activities on
the property in question, (2) the social value of the claimant's activities
and their suitability to the locality
m question, and (3) the relative ease
with which the alleged harm can be
avoided through measures taken by
the claimant and the government, or
adjacent private homeowners, alike,
for these purposes, the fact that a
particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any
common law
prohibition—although
c h a n g e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s or new
knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so—
and so also does the fact that other
landowners similarly situated, are
permitted to continue the use denied
to the claimant (Blackmun and Stevens, J J , dissented in part from this
holding )

Appeal § 1750 — remand — question to be decided
12. The United States Supreme
Court—having reversed on certiorari
a state appellate court decision
which held that, since a state beachfront management statute was designed to protect a public resource, a
developer whose beachfront property
was allegedly rendered valueless by
the statute's barring construction' of
habitable structures thereon was not
entitled to just compensation for an
alleged " t a k i n g ' of the p r o p e r t y will remand the case to the state
appellate court to determine the
state-law question whether commonlaw principles would have prevented
the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on the developer's land, where the Supreme
Court rules that when a state regulation deprives land ot all economic a l beneiicial use, the state may
resist an asserted right to compensation, on the theory that there is no
"taking," only if the proscribed use
interests were not part of the owner's title to begin with due to restrictions impoted by background principles of the state's law of property
and nuisance

SYLLABUS BY REPORTER OF DECISIONS

In 1986, petitioner Lucas bought
two residential lots on a South Caro
lina barrier island, intending to
build single-family homes such as
those on the immediately adjacent
parcels At that time, Lucas's lots
were not subject to the State's
coastal zone building permit requirements In 1988, however the state
legislature enacted the Beachfront
Management Act, which barred Lucas from erecting anv permanent
habitable structures on hi4* parcels

He filed suit against respondent
state agency, contending that, even
though the Act may have been a
lawful exercise of the State's police
power, the ban on construction deprived him of all "cconomicallv viable use" of his property and therefore etfected a "taking ' under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
that requ ed the payment of just
compt nsation See, e g , Agins v Tiburon 447 US 255, 261 65 L Ed 2d
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106, 100 S Ct 2138. The state
trial court agreed, finding that the
ban rendered Lucas's parcels "valueless, " and entered an award exceeding $1 2 million In reversing, the
State Supreme Court held itself
bound, in light of Lucas's failure to
attack the Act's validity, to accept
the legislature's "uncontested
findings' that new construction in
the coastal zone threatened a valuable public resource The court ruled
that, under the Mugler v Kansas,
123 US 623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273,
line of cabes, when a regulation is
designed to prevent "harmful or
noxious uses" of property akin to
public nuisances, no compensation is
owing under the Takings Clause regardless of the regulation s effect on
the property's value.
Held.
1 Lucas's takings claim is not
rendered unripe by the fact that he
may yet be able to secure a special
permit to build on his property under an amendment to the Act passed
after briefing and argument before
the State Supreme Court, but prior
to issuance of that court's opinion
Because it declined to rest its judgment on ripeness grounds, preferring to dispose of the case on the
merits, the latter court's decision
precludes, both practicallv and legally, any takings claim with respect
to Lucas's preamendment deprivation Lucas has properly alleged mjury-in-fact with respect to this
preamendment deprivation, and it
would not accord with sound process
in these circumstances to insist that
he pursue the late-created procedure
before that component of his takings
claim can be considered ripe
2 The State Supreme Court erred
in applying the "harmful or noxious
u^es" principle to decide this case
(a) Regulations that deny the prop-
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erty owner all "economically viable
use of his land" constitute one of the
discrete categories of regulatory deprivations that require compensation
without the usual case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support ot the restraint
Although the Court has never set
forth the justification for this categorical rule, the practical—and economic— equivalence of physically
appropriating ind eliminating all
beneficial use of land counsels its
preservation
(
b) A review of the relevant decisions demonstrates that the "harmful or noxious use" principle was
merely this Court's early formulation of the police power justification
necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in value; that the distinction
between regulation that "prevents
harmful use" and that which "confers benefits" is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective,
value-free basis; and that, therefore,
noxious-use logic cannot be the basis
tor departing from this Court's categorical rule that total regulatory
takings must be compensated
(c) Rather, the question must turn,
in accord with this Court's "takings"
jurisprudence, on citizens' historic
understandings regarding the content of, and the State's power over,
the "bundle of rights" that they acquire when they take title to property Because it is not consistent
with the historical compact embodied in the Takings Clause that title
to real estate is held subject to the
State s subsequent decision to eliminate all economically beneficial use,
a regulation having that effect cannot be newly decreed, and sustained,
without compensation's being paid
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the owner. However, no compensation is owed—in this setting as with
all takings claims—if the State's affirmative decree simply makes explicit what already inheres in the
title itself, in the restrictions rhat
background principles of the State's
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. Cf.
Scranton v Wheeler, 179 US 141,
163, 45 L Ed 128, 21 S Ct 48.
(d) Although it seems unlikely
that common-law principles would
have prevented the erection of any
habitable or productive improvements on Lucas's land, this state-law
question must be dealt with on remand. To win its case, respondent
cannot simply proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lu-

cas desires are inconsistent with the
public interest, or the conclusory
assertion that they violate a common-law maxim such as sic utere
tuo ut aiienum non laedas, but must
identify background principles of
nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses Luca.^ now intends in
the property's present circumstances.
304 SC 376, 404 SE2d 895, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of
the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J.,
and White, O'Connor, and Thomas,
JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., tiled an
opinion concurring in the judgment.
Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., tiled
dissenting opinions. Souter, J., filed
a separate statement.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

A. Camden Lewis argued the cause for petitioner.
C. C. Harness, III argued the cause for respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
[1a] In 1986, petitioner David H.
Lucas paid $975,000 for two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in
Charleston County. South Carolina,
on which he intended to build singlefamily homes. In 1988, however, the
South Carolina Legislature enacted
the Beachfront Management Act, SC
Code § 48-39-250 et seq. (Supp 1990)
(Act), which had the direct effect of
barring petitioner from erecting any
permanent habitable structures on
his two parcels. See § 48-39-290(A). A
state trial court found that this prohibition rendered Lucas's parcels
"valueless." App to Pet for Cert 37.
This case requires us to decide
whether the Act's dramatic effect on
the economic value of Lucas's lots
accomplished a taking of private

property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments requiring the
payment of "just compensation." US
Const, Amdt 5.
I
A
South Carolina's expressed interest in intensively managing development activities in the so-called
''coastal zone" dates from 1977
when, in the aftermath of Congress's
passage of the federal Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, 86 Stat
1280, as amended, 16 USC § 1451 et
seq. [16 USCS §§ 1451 et seq.], the
legislature enacted a Coastal Zone
Management Act of its own. See SC
Code §48-39-10 et seq. (1987). In its
original form, the South Carolina
Act required owners of coastal zone
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land that qualified as a * 'critical
area" (defined in the legislation to
include beaches and immediately adjacent sand dunes, § 48-39-1CXJ)) to
obtain a permit from the newly created South Carolina Coastal Council
respondent here; prior to committing the land to a "use other than
the use the critical area was devoted
to on [September 28, 1977]." § 48-39130(A).
In the late 1970's, Lucas and others began extensive residential development of the Isle of Palms, a
barrier island situated eastward of
the City of Charleston. Toward the
:lose of the development cycle for
}ne residential subdivision known as
'Beachwood East," Lucas in 1986
purchased the two lots at issue in
:his litigation for his own account.
So portion of the lots, which were
ocated approximately 300 feet from
,Le beach, qualified as a "critical
irea" under the 1977 Act; accordugly, at the time Lucas acquired
hese parcels, he was not legally
)bliged to obtain a permit from the
Council in advance of any development activity. His intention with
•espect to the lots was to do what
he owners of the immediately adjacent parcels had already done: erect
•ingle-family residences. He commis»ioned architectural drawings for
his purpose.
The Beachfront Management Act
wrought Lucas's plans to an abrupt
1. This specialized historical method of deermining the baseline applied because the
teach wood East subdivision is located adjaent to a so-called 'inlet erosion zone"
iefined in the Act to mean "a segment of
horehne along or adjacent to tidal inlets
mich is influenced directly by the inlet and
-s associated shoals," SC Code § 48-39-270(7)
5upp 1988)) that is "not stabilized by jetties,
srmmdl groins, or other structures," § 48-39r*CXAx2) For areas other than these unstabi-
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end. Under that 1988 legislation, the
Council was directed to establish a
"baseline" connecting the landwardmost ftpoint[s] of erosion . . . during
the past forty years" in the region of
the Isle ot Palms that includes Lucas's lots. § 48-39-280(A)(2) <Supp
1988).l In action not challenged here,
the Council fixed this baseline landward of Lucas's parcels. That was
significant, for under the Act construction of occupable improvements2 was flatly prohibited seaward
of a line drawn 20 feet landward of,
and parallel to, the baseline, § 48-39290(A) (Supp 1988). The Act provided
no exceptions.
B
Lucas promptly filed suit in the
South Carolina Court of Common
Pleas, contending that the Beachfront Management Act's construction bar effected a taking of his
property without just compensation.
Lucas did not take issue with the
validity of the Act as a lawful exercise of South Carolina's police power,
but contended that the Act's complete extinguishment of his property's value entitled him to compensation regardless of whether the legislature had acted in furtherance of
legitimate police power objectives.
Following a bench trial, the court
agreed. Among its factual determinations was the finding that ffat the
time Lucas purchased the two lots,
hzed inlet erosion zones, the statute directs
that the baseline be established "along the
crest of the primary oceanfront sand dune."
§48-39-280<Atfl)
2. The Act did allow the construction of
certain nonhabitable improvements, e.g,
"wooden walkways no larger in width than
six feet," and "small wooden decks no larger
than one hundred forty-four 3quare feet"
§§ 48-39-2901 AH 1) and (2) (Supp 1988)

both were zoned for singlefamily residential construction and . . . there
were no restrictions imposed upon
such use of the property by either
the State of South Carolina, the
County of Charleston, or the Town
of the Isle of Palms." App to Pet for
Cert 36. The trial court further
found that the Beachfront Management Act decreed a permanent ban
on construction insofar as Lucas's
lots were concerned, and that this
prohibition "deprive[dj Lucas of any
reasonable economic use of the lots,
. . . eliminated the unrestricted
right of use, and renderfed] them
valueless " Id., at 37. The court thus
concluded that Lucas's properties
had been "taken" by operation of
the Act, and it ordered respondent
to pay ftjust compensation" in the
amount of $1,232,387.50. Id., at 40.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed. It found dispositive
what it described as Lucas's concession "that the Beachfront Management Act [was] properly and validly
designed to preserve . . South Carolina's beaches." 304 SC 376, 379,
404 SE2d 895, 896 (1991). Failing an
attack on the validity of the statute
as such, the court believed itself
bound to accept the "uncontested
. . . findings" of the South Carolina
legislature that new construction in
the coastal zone—such as petitioner
intended—threatened this public resource. Id., at 383, 404 SE2d, at 898.
The Court ruled that when a regulation respecting the use of property is
designed "to prevent serious public
harm," id., at 383, 404 SE2d, at 899
(citing, inter alia, Mugler v Kansas,
123 US 623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273
11887)), no compensation is owing
under the Takings Clause regardless
of the regulation's effect on the property's value
Two justices dissented. They ac-

knowledged that our Mugler line ot
cases recognizes governmental power
to prohibit "noxious" uses of property—i.e., uses of property akin to
"public nuisances"—without having
to pay compensation. But they would
not have characterized the Beachfront Management Act's "primary
purpose [as] the prevention of a nuisance." 304 SC, at 395, 404 SE2d, at
906 (Harwell, J., dissenting). To the
dissenters, the chief purposes of the
legislation, among them the promotion of tourism and the creation of a
"habitat for indigenous flora and
fauna," could not fairly be compared
to nuisance abatement. Id., at 396,
404 SE2d, at 906. As a consequence,
they would have affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that the Act's
obliteration of the value of petitioner's lots accomplished a taking.
We granted certiorari. 502 US
, 116 L Ed 2d 455. 112 S Ct 436
(1991).
II
[2a] As a threshold matter, we
must briefly address the Council's
suggestion that this case is inappropriate for plenary review. After
briefing and argument before the
South Carolina Supreme Court, but
prior to issuance of that court's opinion, the Beachfront Management
xAct was amended to authorize the
Council, in certain circumstances, to
issue "special permits" for the construction or reconstruction of habitable structures seaward of the baseline. See SC Code § 48-39-290(D)(l>
(Supp 1991). According to the Council, this amendment renders Lucas's
claim of a permanent deprivation
unripe, as Lucas may yet be able to
secure permission to build on his
property "[The Court's! cases," we
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are reminded, "uniformly reflect an struction rights during the period
insistence on knowing the nature before the 1990 amendment. See
and extent of permitted development generally First English Evangelical
before adjudicating the constitution- Lutheran Church of Glendale v
ality of the regulations that purport Countv of Los Angeles, 482 US 304,
to limit it." MacDonald, Sommer & 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct 2378 (1987)
Frates v County of Yolo, 477 US 340, (holding that temporary deprivations
351, 91 L Ed 2d 285, 106 S Ct 2561 of use are compensable under the
(1986). See also Agins v Tiburon, 447 Takings Clause). Without even so
US 255, 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S much as commenting upon the con-*
Ct 2138 (1980) Because petitioner sequences of the South Carolina Suf
has not yet obtained a final deci- preme Court's judgment in this resion regarding how [he] will be al- spect, the Council insists that perlowed to develop [his] property," Wil- mitting Lucas to press his claim of a
liamson County Regional Planning past deprivation on this appeal
Comrn'n of Johnson Citv v Hamilton would be improper, since "the issues
Bank, 473 US 172, 190', 87 L Ed 2d of whether and to what extent [Lu126, 105 S Ct 3108 (1985), the Coun- cas] has incurred a temporary takcil argues that he is not yet entitled ing . . . have simply never been addressed." Brief for Respondent 11.
to definitive adjudication of his takYet Lucas had no reason to proceed
ings claim in this Court.
on a "temporary taking" theory at
We think these considerations trial, or even to seek remand for
would preclude review had the that purpose prior to submission of
South Carolina Supreme Court the case to the South Carolina Surested its judgment on ripeness preme Court, since as the Act then
grounds, as it was (essentially) in- reaa, the taking was unconditional
vited to do by the Council, see Brief and permanent. Moreover, given the
for Respondent 9, n 3 The South breadth of the South Carolina SuCarolina Supreme Court shrugged preme Court's holding and judgoff the possibility of further adminis- ment, Lucas would plainly be unable
trative and trial proceedings, how- (absent our intervention now) to obever, preferring to dispose of Lucas's tain further state-court adjudication
takings claim on the merits. Com- with respect to the 1988-1990 period.
pare, e.g., San Diego Gas & Electric
[2b, 3a] In these circumstances, we
Co, 450 US 621, 631-632, 67 L Ed 2d think it would not accord with sound
551, 101 S Ct 1287 (1981). This unu- process to insist that Lucas pursue
sual disposition does not preclude the late-created "special permit"
Lucas from applying for a permit procedure before his takings claim
under the 1990 amendment for fu- can be considered ripe. Lucas has
ture construction, and challenging, properly alleged Article III mjury-inon takings grounds, any denial. But fact in this case, with respect to both
it does preclude, both practically and the pre-1990 and post-1990 conlegally, any takings claim with re- straints placed on the use of his
spect to Lucas's past deprivation, i. parcels by the Beachfront Managee , for his having been denied con- ment Act.3 That there is a discre3. [2c] Justice Blackmun insists that this
aspect of Lucas's claim is "not justiciable,"
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rionary "'special permit" procedure
by which he may regain—for the
future, at least—beneficial use of his
land goes only to the prudential
"ripeness" of Lucas's challenge, and
for the reasons discussed we do not
think it prudent to apply that prudential requirement here. See Espo-

.sito v South Carolina Coastal Coun
cil, 939 F2d 165, 168 (CA4 1991), cert
pending, No. 91-941.4 We leave for
decision on remand, of course, the
questions left unaddressed by the
South Carolina wSupreme Court as a
consequence of its categorical disposition.*

iiamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 US 172,
87 L fid 2d 126. 105 S Ct 3108 (1985), *.o
"submit] a plan for development of Ihis] property ' to the proper state authorities. Id., at
187, 87 L Ed 2d 126. 105 S Ct 3108. See post,
at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 830. But such a
•submission would have been pointless, as the
Council stipulated below that no building permit would have been issued under the i988
Act, application or no application. Record 14
(Stipulations). Nor does the peculiar posture of
this case mean that we are without Article III
jurisdiction, as Justice Blackmun apparently
beheves, see post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 830.
and n 5. Given the South Carolina Supremo
Court's dismissive foreclosure of further
pleading and adjudication with respect to the
p r e 1990 component of Lucas's taking claim,
it is appropriate for us to address that component as if the case were here on the pleadings
alone. Lucas properly alleged injury-in-fact in
his complaint, see App to Pet for Cert 154
•complaint); id., at 156 tasking "damages for
the temporary taking of his property" from
the date of the 1988 A c t s passage to "such
time as this matter is finally resolved"). No
more can reasonably be demanded. Cf. First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v Countv of Los Angeles, 482 US
304, 312-313, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct 2378
(1987). Justice Blackmun finds it "bafHing,"
post, at
, n 5, 120 L Ed 2d, at 830, that we
grant standing here, whereas "just a lew days
ago. in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US
119 L Ed 2d 351. 112 S Ct
(1992),"
we denied standing. He sees in that strong
evidence to support his repeated imputations
that the Court "presses" to take this case,
poet, at
. 120 L Ed 2d. at 826, is 'Vager to
decide' it, px>st, at
. 120 L Ed 2d, at 831,
and is unwilling to "be denied," post, at
.
i20 L Ed 2d, at 829. He has a point: The
decisions are indeed very close in time, yet
one grants standing and the other denies it.
The distinction, however, rests in law rather
than chronology. Lujan, since it involved the
establishment of injury-in-fact at the sum-

mary judgment stage, required specific facts
to be adduced by sworn testimony; had the
same challenge to a generalized allegation of
injury-in-fact been made at the pleading
stage, it would have been unsuccessful.
4. In that e.*ise, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reached the merits of a takings challenge to the 1988 Beachfront Management Act identical to the one Lucas brings
here even though the Act was amended, and
the special permit procedure established,
while :he case was under submission. The
court observed:
"The enactment of the 1990 Act during the
pendency of this appeal, with its provisions
for special permits and other changes that
may affect the plaintiffs, does not relieve us of
the need to address the plaintiffs' claims under the provisions of the 1988 Act. Even if the
amended Act cured all of the plaintiffs' concerns, the amendments would not foreclose
the possibility that a taking had occurred
during the years when the 1988 Act was in
effect." Esposito v South Carolina Coastal
Council, 939 F2d 165, 168 (CA4 1991).
5. [ 3 b ] Justice Blackmun states that our
"intense interest in Lucas' plight . . . would
have been more prudently expressed by vacating the judgment below and remanding for
further consideration in light of the 1990
amendments" to the Beachfront Management
Act, Post, at
, n 7, 120 L Ed 2d, at 831.
That is a strange suggestion, given that the
South Carolina Supreme Court rendered its
categorical disposition in this case after the
Act had been amended, and after it had been
invited to consider the effect of those amendments on Lucas's case. We have no reason to
believe that the justices of the South Carolina
Supreme Court are any more desirous of using a narrower ground now than they were
then; and neither "prudence" nor any other
principle of judicial restraint requires that we
remand to find out. whether they have
changed their mind.
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A
Prior to Justice Holmes' exposi;ion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Ma1011, 260 US 393, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S
2t 158, 28 ALR 1321 (1922), it was
generally thought that the Takings
Clause reached only a "direct approb a t i o n " of property, Legal Tender
:ases, 12 Wall 457, 551, 20 L Ed 287
1871), or the functional equivalent
>f a "practical ouster of [the owner's]
>ossession." Transportation Co. v
:hicago, 99 US 635, 642, 25 L Ed
136 (1879). See also Gibson v United
States, 166 US 269, 275-276, 41 L Ed
>96, 17 S Ct 578 (1897). Justice
lolmes recognized in Mahon, howiver, that if the protection against
>hysical appropriations of private
property was to be meaningfully enorced, the government's power to
edefine the range of interests inluded in the ownership of property
/as necessarily constrained by cond i t i o n a l limits. 260 US, at 41415, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S a 158, 28
iLR 1321. If, instead, the uses of
rivate property were subject to unridled, uncompensated qualification
nder the police power, "the natural
sndency of human nature [would
e] to extend the qualification more
nd more until at last private proprty disappeared]." Id., at 415, 67 L
Id 322, 43 S Ct 158, 28 ALR 1321.
hese considerations gave birth in
lat case to the oft-cited maxim
lat, "while property may be reguited to a certain extent, if regulaon goes too far it will be recognized
3 a taking." Ibid.
Nevertheless, our decision in Madn offered little insight into when,
id under what circumstances, a
ven regulation would be seen as
)ing "too far" for purposes of the
12
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Fifth Amendment. In 70-odd years of
succeeding "regulatory takings" jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any " fset formula'" for determining how far is too far, preferring to "engag[el in . . . essentially
ad hoc, factual inquiries," Penn Central Transportation Co. v New York
City, 438 US 104, 124, 57 L Ed 2d
631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978) (quoting
Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 US 590,
594, 8 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S Ct 987
(1962)). See Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup Ct
Rev 1, 4. We have, however, described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry
into the public interest advanced in
support of the restraint. The first
encompasses regulations that compel
the property owner to suffer a physical "invasion" of his property. In
general (at least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how
minute the intrusion, and no matter
how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation. For example, in Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 US 419, 73 L Ed 2d 868, 102 S
Ct 3164 (1982), we determined that
New York's law requiring landlords
to allow television cable companies
to emplace cable facilities in their
apartment buildings constituted a
taking, id., at 435-440, 73 L Ed 2d
868, 102 S Ct 3164, even though the
facilities occupied at most only l{/i
cubic feet of the landlords' property,
see id., at 438, n 16, 73 L Ed 2d 868,
102 S Ct 3164. See also United
States v Causby, 328 US 256, 265,
and n 10, 90 L Ed 1206, 66 S Ct 1062
(1946) (physical invasions of airspace); cf. Kaiser Aetna v United
States. 444 US 164, 62 L Ed 2d 332,
100 S Ct 383 (1979) (imposition of
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495, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232
(1987); Hodel v Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.,
[4a] The second situation in which 452 US 264, 295-296, 69 L Ed 2d 1,
we have found categorical treatment 101 S Cc 2352 (1981:.6 As we have
appropriate is where regulation de- said on numerous occasions, the
nies all economically beneficial or Fifth Amendment is violated when
productive use of land. See Agins, landuse regulation "does not sub447 US, at 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 stantially advance legitimate state
S Ct 2138; see also Noilan v Califor- interests or denies an owner economnia Coastal Comm'n, 483 US 825, ically viable use of his land." Agins,
834, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 3141 supra, at 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S
(1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ct 21387 (citations omitted) (emphasis
Assn. v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, added).

navigational servitude upon private
marina).

6. We will net attempt to respond to all of
Justice Blackmun's mistaken citation of case
precedent. Characteristic of its nature is his
assertion that the cases we discuss here stand
merely for the proposition "that proof that a
regulation does not deny an owner economic
use of his property is sufficient to defeat a
facial taking challenge" and not for the point
that "denial of such use is sufficient to establish a taking ciaim regardless of any other
consideration." Post, at
, n 11, 120 L Ed
2d, at 835. The cases say. repeatedly and
unmistakably, that " '[L]he test to be applied
in considering [a] facial [takings] challenge is
fairiy straightforward. A statute regulating
the uses that can be made of property effects
a taking if it 'denies an owner
economically
viable use of his land." ' " Keystone, 480 US,
at 495, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (quoting
Hodel. 452 US. at 295-296, 69 L Ed 2d i. 101
S Ct 2352 (quoting Agins, 447 US. at 260))
(emphasis added).
[4b] Justice Blaokmun describes that rule
'which we do not invent but merely apply
today* as "altering] the long-settled rules of
review" by foisting on the State "the burden
of showing [its) regulation is not a taking."
Poet, at
.
. 120 L Ed 2d. at 832. This
LB of course wrong. Lucas had to do more than
simpiy rile a lawsuit to establish his constitutional entitlement: he had to show that the
Beachfront Management Act denied him economically beneticiai use of his land. Our analgia presumes the unconstitutionality of state
land-use regulation only in the sense that any
rule-with-exceptions presumes the invalidity
>f a law that violates it—for example, the
•uie generally prohibiting content-based re(trictions on speech. See, e.g., Simon & Schus*r. Inc. v New York Crime Victims Board,
502 L'S
.
. 116 L Ed 2d 476, 112 S Ct

501 (1991> ("A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if" it imposes a financial burden on speakers because
of the content of their speech''). Justice Blackmun's real quarrel is with the substantive
standard of liability we apply in this case, a
long-established standard we ^ee no need to
repudiate.
7. Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our
"deprivation of all economically feasible use"
rule ; greater than its precision, since the
rule does not make clear the "property intere s t ' against which the loss of value is to be
measured When, lor example, a regulation
requires a de.eloper to leave 90% of a rural
tract in its natural state, it is unclear
whether we wouid analyze the situation as
one in. which the owner has been deprived of
all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which
the owner has suffered a mere diminution in
value of the tract as a whole. <For an extreme
—and, we think, insupportable—view of the
relevant calculus, see Penn Central Transportation Co. v New York City, 42 NTY2d ,124.
333-334, 366 NE2d 1271, 1276-1277 i 1977K
afFd. 438 US 104. 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct
2646 (197c». where the state court examined
the diminution in a particular parcel's value
produced by a municipal ordinance in light of
total value of the taking claimant's other
holdings in the vicinity.) Unsurprisingly, this
uncertainty regarding the composition of the
denominator in our "deprivation" fraction has
produced inconsistent pronouncements by the
Court. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Manor,, 260 US 393. 414. 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct
158, 28 ALR 1321 (1922) (law restricting subsurface extraction of coal held to effect a
taking;, with Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn.
v DeBf nedictis. 480 US 470, 497-502, 94 L Ed
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relatively rare situations where the
government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial
uses.

We have never set forth the justification for this rule. Perhaps it is
simply, as Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's
x>int of view, the equivalent of a
physical appropriation. See San Di>go Gas & Electric Co. v San Diego,
i50 US, at 652, 67 L Ed 2d 551, 101
3 Ct 1287 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
f
[F]or what is the land but the
profits thereof!?]" 1 E. Coke, Insti;utes ch 1, §1 (1st Am ed 1812).
Surely, at least, in the extraordinary
:ircumstance when no productive or
economically beneficial use of land is
)ermitted, it is less realistic to inlulge our usual assumption that the
egislature is simply ''adjusting the
>enefits and burdens of economic
ife," Penn Central Transportation
>>., 438 US, at 124, 57 L Ed 2d 631,
)8 S Ct 2646, in a manner that
ecures an "average reciprocity of
idvantage" to everyone concerned,
^nnsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260
JS, at 415, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158,
!8 ALR 1321. And the functional
tasis for permitting the government,
iy regulation, to affect property valtes without compensation—that
Government hardly could go on if
o some extent values incident to
roperty could not be diminished
rithout paying for every such
hange in the general law," id., at
13, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 28
LLR 1321—does not apply to the

On the other side of the balance,
affirmatively supporting a compensation requirement, is the fact that
regulations that leave the owner of
land without economically beneficial
or productive options for its use—
typically, as here, by requiring land
to be left substantially in its natural
state—carry with them a heightened
risk that private property is being
pressed into some form of public
service under the guise of mitigating
serious public harm. See, e.g., Annicelli v South Kingstown, 463 A2d
133, 140-141 (RI 1983) (prohibition
on construction adjacent to beach
justified on twin grounds of safety
and "conservation of open space");
Morris County Land Improvement
Co. v Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 NJ 539, 552-553, 193 A2d
232, 240 (1963) (prohibition on filling
marshlands imposed in order to preserve region as water detention basin and create wildlife refuge). As
Justice Brennan explained: "From
the government's point of view, the
benefits flowing to the public from
preservation of open space through
regulation may be equally great as
from creating a wildlife refuge
through formal condemnation or increasing
electricity
production

i 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (1987) (nearly identical
iw held not to effect a taking); see also id., at
L5-520. 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232
Lehnquist, C.J , dissenting); Rose, Mahon Remstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a
[uddle, 57 S Cal L Rev 561, 566-569 (1984).
he answer to this difficult question may lie
i how the owner's reasonable expectations
ave been shaped by the State's law of propty—i. e., whether and to what degree the
kite's law has accorded legal recognition and

protection to the particular interest in land
with respect to which the takings claimant
alleges a diminution in (or elimination oO
value. In any event, we avoid this difficulty in
the present case, since the interest in land"
that Lucas has pleaded (a tee simple interest)
is an estate with a rich tradition of protection
at common law, and since the South Carolina
Court of Common Pleas found that the Beachfront Management Act left each of Lucas's
beachfront lots without economic value.
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through a dam project that floods
private property." San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co., supra, at 652, 67 L Ed 2d
551, 101 S Ct 1287 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The many statutes on
the books, both state and federal,
that provide for the use of eminent
domain to impose servitudes on private scenic lands preventing develop
mental uses, or to acquire such
lands altogether, suggest the practical equivalence in this setting of
negative regulation and appropriation. See, e.g., 16 USC § 410ff-l(a) [16
USCS § 410ff-l(a)] (authorizing acquisition of "lands, waters, or interests
[within Channel Islands National
Park] (including but not limited to
scenic easements)"); § 460aa-2(a) (authorizing acquisition of ''any lands,
or lesser interests therein, including
mineral interests and scenic easements" within Sawtooth National
Recreation Area); §§3921-3923 (authorizing acquisition of wetlands);
NC Gen Stat § 113A-38 (1990/ <au-

thorizing acquisition of, inter alia,
" 'scenic easements'" within the
North Carolina natural and scenic
rivers system); Tenn Code Ann §§ 11
15-101—11-15-108 (1987) (authorizing
acquisition of "protective easements"
and other rights in real property
adjacent to State's historic, architectural, archaeological, or cultural resources).

8. Justice Stevens criticizes the "deprivation
of all economically beneficial use" rule as
"wholly arbitrary'', in that "(the) landowner
whose property is diminished in value 95%
recovers nothing." while the landowner who
surfers a complete elimination of value "recovers the land's full value." Post, at
.
120 L Ed 2d, at 844. This analysis errs in its
assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one step short of complete is not
entitled to compensation. Such an owner
might not be able to claim the benefit of our
categorical formulation, but, as we have acknowledged time and again, "[t]he economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and
the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations" are keenly relevant to takings
analysis generally Penn Central Transportation Co. v New York City, 438 US 104, 124. 57
L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978). It is true
that in at least some cases the landowner
with 95% loss will get nothing, while the
landowner with total loss will recover in full.
But that occasional result is no more strange

than the gross disparity between the landowner whose premises are taken for a highway (who recovers in full) and the landowner
whose property is reduced to 5<7<- of its former
value by the highway (who recovers nothing).
Takings law is full of these "all-or-nothing"
situations.
[5b] Justice Stevens similarly misinterprets our focus on "developmental" uses of
property 'the uses proscribed by the Beachfront Management Act) as betraying an "assumption that the only uses of property cognizable under the Constitution are developmental uses." Post, at
, n 3, 120 L Ed 2d, at
844. We make no such assumption. Though
our prior takings cases evince an abiding
concern for the productive use of, and economic investment in, land, there are plainly a
number of noneconomic interests in land
whose impairment will invite exceedingly
close scrutiny under the Takings Clause. See,
eg.. Ix^retto v Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 US 419, 436, 73 L Ed 2d
$68. 102 S Ct 3164 (1982) (interest in excluding strangers from one's land).

[4c, 5a] We think, in short, that
there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when
the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of
the common good, that is, to leave
his property economically idle, he
has suffered a taking.8
B
[6a] The trial court found Lucas's
two beachfront lots to have been
rendered valueless by respondent's
enforcement of the coastal-zone con-
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struction ban.9 Under Lucas's theory
of the case, which rested upon our
"no economically viable use" statements, that finding entitled him to
compensation. Lucas believed it unnecessary to take issue with either
the purposes behind the Beachfront
Management Act, or the means chosen by the South Carolina Legislature to effectuate those purposes.
The South Carolina Supreme Court,
however, thought otherwise. In its

view, the Beachfront Management
Act was no ordinary enactment, but
involved an exercise of South Carolina's "police powers" to mitigate the
harm to the public interest that petitioner's use of his land might occasion. 304 SC, at 384, 404 SE2d, at
899. By neglecting to dispute the
findings enumerated in the Act10 or
otherwise to challenge the legislature's purposes, petitioner "conceded] that the beach/dune area of

9. [6b] This finding was the premise of the
Petition for Certiorari, and since it was not
challenged in the Brief in Opposition we decline to entertain the argument in respondent's brief on the merits, see Brief for Respondent 45-50, that the finding was erroneous. Instead, we decide the question presented
under the same factual assumptions as did
the Supreme Court of South Carolina. See
Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 US 808, 816, 85
L Ed 2d 791, 105 S Ct 2427 (1985).

"(2) Beach/dune system vegetation is
unique and extremely important to the vitality and preservation of the system.
"(3) Many miles of South Carolina's beaches
have been identified as critically eroding.
"(4) . . . [Development unwisely has been
sited too close to the [beach/dune] system.
This type of development has jeopardized the
stability of the beach/dune system, accelerated erosion, and endangered adjacent property. It is in both the public and private
interests to protect the system from this unwise development.
"(5) The use of armoring in the form of
hard erosion control devices such as seawalls,
bulkheads, and rip-rap to protect erosionthreatened structures adjacent to the beach
has not proven effective. These armoring devices have given a false sense of security to
beachfront property owners. In reality, these
hard structures, in many instances, have increased the vulnerability of beachfront property to damage from wind and waves while
contributing to the deterioration and loss of
the dry sand beach which is so important to
the tourism industry.
"(6) Erosion is a natural process which
becomes a significant problem for man only
when structures are erected in close proximity to the beach/dune system. It is in both the
public and private interests to afford the
beach/dune system space to accrete and erode
in its natural cycle. This space can be provided only by discouraging new construction
in close proximity to the beach /dune system
and encouraging those who have erected
structures too close to the system to retreat
from it.

10. The legislature's express findings include the following:
"The General Assembly finds that:
"(1) The beach/dune system along the coast
of South Carolina is extremely important to
the people of this State and serves the following functions:
"(a) protects life and property by serving as a storm barrier which dissipates
wave energy and contributes toshoreline
stability in an economical and effective
manner;
"(b) provides the basis for a tourism
industry that generates approximately
two-thirds of South Carolina's annual
tourism industry revenue which constitutes a significant portion of the state's
economy. The tourists who come to the
South Carolina coast to enjoy the ocean
and dry sand beach contribute significantly to state and local tax revenues;
"(c) provides habitat for numerous species of plants and animals, several of
which are threatened or endangered. Waters adjacent to the beach/dune system
also provide habitat for many other marine species;
"id) provides a natural health environment for the citizens of South Carolina to
spend leisure time which serves their
physical and mental well-being.
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South Carolina's shores is an extremely valuable public resource;
that the erection of new construction, inter alia, contributes to the
erosion and destruction of this public resource; and that discouraging
new construction in close proximity
to the beach/dune area is necessary
to prevent a great public harm." Id.,
at 382-383, 404 SE2d, at 898. In the
c o u r t ' s view, t h e s e concessions
brought petitioner's challenge within
a long line of this Court's cases sustaining against Due Process and
T a k i n g s Clause c h a l l e n g e s t h e
State's use of its "police powers" to
enjoin a property owner from activities akin to public nuisances. See
Mugier v Kansas, 123 US 623, 31 L
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887) (law prohibiting manufacture of alcoholic
beverages); Hadacheck v Sebastian,
239 US 394, 60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct
143 (1915) (law barring operation of
brick mill in residential area); Miller
v Schoene, 276 US 272, 72 L Ed 568.
48 S Ct 246 * 1928) (order to destroy
diseased cedar trees to prevent infection of nearby orchards); Goldblatt v
Hempstead. 369 US 590, 8 L Ed 2d
130, 82 S Ct 987 s 1962) (law effectively preventing continued operation of quarry in residential area).
[1b] It is correct that many of our
prior ooinions have suggested that
'harmful or noxious uses" of property mav be proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of compensation. For a number
of reasons, however, we think the
South Carolina Supreme Court was
too quick to conclude that that principle decides the present case. The
"harmful or noxious uses" principle
was the Court's early attempt to
describe in theoretical terms why
government may, consistent with
the Takings Clause, affect property

values by regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate—a
reality we nowadays acknowledge
explicitly with respect to the full
scope of the State's police power.
See, e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co , 438 US, at 125. 57 L Ed 2d
631, (J8 S Ct 2646 (where State "reasonably conclude!s] that 'the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare*
would be promoted by prohibiting
particular contemplated uses of
land," compensation need not accompany prohibition); see also Nollan v
California Coastal Commission, 483
US, at 834-835, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107
S Ct 3141 < r Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a 'legiti
mate state interest[,]' [but] ft]he>
have made clear . . . that a broad
range of governmental purposes and
regulations satisfy these requirements"). We made this very point in
Penn Central Transportation Co.,
where, in the course of sustaining
New York City's landmarks preservation program against a takings
challenge, we rejected the petitioner's suggestion that iMugler and the
cases following it were premised on,
and thus limited by, some objective
conception of "noxiousness":
"fT]he uses in issue in Hadacheck,
iMiller, and Goldblatt were perfectly lawful in themselves. They
involved no 'blameworthiness, . . .
moral wrongdoing or conscious act
of dangerous risk-taking which induced society] to shift the cost to
a pafrt|icular individual.' Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74
Yale LJ 36, 50 (1964). These cases
are better understood as resting
not on any supposed 'noxious'
quality of the prohibited uses but
rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related
817

U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

120 L Ed 2d

[1c] The transition from our early
focus on control of "noxious" uses to
our contemporary understanding of
the broad realm within which government may regulate without compensation was an easy one, since the
distinction between "harm-prevent-

ing" and "benefit-conferring" regulation is often in the eye of the beholder. It is quite possible, for example, to describe in either fashion the
ecological, economic, and aesthetic
concerns that inspired the South
Carolina legislature in the present
case. One could say that imposing a
servitude on Lucas's land is necessary in order to prevent his use of it
from "harming" South Carolina's
ecological resources; or, instead, in
order to achieve the "benefits" of an
ecological preserve.11 Compare, e.g.,
Claridge v New Hampshire Wetlands Board, 125 NH 745, 752, 485
A2d 287, 292 (1984) (owner may,
without compensation, be barred
from filling wetlands because landtilling would deprive adjacent coastal
habitats and marine fisheries of ecological support), with, e.g., Bartlett v
Zoning Comm'n of Old Lyme, 161
Conn 24, 30, 282 A2d 907, 910 (1971)
(owner barred from filling tidal
marshland must be compensated, despite municipality's "laudable" goal
of "preserving] marshlands from encroachment
or
destruction").
Whether one or the other of the
competing characterizations will

11. In the present case, in fact, some of the
"[South Carolina] legislature's 'findings' " to
which the South Carolina Supreme Court
purported to defer in characterizing the purpose of the Act as "harm-preventing," 304 SC
376, 385, 404 SE2d 895. 900 (1991), seem to us
phrased in "benefit-conferring" language instead. For example, they describe the lmpor:ance of a construction ban in enhancing
'South Carolina's annual tourism industry
•evenue," SC Code § 48-39-250(1 Kb) (Supp
L991>, in "providing] habitat for numerous
species cf plants and animals, several of
vhich are threatened or endangered," § 48-39!50<lxc), and in "provid[ing] a natural
lealthy environment for the citizens of South
Carolina to spend leisure time which serves
heir phvsicai and mental well-being." § 48-39150ilXd). It would be pointless to make the
lUtcome of this case hang upon this terminolgy, since the same interests could readily be

described in "harm-preventing" fashion.
Justice Blackmun, however, apparently insists that we must make the outcome hinge
(exclusively) upon the South Carolina Legislature's other, "harm-preventing" characterizations, focusing on the declaration that "prohibitions on building in front of the setback line
are necessary to protect people and property
from storms, high tides, and beach erosion."
Post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 828. He says
"[n)othing in the record undermines [this]
assessment," ibid., apparently seeing no
significance in the fact that the statute permits owners of existing structures to remain
(and even to rebuild if their structures are
not "destroyed beyond repair," SC Code Ann
§ 48-39-290B)), and in the fact that the 1990
amendment authorizes the Council to issue
permits for new construction m violation of
the uniform prohibition, see SC Code § 48-39290(D)(1) (Supp 1991).

to the implementation of a policy
—not unlike historic preservation
—expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property." 438 US, at 133-134, n 30, 57
L Ed 2d 631. 98 S Ct 2646.
"Harmful or noxious use" analysis
was, in other words, simply the progenitor of our more contemporary
statements that "land-use regulation
does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' . . . ." Nollan, supra, at 834,
97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 3141
(quoting Agins v Tiburon, 447 US, at
260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138);
see also Penn Central Transportation Co., supra, at 127, 57 L Ed 2d
631, 98 S Ct 2646; Euclid v Ambler
Realty Co., 272 US 365, 387-388, 71
L Ed 303, 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016
(1926).
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When it is understood that "prevention of harmful use" was merely

our early formulation of the police
power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in value; and
that the distinction between regulation that "prevents harmful u^e"
and that which confers benefits'' ts
difficult, if not impossible, to discern
on an objective, value-free basis; it
becomes self-evident that noxioususe logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory "takings"—which require compensation
—from regulatory deprivations that
do not require compensation. A fortiori the legislature'? recitation of a
noxious-use justification cannot be
the basis for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory
takings must be compensated, [f it
were, departure would virtually always be allowed. The South Carolina
Supreme Court's approach would essentially nullify Mahon's affirmation
of limits to the noncompensable exercise of the police power. Our cases
provide no support for this: None of
them that employed the logic of
"harmful use" prevention to sustain
a regulation involved an allegation
that the regulation wholly eliminated the value of the claimant's
land See Keystone Bituminous Coal
Assn , 480 US, at 513-514, 94 L Ed
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).11

12. [ 1 d ] In Justice Blackmun's view, even
with respect to regulations that deprive an
owner of all developmental or economically
beneficial land uses, the test tor required
compensation is whether the 'egisiature has
recited a harm p: eventing justification lor its
action See post, at
. 120 L Ed
2d, at 828. 833-836 Since such a justification
can he formulated in practically everv case,
this amounts to a test ot whether the legisla
tuie has a stuDid staff We think the Takings
Clause requires courts to do more than insist
upon artful harm-preventing characterizations

13. E g , Mugler v K a n s a s !23 US 623, 31 L
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887) (prohibition ipon
use of a building as a brewery, othci uses
permitted), Plymouth Coal Co \ Vt nnsylvania, 232 US 531. 58 L Ed 713 34 S a 359
(1914' (requirement that "pillar' of coal he
left in ground to safeguard mine woikers,
mineral rights could otherwise be exploited),
Remman v Little HOCK, 237 US 171, 59 L Ed
900 35 S Ct 511 (1915) (declaration tnat
hverv stable constituted a public nuisance,
other us>e» ot the property permitted), Hadacheck v Sebastian. 239 US 394, 60 L Ed 348,
3b S Ct 143 (1915) (prohibition of brick manu-

come to one's lips in a particular
case depends primarily upon one's
evaluation of the worth of competing
uses of real estate. See Restatement
'Second) of Torts §822, Comment g.
p 112 1979) ("[practically all human activities unless carried on in a
wilderness interfere to some extent
with others or involve some risk of
interference ^ A given restraint will
be seen as mitigating rf harm" to the
adjacent parcels or securing a "benefit" for them, depending upon the
observer's evaluation of the relative
importance of the use that the restraint favors See Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 Yale LJ 36, 49
'1964) ("[T]he problem [in this area|
is not one of noxiousness or harmcreating activity at all; rather it is a
problem of inconsistency between
perfectly innocent and independently desirable uses"'. Whether Lucas's construction of single-tamily
residences on his parcels should be
describee as bringing "harm" to
South Carolina's adjacent ecological
resources thus depends principally
upon whether the describer believes
that the State's use interest in nurturing those resources is so important that any competing adjacent
use must yield.12
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[1e, 7a] Where the State seeks to
sustain regulation that deprives land
of all economically beneficial use, we
think it may resist compensation
only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's
estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to
begin with.14 This accords, we think,
with our "takings" jurisprudence,
which has traditionally been guided
by the understandings of our citizens
regarding the content of, and the
State's power over, the "bundle of
rights" that they acquire when they
obtain title to property. It seems to
us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property
to be restricted, from time to time,
by various measures newly enacted
by the State in legitimate exercise of
its police powers; "[a]s long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must
yield to the police power." Pennsyl-

vania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US, at
413, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158. And
in the case of personal property, by
reason of the State's traditionally
high degree of control over commercial dealings, he ought to be aware
of the possibility that new regulation
might even render his property economically worthless (at least if the
property's only economically produc :
tive use is sale or manufacture for
sale), see Andrus v Allard, 444 US
51, 66-67, 62 L Ed 2d 210, 100 S Ct
318 (1979) (prohibition on sale of
eagle feathers). In the case of land,
however, we think the notion
pressed by the Council that title is
somehow held subject to the "implied limitation" that the State may
subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent
with the historical compact recorded
in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture.15

factunng in residential area; other uses permitted): Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 US 590,
3 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962) (prohibition
on excavation; other uses permitted).
14. Drawing on our First Amendment jurisprudence, see, e.g, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v
Smith, 494 US 872, 878-879, 108 L Ed 2d 876,
110 S Ct 1595 (1990), Justice Stevens would
"loo(k] to the generality of a regulation of
property" to determine whether compensation
is owing. Post, at
. 120 L Ed 2d, at 849.
The Beachfront Management Act is general,
in his view, because it "regulates the use of
the coastline of the entire state." Post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 850. There may be some
validity to the principle Justice Stevens proposes, but it does not properly apply to the
present case. The equivalent of a law of general application that inhibits the practice of
religion without being aimed at religion, see
Oregon v Smith, supra, is a law that destroys
the value of land without being aimed at
land. Perhaps such a law—the generally applicable criminal prohibition on the manufacturing jf alcoholic beverages challenged in
Mugler comes to mind—cannot constitute a

compensable taking. See 123 US, at 655-666,
31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273. But a regulation
specifically directed to land use no more acquires immunity by plundering landowners'
generally than does a law specifically directed
at religious practice acquire immunity by
prohibiting all religions. Justice Stevens' approach renders the Takings Clause little more
than a particularized restatement of the
Equal Protection Clause.
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15. [7b] After accusing us of "launching] a
missile to kill a mouse," post, at
, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 825, Justice Blackmun expends a
good deal of throw-weight of his own upon a
noncombatant, arguing that our description of
the "understanding" of land ownership that
informs the Takings Clause is not supported
by early American experience. That is largely
true, but entirely irrelevant. The practices of
the States prior to incorporation of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses, see Chicago, B. & Q R. Co. v Chicago, 166 US 226, 41
L Ed 979, 17 S Ct 581 (1897V-which, as
Justice Blackmun acknowledges, occasionally
included outright physical appropriation of
land without compensation, see post, at
,
120 L Ed 2d, at 839—were out of accord with
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[1f, 8] Where "permanent physical
occupation" of land is concerned, we
have refused to allow the government to decree it anew 'without
c o m p e n s a t i o n ) , no m a t t e r how
weighty the asserted "public interests" involved, Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US,
•at 425, 73 L Ed 2d 868, 102 S Q
3164—though we assuredly would
permit the government to assert a
permanent easement that was a preexisting limitation upon the landowner's title. Compare Scranton v
Wheeler, 179 US 141, 163, 45 L Ed
126, 21 S Ct 48 '1900) (interests of
"riparian owner in the submerged
lands . . . bordering on a public navigable water'' held subject to Government's navigational servitude),
with Kaiser Aetna v United States.
444 US, at 178-180, 62 L Ed 2d 332,
100 S Ct 383 (imposition of navigational servitude on marina created
and rendered navigable at private
expense held to constitute a taking).
We believe similar treatment must
be accorded confiscatory regulations,
i. e., regulations that prohibit all
economically beneficial use of land:
Any limitation ^o severe cannot be
newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation), but must inhere in
ch3 title itself, in the restrictions
that background principles of the

State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership.
A law or decree with such an effect
must, in other words, do no more
than duplicate the result that could
have been achieved in the couits--by adjacent landowners lor other
uniquely affected persons/ under the
State's law of private nuisance, or by
the State under its complementary
power to abate nuisances that affect
the public generally, or otherwise. 16

inv plausible interpretation ol those provisions Justice Blackmun is correct that early
:onstitutionai theorists did not believe the
Takines ("iau-e embraced regulations ot property at all. >ee post, at
. 120 L Ed 2d, at
^39, and n 23 but e\en he does not suggest
°xplicitl>, at least) :hat we renounce the
Jourt'^ contrary conclusion in Mahon Since
he text of th * Clause can De read to encom
,ass regulator \ as well a* ohvsical depriva10ns i in contrast to the text original!v prnx>sen ov Madison see Soee.h Prv,posimr Bill
-: Rights ' J u n e *. 17**9». in 12 .J Madison
'he Papers ot James Madison 201 *C Hobson,
I Rutland. W Rachai &: J Sisson ed 1979)

>' No person ^hall be
obliged to relinquish
his property, where it may be necessary for
public u^e. without a just compensation"), we
decline to do so as well

[1g, 9, 10a] On this analysis, the
owner of a lake bed. for example,
would not be entitled to compensation when he is denied the requisite
permit to engage in a landfilling
operation that would have the effect
of Hooding others' land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, when it is directed to
remove all improvements from its
land upon discovery that the plant
sits astride an earthquake fault.
Such regulatory action may well
have the effect of eliminating the
land's only economically productive
use, but it does not proscribe a productive use that was previously permissible under relevant property
and nuisance principles. The use of
these properties for what are now
expressly prohibited purposes was
always unlawful, and (subject to
other constitutional limitations) it

16. The principal 'otherwise*' that we have
•n mind is litigation absolving the State ior
private parties) of liability for the destiuction
of "real and personal property, in cases of
actual necessity, to prevent the spreading ot a
fire" or to toiestall other t^rave thieats IO the
lives and ^ o p e r t v ot others Bowditch v Boston. 101 US lb, 18-19, 25 L F,d W0 <1880>. see
United States % Pautic Railioad. 120 US 227.
238 239 30 I Ld 034, 7 S Ct 190 11887'
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was open to the State at any point
to make the implication of those
background principles of nuisance
and property law explicit. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165, 1239-1241
(1967). In light of our traditional
resort to "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law" to
define the range of interests that
qualify for protection as "property"
under the Fifth .and Fourteenth)
Amendments, Board of Regents of
State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564,
577, 33 L Ed 2d 548, 92 S Ct 2701
(1972); see, e.g., Ruckelshaus v Monsanto Co., 467 US 986, 1011-1012, 81
L Ed 2d 815, 104 S Ct 2862 (1984);
Hughes v Washington, 389 US 290,
295, 19 L Ed 2d 530, 88 S Ct 438
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring), this
recognition that the Takings Clause
does not require compensation when
an owner is barred from putting
land to a use that is proscribed by
those "existing rules or understandings" is surely unexceptional. When,
however, a regulation that declares
"off-limits" all economically productive or beneficial uses of land goes
beyond what the relevant background principles would dictate,
compensation must be paid to sustain it.17
[11] The "total taking" inquiry we
require today will ordinarily entail
(as the application of state nuisance
law ordinarily entails) analysis of,
among other things, the degree of
17. [10b] Of course, the State may elect to
rescind its regulation and thereby avoid having to pay compensation for a permanent
deprivation. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 US, at 321, 96 L Ed 2d
250, 107 S Ct 2378 But "where the [regula-
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harm to public lands and resources,
or adjacent private property, posed
by the claimant's proposed activities,
see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 826, 827, the social value of
the claimant's activities and their
suitability to the locality in question,
see, e.g., id., §§ 828(a) and (b), 831,
and the relative ease with which the
alleged harm can be avoided
through measures taken by the
claimant and the government (or
adjacent private landowners) alike,
see, e.g., id., §§ 827(e), 828(c), 830.
The fact that a particular use has
long been engaged in by similarly
situated owners ordinarily imports a
lack of any common-law prohibition
(though changed circumstances or
new knowledge may make what was
previously permissible no longer so,
see Restatement (Second) of Torts,
supra, § 827, comment g). So also
does the fact that other landowners,
similarly situated, are permitted to
continue the use denied to the claimant.
[1h, 12] It seems unlikely that
common-law principles would have
prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on
petitioner's land; they rarely support
prohibition of the "essential use" of
land, Curtin v Benson, 222 US 78,
86, 56 L Ed 102, 32 S Ct 31 (1911).
The question, however, is one of
state law to be dealt with on remand. We emphasize that to win its
case South Carolina must do more
than proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires
are inconsistent with the public intion has] already worked a taking of all use of
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the
taking was effective." Ibid.

terest, or the conclusory assertion and property law that prohibit the
that they violate a common-law uses he now intends in the circummaxim such as sic mere tuo ut alie- stances in wnich the property is
num non laedas. As we have said, a presently found. Only on this show"State, by ipse dixit, may not trans- ing can the State fairly claim that,
form private property into public in proscribing all such beneficial
property without compensation uses, the Beachfront Management
18
. . ." Webb s fabulous Pharmacies, Act is taking nothing.
Inc. v Beckwith. 449 US 155, 164, 66
L Ed 2d 358. 101 S Ct 446 (1980).
Instead, as it would be required to
The judgment is reversed and the
do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a cause remanded for proceedings not
rominon-law action for public nui- inconsistent with thia opinion.
sance, South Carolina must identify
background principles of nuisance
So ordered.
SEPARATE OPINIONS

Justice Kennedy, concurring in
the judgment.
The case comes to the Court in an
unusual posture, as all my colleagues observe. Ante, at
, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 810; post, at
, 120 L Ed
2d. at 829 (BUckmun, J., dissenting);
post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 842
(Stevens, J., dissenting); post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 851-852
^Statement of Souter, J.). After the
suit was initiated but before it
reached us, South Carolina amended
its Beachfront Management Act to
authorize the issuance of special permits at variance with the Act's general limitations. See SC Code § 48-3929CHDKD (Supp 1991). Petitioner has
not applied for a special permit but
may still do so. The availability of
this alternative, if it can be invoked,
,rnay dispose of petitioner's claim of a
permanent taking. As I read the

Court's opinion, it does not decide
the permanent taking claim, but neither does it foreclose the Supreme
Court of South Carolina from considering the claim or requiring petitioner to pursue an administrative
alternative not previously available.

18. [11] Justice Blackmun decries our reliance on background nuisance principles at
least in part because ne believes those principles to be as mampulable ds we find the
"harm prevention" "benefit conferral" dichotomy, ^ee post, at
120 L Ed 2d. at
837-838 There is no dcubt some leeway in a
court s interpretation of what existing bi&te
law permits—but not remotely as much, we

think, as in a legislative crafting of the reasons for its confiscatory regulation We stress
that an affirmative decree eliminating all
economically beneficial uses may be defended
only if an objectively reasonable application
of relevant precedents would exclude those
beneficial uses in the circumstances in which
the land is presently found.

The potential for future relief does
not control our disposition, because
whatever may occur in the future
cannot undo what has occurred in
the past. The Beachfront Management Act was enacted in 1988. SC
Code §48-39-250 et seq. (Supp 19901
It may have deprived petitioner of
the use of his land in an interim
period. § 48-39-290(A). If this deprivation amounts to a taking, its limited duration will not bar constitutional relief. It is well established
that temporary takings are as protected by the Constitution as are
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permanent ones. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v County of Los Angeles, 482 US
304, 318, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct
2378(1987).
Trie issues presented in the case
are ready for our decision. The Supreme Court of South Carolina decided the case on constitutional
grounds, and its rulings are now
before us. There exists no jurisdictional bar to our disposition, and
prudential considerations ought not
to militate against it. The State cannot complain of the manner in
which the issues arose. Any uncertainty in this regard is attributable
to the State, as a consequence of its
amendment to the Beachfront Management Act. If the Takings Clause
is to protect against temporary deprivations as well as permanent ones,
its enforcement must not be frustrated by a shifting background of
state law.
Although we establish a framework for remand, moreover, we do
not decide the ultimate question of
whether a temporary taking has occurred in this case. The facts necessary to the determination have not
been developed in the record. Among
the matters to be considered on remand must be whether petitioner
had the intent and capacity to develop the property and failed to do
so in the interim period because the
State prevented him. Any failure by
petitioner to comply with relevant
administrative requirements will be
part of that analysis.
The South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found that petitioner's
real property has been rendered valueless by the State's regulation. App
to Pet for Cert 37. The finding appears to presume that the property
824
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has no significant market value or
resale potential. This is a curious
finding, and I share the reservations
of some of my colleagues about a
finding that a beach front lot loses
all value because of a development
restriction. Post, at
, 120
L Ed 2d, at 830-831 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); post, at
, n 3, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 844 (Stevens, J., dissenting); post, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
851-852 (Statement of Souter, J.).
While the Supreme Court of South
Carolina on remand need not consider the case subject to this constraint, we must accept the finding
as entered below. See Oklahoma
City v Tuttle, 471 US 808, 816, 85 L
Ed 2d 791, 105 S Ct 2427 (1985).
Accepting the finding as entered, it
follows that petitioner is entitled to
invoke the line of cases discussing
regulations that deprive real property of all economic value. See Agins
v Tiburon, 447 US 255, 260, 65 L Ed
2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138 (1980).
The finding of no value must be
considered under the Takings Clause
by reference to the owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations. Kaiser Aetna v United States,
444 US 164, 175, 62 L Ed 2d 332, 100
S Ct 383 (1979); Penn Central Transportation Co. v New York City, 438
US 104, 124, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct
2646 (1978); see also W. B. Worthen
Co. v Kavanaugh, 295 US 56, 79 L
Ed 1298, 55 S Ct 555, 97 ALR 905
(1935). The Takings Clause, while
conferring substantial protection on
property owners, does not eliminate
the police power of the State to enact limitations on the use of their
property. Mugler v Kansas, 123 US
623, 669, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273
(1887). The rights conferred by the
Takings Clause and the police power
of the State may coexist without
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conflict. Property is bought and
sold, investments are made, subject
to the State's power to regulate.
Where a taking is alleged from regu
iations which deprive the property
of all value, the test must be
whether the deprivation is contrary
to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.
There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis,
of course; for if the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by
what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what courts
say it is. Some circularity must be
tolerated in these matters, however,
as it is in other spheres. E.g., Katz v
United States, 389 US 347, 19 L Ed
2d 576, 88 S Ct 507 11967) (Fourth
Amendment protections defined by
reasonable expectations of privacy).
The definition moreover, is not circular in its entirety. The expectations protected by the Constitution
are based on objective rules and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved.

vention accords with the most common expectations of property owners
who face regulation, but I do not
believe this can be the soie source of
state authority to impose severe restrictions. Coastal property may
present such unique concerns for a
fragile land system that the State
can go further in regulating its development and use than the common
law of nuisance might otherwise permit.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina erred, in my view, by reciting
the general purposes for which the
state regulations were enacted without a determination that they were
in accord with the owner's reasonable expectations and therefore sufficient to support a severe restriction
on specific parcels of property. See
304 SC 376, 383, 404 SE2d 895, 899
\ 1991V The promotion of tourism, for
instance, ought not to suffice to deprive specific property of all value
without a corresponding duty to
compensate. Furthermore, the
means as well as the ends of regulation must accord with the owner's
reasonable expectations. Here, the
In my view, reasonable expecta- State did not act until after the
ions must be understood in light of property had been zoned for individhe whole of our legal tradition. The ual lot development and most other
ommon law of nuisance is too nar- parcels had been improved, throwing
ow a confine for the exercise of the whole burden of the regulation
egulatory power in a complex and on the remaining lots. This too must
iterdependent society. Goidblatt v be measured in the balance. See
[empstead, 369 US 590, 593, 8 L Ed Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260
i 130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962). The State US 393, 416, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct
tould not be prevented from enact- 158(1922).
ig newT regulatory initiatives in reWith these observations, I concur
>onse to changing conditions, and
>urts must consider all reasonable in the judgment of the Court.
ipectations whatever their source,
le Takings Clause does not require
static body of state propertv law; it
Justice Blackmun, dissenting.
otects private expectations to enre private investment. I agree
Today the Court launches a misth the Court that nuisance pre- sile to kill a mouse.
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The State of South Carolina pro- row confines of the present case. For
hibited petitioner Lucas from build- that reason, I, like the Court, will
ing a permanent structure on his give far greater attention to this
property from 1988 to 1990. Relying case than its narrow scope suggests
on an unreviewed (and implausible) —not because I can intercept the
state trial court finding that this Court's missile, or save the targeted
restriction left Lucas' property val- mouse, but because I hope perhaps
ueless, this Court granted review to to limit the collateral damage.
determine whether compensation
must be paid in cases where the
I
State prohibits all economic use of
real estate. According to the Court,
A
such an occasion never has arisen in
any of our prior cases, and the Court
In 1972 Congress passed the
imagines that it will arise "rela- Coastal Zone Management Act. 16
tively rarely" or only in "extraordi- USC § 1451 et seq. [16 USCS §§ 1451
nary circumstances." Almost cer- et seq.]. The Act was designed to
tainly it did not happen in this case. provide States with money and incentives to carry out Congress' goal
Nonetheless, the Court presses on
to decide the issue, and as it does, it of protecting the public from shoreignores its jurisdictional limits, re- line erosion and coastal hazards. In
makes its traditional rules of review, the 1980 Amendments to the Act,
and creates simultaneously a new Congress directed States to enhance
categorical rule and an exception their coastal programs by "[prevent(neither of which is rooted in our ing or significantly reducing threats
prior case law, common law, or com- to life and the destruction of propmon sense). I protest not only the erty by eliminating development and
in high-hazard arCourt's decision, but each step taken redevelopment
1
to reach it. More fundamentally, I eas." 16 USC § 1456b(a)(2) (1988 ed,
question the Court's wisdom in issu- Supp II) [16 USCS § 1456b(aX2)].
ing sweeping new rules to decide
South Carolina began implementsuch a narrow case. Surely, as Jusing
the congressional directive by
tice Kennedy demonstrates, the
enacting
the South Carolina Coastal
Court could have reached the result
Zone
Management
Act of 1977. Unit wanted without inflicting this
der
the
1977
Act,
any
construction
damage upon our Taking Clause juactivity in what was designated the
risprudence.
"critical area" required a permit
from
the Council, and the construcMy fear is that the Court's new
tion
of
any habitable structure was
policies will spread beyond the nar1. The country has come to recognize that
uncontrolled beachfront development can
rause serious damage to life and property See
3nef for Sierra Club, et al as Amici Curiae 25 Hurricane Hugo's September 1989 attack
upon South Carolina's coastline, for example,
^aused 29 deaths and approximately $6 billion
n property damage, much of it the result of
jncontrolled beachfront development. See
£aikin, Shifting Sands and Shifting Doctrines:
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The Supreme Court's Changing Takings Doctrine and South Carolina's Coastal Zone Statute, 79 Cal L Rev 205, 212-213 (1991) The
beachfront buildings are not only themselves
destroyed in such a storm, "but they are often
driven, like battering rams, into adjacent inland homes " Ibid. Moreover, the development
often destroys the natural sand dune barriers
that provide storm breaks. Ibid.
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daily by the ebb and flow of the tide.
Tr 84. Between 1957 and 1963, petitioner's property was under water.
This effort did not stop the loss of Id., at 79. 81-82. Between 1963 and
snorehne. In October 1986, the 1973 the shoreline was 100 to 150
Council appointed a "Blue Ribbon feet onto petitioner^ proper v. Ibid.
Committee on Beachfront Manage- In 197o the first line of stable vegement" to investigate beach erosion tation was about halfway through
and propose possible solutions. In the property. Id., at 80. Between
March 1987, the Committee found 1981 and 1983, the Isle of Palms
that South Carolina's beaches were issued 12 emergency orders for sand"critically eroding," and proposed bagging to protect property in the
land-use restrictions. Report of the
Wild Dune development. Id., at 99.
South Carolina Blue Ribbon Committee on Beachfront Management i, Determining that local habitable
6-10 (March 1987). In response, structures were in imminent danger
South Carolina enacted the Beach- of collapse, the Council issued perfront Management Act on July 1, mits for two rock revetments tr pro1988. SC Code §48-39-250 et seq. tect condominium developments
(Supp 1990). The 1988 Act did not near petitioner's property from erochange the uses permitted within sion; one of the revetments extends
the designated critical areas. Rather, more than halfway onto one of his
it enlarged those areas to encompass lots. Id., at 102.
the distance from the mean high
watermark to a setback line estabC
lished on the basis of "the best scienz
tific and historical data" available.
The South Carolina Supreme
SC Code § 48-39-280 (Supp 1991).
Court found that the Beach Management Act did not take petitioner's
property without compensation. The
B
decision rested on two premises that
Petitioner Lucas is a contractor, until today were unassailable—that
manager, and part owner of the the State has the power to prevent
Wild Dune development on the Isle any use of property it finds to be
of Palms. He has lived there since harmful to its citizens, and that a
1978. In December 1986, he pur- state statute is entitled to a prechased two of the last four pieces of sumption of constitutionality.
vacant property in the development.1
The Beachfront Management Act
The area is notoriously unstable In
roughly half of the last 40 years, all includes a finding by the South Caroor part of petitioner's property was lina General Assembly that the
part of the beach or flooded twice beach/dune system serves the pur-

prohibited. The 1977 critical area
was relatively narrow.

2. The setback line was determined by calculating the distance landward from the crest
of an ideal oceanfront band dune which is
forty times the annual erosion rate SC Code
§48-39-280 (Supp 199b
3. The properties were sold frequently at
rapidly escalating prices before Lucas purchased them Lot 22 was first sold in 1979 for

$96,660. sold in 1984 tor $187,500, then in
1985 tor $260,000, and, iinallv to Lucas in
1986 for $475,000 He estimated r s worth in
1991 at S650.000 Ix>t 24 had a similar past.
The record does not indicate who purchased
the properties prior to Lucas, or whv none of
the purchasers held on to the lota and built
on them Tr 44-46.
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pose of "protectingJ life and property by serving as a storm barrier
which dissipates wave energy and
contributes to shoreline stability in
an economical and effective manner." § 48-39-250(1 )(a). The General
Assembly also found that "development unwisely has been sited too
close to the [beach/dune] system.
This type of development has jeopardized the stability of the beach/
dune system, accelerated erosion,
and endangered adjacent property/'
§ 48-39-250(4); see also § 48-39-250(6)
(discussing the need to "afford the
beach/dune system space to accrete
and erode").
If the state legislature is correct
that the prohibition on building in
front of the setback line prevents
serious harm, then, under this
Court's prior cases, the Act is constitutional. "Long ago it was recognized that all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall
not be injurious to the community,
and the Takings Clause did not
transform that principle to one that
requires compensation whenever the
State asserts its power to enforce it."
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v
DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 491-492,
.94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (1987)
(internal quotations omitted); see
also id., at 488-489, and n 18, 94 L
Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. The Court
consistently has upheld regulations
imposed to arrest a significant
threat to the common welfare, whatever their economic effect on the
owner. See e.g., Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 US 590, 592-593, 8 L Ed
2d 130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962); Euclid v
Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, 71 L
Ed 303, 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016
(1926); Gorieb v Fox, 274 US 603,
608, 71 L Ed 1228, 47 S Ct 675, 53
828
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ALR 1210 (1927); Mugler v Kansas,
123 US 623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273
(1887).
Petitioner never challenged the
legislature's findings that a building
ban was necessary to protect property and life. Nor did he contend
that the threatened harm was not
sufficiently serious to make building
a house in a particular location a
"harmful" use, that the legislature
had not made sufficient findings, or
that the legislature was motivated
by anything other than a desire to
minimize damage to coastal areas.
Indeed, petitioner objected at trial
that evidence as to the purposes of
the setback requirement was irrelevant. Tr 68. The South Carolina Supreme Court accordingly understood
petitioner not to contest the State's
position that "discouraging new construction in close proximity to the
beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm," 304 SC
376,
, 404 SE2d 895, 898 (1991),
and "to prevent serious injury to the
community." Id., at
, 404 SE2d,
at 901. The court considered itself
"bound by these uncontested legislative findings . . . [in the absence of)
any attack whatsoever on the statutory scheme." Id., at
, 404 SE2d,
at 898.
Nothing in the record undermines
the General Assembly's assessment
that prohibitions on building in
front of the setback line are necessary to protect people and property
from storms, high tides, and beach
erosion. Because that legislative determination cannot be disregarded
in the absence of such evidence, see,
e.g., Euclid, 272 US, at 388, 71 L Ed
303, 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016;
O'Gorman & Young v Hartford Fire
Ins. Co, 282 US 251, 257-258, 75 L
Ed 324, 51 S Ct 130, 72 ALR 1163
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(1931) (Brandeis, J.), and because its
determination of harm to life and
property from building is sufficient
to prohibit that use under this
Court's cases, the South Carolina
Supreme Court correctly found no
taking.
II
Mv disagreement with the Court
Logins with its decision to review
this case. This Court has held consistently that a land-use challenge is
not ripe for review until there is a
final decision about what uses of the
property will be permitted. The ripeness requirement is not simply a
gesture of good-will to land-use planners. In the absence of "a final and
authoritative determination of the
type and intensity of development
legally permitted on the subject
property," MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v Yolo County, 477 US 340,
348, 91 L Ed 2d 285, 106 S Ct 2561
'1986), and the utilization of state
procedures for just compensation,
there is no final judgment, and in
the absence of a final judgment
;here is no jurisdiction. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v San Die^o,
450 US 621, 633, 67 L Ed 2d 551, 101
S Ct 1287 (1981); Agins v Tiburon,
447 US 255, 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100
SCt 2138(1980).
This rule is "compelled by the
ery nature of the inquiry required
y the Just Compensation Clause,"
ecause the factors applied in decidig a takings claim "simply cannot
e evaluated until the administra-». The Court's reliance, ante, at
, 120 L
i 2d, at 811 en Esposito v South Carolina
»asta* Council. 939 F2d 165. 168 <CA4 1991 >
n ^ending, No 91-941. in support of its
cision to consider Lucas temporary taking
im ripe is misplaced In Esposito the plain's brought a facial challenge to the mere

tive agency has arrived at a final,
definitive position regarding how it
will apply the regulations at issue to
the particular land in question."
Williamson County Regional Planling Comm'n v Han ilton Bank ot
Johnson City, 473 US 172, 190, 191,
87 L Ed 2d 126, 105 S Ct 3108 (1985).
See also MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates, 477 US, at 348, 91 L Ed 2d
285, 106 S Ct 2561 ("A court cannot
determine whether a regulation has
gone too far' unless it knows how
far the regulation goes") (citation
omitted).
The Court admits that the 1990
amendments to the Beachfront Management Act allowing special permits preclude Lucas from asserting
that his property has been permanently taken. See ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 810. The Court
agrees that such a claim would not
be ripe because there has been no
tinal decision by respondent on what
uses will be permitted. The Court,
however, will not be denied: it determines that petitioner's "temporary
takings" claim for the period from
July 1, 1988, to June 25, 1990, is
ripe. But this claim also is not justiciable.4
From the very beginning of this
litigation, respondent has argued
that the courts:
"lac[kj jurisdiction in this matter
because the Plaintiff has sought no
authorization from Council for use
of his property, has not challenged
the location of the baseline or setenactment of the Act. Heie, of course, Lucas
has brought an asapphed challenge See Brief
for Petitioner 16 Facial challenges are ripe
when the \ c t is passed; applied challenges
require a Lnal decision on the Act's application to the property in question
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That petitioner's property fell
within the critical area as initially
interpreted by the Council does not
excuse petitioner's failure to challenge the Act's application to his
property in the administrative process. The claim is not ripe until
Tr 10 (answer, as amended). Alpetitioner seeks a variance from that
though the Council's plea has been
M
status.
[W]e have made it quite
ignored by every court, it is undoubtclear
that
the mere assertion of reg-*
edly correct.
ulatory jurisdiction by a governmenUnder the Beachfront Manage- tal body does not constitute a regulament Act, petitioner was entitled to tory taking." United States v Riverchallenge the setback line or the side Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 US
baseline or erosion rate applied to 121, 126, 88 L Ed 2d 419, 106 S Ct
his property in formal administra- 455 (1985). See also Williamson
tive, followed by judicial, proceed- County, 473 US, at 188, 87 L Ed 2d
ings. SC Code § 48-39-28(XE) (Supp 126, 105 S Ct 3108 (claim not ripe
1991). Because Lucas failed to pur- because respondent did not seek varsue this administrative remedy, the iances that would have allowed it to
Council never finally decided
whether Lucas1 particular piece of develop the property, notwithstandproperty was correctly categorized as ing the Commission's finding that
a critical area in which building the plan did not comply with the
and subdivision
would not be permitted. This is all zoning ordinance
5
the more crucial because Lucas ar- regulations).
gued strenuously in the trial court
Even if I agreed with the Court
that his land was perfectly safe to
that
there were no jurisdictional
build on. and that his company had
barriers
to deciding this case, I still
studies to prove it. Tr 20, 25, 36. If
he was correct, the Council's final would not try to decide it. The Court
decision would have been to alter creates its new taking jurisprudence
the setback line, eliminating the based on the trial court's finding
construction ban on Lucas' property. that the property had lost all ecoback line as alleged in the Complaint and because no final agency
decision has been rendered concerning use of his property or location of said baseline or setback
line."

5. Even more baffling, given its decision,
just a few days ago, in Lujan v Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 US
. 119 L Ed 2d 351, 112 S
Ot 2130 (1992), the Court decides petitioner
has demonstrated injury in fact In his complaint, petitioner made no allegations that he
had any definite plans for using his property
App to Pet for Cert 153-156 At trial, Lucas
testified that he had house plans drawn up,
but that he was "in no hurry" to build "because the lot was appreciating in value.' Tr
28-29 The trial court made no findings of fact
that Lucas had any plans to use the property
from 1988 to 1990 " '[S]ome day' intentions—
without any description of concrete plans, or
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mdeed even any specification of when the
some day will be—do not support a finding of
the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases
require " 504 US, at
, , 119 L Ed 2d 351,
112 S Ct 2130 The Court circumvents Defenders of Wildlife by deciding to resolve this case
as if it arrived on the pleadings alone But it
did not. Lucas had a full trial on his claim for
"damages for the temporary taking of his
property from the date of the 1988 Act's
passage to such time as this matter is finally
resolved," ante, at
, n 3, 120 L Ed 2d, at
811, quoting the Complaint, and failed to
demonstrate any immediate concrete olans to
build or sell
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State on the property's value without a home, and petitioner's appraiser testified that he never had
considered what the value would be
absent a residence. Tr 54-55. The
appraiser's value was based on the
fact that the "highest and best use
of these lots . . . (is] luxury single
family detached dwellings." Id., at
48. The trial court appeared to believe that the property could be considered "valueless" if it was not
available for its most profitable use.
Absent that erroneous assumption,
see Goldblatt, 369 LS, at 592, 8 L Ed
2d 130, 82 S Ct 987, I find no evidence in the record supporting the
trial court's conclusion that the
damage to the lots by virtue of the
restrictions was "total." Record 128
(findings of fact). I agree with the
Court, ante, at
, n 9, 120 L Ed
2d, at 816, that it has the power to
decide a case that turns on an erroneous finding, but I question the
wisdom of deciding an issue based on
a factual premise that does not exist
in this case, and in the judgment of
the Court will exist in the future
only in "extraordinary circumYet the trial court, apparently be- stancefs]." Ante, at
, 120 L Ed
lieving that "less value'' and "value- 2d, at 814.
less'' could be used interchangeably;
found the property "valueless." The
Clearly, the Court was eager to
court accepted no evidence from the decide this case.7 But eagerness, in

nomic value. This finding is almost
certainly erroneous. Petitioner still
can enjoy other attributes of ownership, such as the right to exclude
others, "one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna v United States.
444 US 164, 176, 62 L Ed 2d 332, 100
S Ct 383 (1979). Petitioner can picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on
the property in a movable trailer.
State courts frequently have recognized that land has economic value
where the only residual economic
uses are recreation or camping. See,
e.g.. Turnpike Realty Co. v Dedham,
362 Mass 221, 284 NE2d 891 (1972);
Turner v County of Del Norte, 24
Cal App 3d 311, 101 Cal Rptr 93
(1972), cert denied, 409 US 1108, 34
L Ed 2d 689, 93 S Ct 908 (1973); Hail
v Board of Environmental Protection, 528 A2d 453 (Me 1987). Petitioner also retains the right to alienate the land, which would have
value for neighbors and for those
prepared to enjoy proximity cO the
ocean without a house.

8. Respondent contested the findings of fact
of the trial court in the South Carolina Supreme Court, but that court did not rear 1 e
the issue. This Courts decision to assume .„r
its purposes that petitioner had been denied
all economic use of his land does not, of
course, dispose of the issue on remand.
7. The Court overlooks the lack of a ripe
and justiciable claim apparently oat of concern that in the absence of its intervention
Lucas will be unable to obtain further adjudication of his temporary-taking claim. The
Court chastises respondent for arguing that
Lucas's temporary-taking claim is premature
because it failed "so mucn as [to] commenltj"
upon the effect of the South Carolina Su-

preme Court's decision on petitioner's ability
to obtain relief for the 2-year period, and it
frets that Lucas would "be unable (absent our
intervention now) to obtain further statecourt adjudication with respect to the 19881990 period." Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d. at
810. Whatever the explanation for the Court's
intense interest in Lucas' plight when ordinarily we are more cautious in granting discretionary review, the concern would have
been more prudently expressed bv vacating
the judgment below and remanding for further consideration in iight of the 1990 amendments. At that point, petitioner could have
brought a temporary-taking claim in the state
courts
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the absence jf proper jurisdiction,
must—and in this case should have
been—met with restraint.
Ill
The Court's willingness to dispense with precedent in its haste to
reach a result is not limited to its
initial jurisdictional decision. The
Court also alters the long-settled
rules of review.
The South Carolina Supreme
Court's decision to defer to legislative judgments in the absence of a
challenge from petitioner comports
with one of this Court's oldest maxims: "the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed." United States v Carolene
Products Co., 304 US 144, 152, 82 L
Ed 1234, 58 S Ct 778 (1938). Indeed,
we have said the legislature's judgment is "well-nigh conclusive." Berman v Parker, 348 US 26, 32, 99 L
Ed 27, 75 S a 98 (1954). See also
Sweet v Rechel, 159 US 380, 392, 40
L Ed 188, 16 S Ct 43 (1895); Euclid,
272 US, at 388, 71 L Ed 303, 47 S Ct
114, 54 ALR 1016 ("If the validity of
the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the
legislative judgment must be allowed
to control").
Accordingly, this Court always has
required plaintiffs challenging the
constitutionality of an ordinance to
provide "some factual foundation of
record" that contravenes the legislative findings. O'Gorman & Young,
282 US, at 258, 75 L Ed 324, 51 S Ct
130, 72 ALR 1163. In the absence of
»uch proof, "the presumption of constitutionality must prevail." Id., at
257, 75 L Ed 324, 51 S Ct 130, 72
ALR 1163. We only recently have
reaffirmed that claimants have the
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burden of showing a state law constitutes a taking. See Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 US, at 485, 94 L Ed
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. See also
Goldblatt, 369 US, at 594, 8 L Ed 2d
130, 82 S Ct 987 (citing "the usual
presumption of constitutionality"
that applies to statutes attacked as
takings).
Rather than invoking these traditional rules, the Court decides the
State has the burden to convince the
courts that its legislative judgments
are correct. Despite Lucas' complete
failure to contest the legislature's
findings of serious harm to life and
property if a permanent structure is
built, the Court decides that the legislative findings are not sufficient to
justify the use prohibition. Instead,
the Court "emphasize[s]" the State
must do more than merely proffer
its legislative judgments to avoid
invalidating its law. Ante, at
,
120 L Ed 2d, at 822. In this case,
apparently, the State now has the
burden of showing the regulation is
not a taking. The Court offers no
justification for its sudden hostility
toward state legislators, and I doubt
that it could.
IV
The Court does not reject the
South Carolina Supreme Court's decision simply on the basis of its disbelief and distrust of the legislature's findings. It also takes the opportunity to create a new scheme for
regulations that eliminate all economic value. From now on, there is
a categorical rule finding these regulations to be a taking unless the use
they prohibit is a background common-law nuisance or property principle. See ante, at
, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 821-823.
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matter how adverse the financial
effect on the owner may be. More
I first question the Court's ratio- than a century ago, the Court explicnale in creating a category that obvi- itly upheld the right of States to
ates a "case-specific inquiry into the prohibit uses of property injurious to
public interest advanced/* ante, at public health, safety, or welfare
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 812, if all without paying compensation. "A
economic value has been lost. If one prohibition simply upon the use of
fact about the Court's taking juris- property for purposes that are deprudence can be stated without con- clared, by valid legislation, to be
tradiction, it is that "the particular injurious to the health, morals, or
circumstances of each case" deter- safety of the community, cannot, in
mine whether a specific restriction any just sense, be deemed a taking
will be rendered invalid by the gov- or an appropriation of propertv"
ernment's failure to pay compensa- Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 623, 668tion. United States v Central Eureka 669, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887).
Mining Co., 357 US 155, 168, 2 L Ed On this basis, the Court upheld an
2d 1228, 78 S Ct 1097 (1958). This is
ordinance effectively prohibiting opso because although we have articulated certain factors to be consid- eration of a previously lawful brewered, including the economic impact ery, although the "establishments
on the property owner, the ultimate will become of no value as properconclusion "necessarily requires a ty/' Id., at 664, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct
weighing of private and public inter- 273; see also id., at 668, 31 L Ed 205,
ests." Agins, 447 US, at 261, 65 L Ed 8 S Ct 273.
2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138. When the
Mugler was only the beginning in
government regulation prevents the
a
long line of cases.8 In Powell v
owner from any economically valuable use of his property, the private Pennsylvania, 127 US 678, 32 L Ed
interest is unquestionably substan- 253, 8 S Ct 992 '1888), the Court
tial, but we have never before held upheld legislation prohibiting the
that no public interest can outweigh manufacture of oleomargarine, de?,
it. Instead the Court's prior decisions spite the owner's allegation that if
"uniformly reject the proposition prevented from continuing it, the
that diminution in property value, value of his property employed
standing alone, can establish a therein would be entirely lost and he
of the means of liveli'taking/ " Penn Central Transp. Co. be deprived
1
hood.'
Id.,
at
682, 32 L Ed 253, 8 S
v New York City, 438 US 104, 131,
Ct
992.
In
Hadacheck
v Sebastian,
57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978).
239 US 394, 60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct
This Court repeatedly has recog- 143 (1915), the Court upheld an ordinized the ability of government, in nance prohibiting a brickyard, alcertain circumstances, to regulate though the owner had made excavaproperty without compensation no tions on the land that prevented it
A

8. Prior to Mugler, the Court had held that
owners whose real property is wholly destroyed to prevent the bpread of a fire are not
entitled to compensation Bowditch v Boston.
101 US 16, 18-19, 25 L Ed 980 '1879) And the

Court recognized in The License Cases. 5 How
504. 589. 12 L Ed 256 (1847) (opinion of Mc
Lean, J >. that "(tjhe acknowledged pohce
power of a State extends often to the destruction ot property "
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from being utilized for any purpose
but a brickyard. Id., at 405, 60 L Ed
348, 36 S a 143. In Miller v
Schoene, 276 US 272, 72 L Ed 568,
48 S Ct 246 (1928), the Court held
that the Fifth Amendment did not
require Virginia to pay compensation to the owner of cedar trees
ordered destroyed to prevent a disease from spreading to nearby apple
orchards. The "preferment of [the
public interest] over the property
interest of the individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of
the distinguishing characteristics of
every exercise of the police power
which affects property.'' Id., at 280,
72 L Ed 568, 48 S Ct 246. Again, in
Omnia Commercial Co. v United
States, 261 US 502, 67 L Ed 773, 43
S Ct 437 (1923), the Court stated
that "destruction of, or injury to,
property is frequently accomplished
without a 'taking' in the constitutional sense." Id., at 508, 67 L Ed
773, 43 S Ct 437.
More recently, in Goldblatt, the
Court upheld a town regulation that
barred continued operation of an
existing sand and gravel operation
in order to protect public safety. 369
US, at 596, 8 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S Ct
987. "Although a comparison of val9. That same year, an appeal came to the
Court asking "[wjhether zoning ordinances
which altogether destroy the worth of valuable land by prohibiting the only economic
use of which it is capable effect a taking of
real property without compensation." Juris
Statement, OT 1962, No. 307, p 5. The Court
dismissed the appeai for lack of a substantial
federal question. Consolidated Rock Products
Co. v Los Angeles, 57 Cal 2d 515, 370 P2d 342,
appeal dism'd, 371 US 36, 9 L Ed 2d 112, 83 S
Ct 145(1962).
10. On remand, the California court found
no taking in part because the zoning regulation "involves this highest of public interests
—the prevention of death and injury." First
Lutheran Church v Los Angeles, 210 Cal App
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ues before and after is relevant," the
Court stated, "it is by no means
conclusive."9 Id., at 594, 8 L Ed 2d
130, 82 S Ct 987. In 1978, the Court
declared that "in instances in which
a state tribunal reasonably concluded that 'the health, safety, morals, or general welfare' would be
promoted by prohibiting particular
contemplated uses of land, this
Court has upheld land-use regulation that destroyed . . . recognized
real property interests." Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 US, at 125, 57
L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646. In First
Lutheran Church v Los Angeles
County, 482 US 304, 96 L Ed 2d 250,
107 S Ct 2378 (1987), the owner
alleged that a floodplain ordinance
had deprived it of "all use" of the
property. Id., at 312, 96 L Ed 2d 250,
107 S Ct 2378. The Court remanded
the case for consideration whether,
even if the ordinance denied the
owner all use, it could be justified as
a safety measure.10 Id., at 313, 96 L
Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct 2378. And in
Keystone Bituminous Coal, the
Court summarized over 100 years of
precedent: "the Court has repeatedly
upheld regulations that destroy or
adversely affect real property interests."11 480 US, at 489, n 18, 94 L Ed
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232.
3d 1353. 1370, 258 Cal Rptr 893,
(1989),
cert denied, 493 US 1056, 107 L E<i 2d 950,
110 S Q 866 (1990).
11. The Court's suggestion that Agins v
Tiburon, 447 US 255, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S
Ct 2138 (1980), a unanimous opinion, created
a new per se rule, only now discovered, is
unpersuasive. In Agins, the Court stated that
"no precise rule determines when property
has been taken" but instead that "the question necessarily requires a weighing of public
and private interest." Id., at 260-262, 65 L Ed
2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138. The other cases cited
by the Court, ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
812, repeat the Agins sentence, but in no way
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The Court recognizes that "our
prior opinions have suggested that
'harmful or noxious uses' of property
may be proscribed by government
regulation without the requirement
of compensation/* ante, at
, 120
L Ed 2d, at Hl7, but seeks to reconcile them with its categorical rule by
claiming that the Court never has
upheld a regulation when the owner
alleged the loss of all economic
value. Even if the Court's factual
premise were correct, its understanding of the Court's cases is distorted. In none of the cases did the
Court suggest that the right of a
State to prohibit certain activities

without paying compensation turned
on the availability of some residual
valuable use.12 Instead, the cases depended on whether the government
interest was sufficient to prohibit the
activity, given the significant private
cost.13

suggest that the public interest is irrelevant if
total value has been taken. The Court has
indicated that proof that a regulation does
not deny an owner economic use of his property is sufficient to defeat a facial taking
challenge. See Hodei v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 US 264.
295-297, 69 L Ed 2d 1. 101 S Ct 2352 (1981).
But the conclusion that a regulation is not on
its face a taking because it allows the landowner some economic use of property is a far
cry from the proposition that denial of such
use is sufficient to establish a taking claim
regardless of any other consideration. The
Court never has accepted the latter proposition.
The Court relies today on dicta in Agins,
Hodei. Nollan v California Coastal Comm'n,
483 US 825, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 3141
1987). and Keystone Bituminous Coal v DeBenedictis. 480 US 470. 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S
Ct 1232 < 1987), for its new categorical rule.
Ante, at
. 120 L Ed 2d. at 813. I prefer to
rely on the directly contrary holdings in cases
such as Mugler and Hadacheck. not to mention contrary statements in the very cases on
which the Court relies See Agins. 447 US, at
260-262, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138;
Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 US, at 489 n
18. 491-492. 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232.

whether the timber owned by the petitioner
in that case was commercially saleable, and
nothing in the opinion suggests that the
State's right to require uncompensated felling
of the trees depended on any such salvage
value. To the contrary, it is clear from its
unanimous opinion that the Schoene Court
would have sustained a law requiring the
burning of cedar trees if that had been necessary to protect apple trees in which there was
a public interest: the Court spoke of preferment of the public interest over the property
interest of the individual, "to the extent even
of its destruction." Id., at 280, 72 L Ed 568, 48
S Ct 246.

12. Miller v Schoene. 276 US 272, 72 L Ed
568, 48 S Ct 246 il928>, is an example. In the
course of demonstrating that apple trees are
more valuable than red cedar trees, the Court
noted that red cedar has "occasional use and
value as lumber." Id . at 279. 72 L Ed 568. 48
S Ct 246 But the Court did not discuss

These cases rest on the principle
that the State has full power to
prohibit an owner's use of property
if it is harmful to the public. ,f[S]ince
no individual has a right to use his
property so as to create a nuisance
or otherwise harm others, the State
has not 'taken' anything when, it
asserts its power to enjoin the nui-

13. The Court seeks to disavow the holdings
and reasoning of Mugler and subsequent
cases by explaining that they were the
Court's early efforts to define the scope of the
police power. There is language in the earliest
taking cases suggesting that the police power
was considered to be the power simply to
prevent harms. Subsequently, the Court ex
panded its understanding of what were government's legitimate interests. But it does not
follow that the holding of those early cases—
that harmful and noxious uses of property
can be forbidden whatever the harm to the
property owner and without the payment of
compensation—was repudiated. To the contrary, as the Court consciously expanded the
scope of the police power beyond preventing
harm, it clarified that there was a core of
public interests that overrode any private
interest. See Kevstone Bituminous Coal, 480
US, at 491. n 20, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct
1232.
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sance-like activity." Keystone Bituminous Coal 480 US, at 491, n 20,
94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. It
would make no sense under this
theory to suggest that an owner has
a constitutionally protected right to
harm others, if only he makes the
proper showing of economic loss.14
See PennsvWania Coal Co. v Mahon,
260 US 393, 418, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S
Ct 158, 28 ALR 1321 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Restriction
upon [harmful] use does not become
inappropriate as a means, merely
because it deprives the owner of the
only use to which the property can
then be profitably put").
B
Ultimately even the Court cannot
embrace the full implications of its
per se rule: it eventually agrees that
there cannot be a categorical rule
for a taking based on economic value
that wholly disregards the public
need asserted. Instead, the Court
decides that it will permit a State to
14. ''Indeed, it would be extraordinary to
construe the Constitution to require a government to compensate private landowners because it denied them 'the right' to use property which cannot be used without risking
injury and death." First Lutheran Church,
210 Cal App 3d, at 1366, 258 Cal Rptr, at
15. Although it refers to state nuisance and
property law, the Court apparently does not
mean just any state nuisance and property
law Public nuisance was first a common-law
creation, see Newark. The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 LQ Rev 480, 482 (1949) (attributing
development of nuisance to 1535), but by the
1800s in both the United States and England,
legislatures had the power to define what is a
public nuisance, and particular uses often
have been selectively targeted. See Prosser,
Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 Va L
Rev 997, 999-1000 .1966); J.F. Stephen, A
General View of the Criminal Law of England
105-107 *2d ed 1890). The Court's references
to "common-law" background principles, how-
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regulate all economic value only if
the State prohibits uses that would
not be permitted under "background
principles of nuisance and property
law."15 Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
823.
Until today, the Court explicitly
had rejected the contention that the
government's power to act without
paying compensation turns on
whether the prohibited activity is a
common-law nuisance.18 The brewery
closed in Mugler itself was not a
common-law nuisance, and the Court
specifically stated that it was the
role of the legislature to determine
what measures would be appropriate
for the protection of public health
and safety. See 123 US, at 661, 31 L
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273. In upholding the
state action in Miller, the Court
found it unnecessary to "weigh with
nicety the question whether the infected cedars constitute a nuisance
according to common law; or
whether they may be so declared by
statute." 276 US, at 280, 72 L Ed
568, 48 S Ct 246. See also Goldblatt,
ever, indicate that legislative determinations
do not constitute "state nuisance and property law" for the Court.
16. Also, until today the fact that the regulation prohibited uses that were lawful at the
time the owner purchased did not determine
the constitutional question. The brewery, the
brickyard, the cedar trees, and the gravel pit
were all perfectly legitimate uses prior to the
passage of the regulation. See Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 623, 654, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273
(1887); Hadacheck v Sebastian, 239 US 394,
60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143 (1915V, Miller, 276
US, at 272, 72 L Ed 568, 48 S Ct 246; Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 US 590, 8 L Ed 2d
130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962). This Court explicitly
acknowledged in Hadacheck that "[a] vested
interest cannot be asserted against [the police
power] because of conditions once obtaining.
To so. hold would preclude development and
fix a city forever in its primitive conditions."
239 US, at 410, 60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143
(citation omitted).
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369 US, at 593, 8 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S
Ct 987; Hadacheck, 239 US, at 411,
60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143. Instead
the Court has relied in the past, as
the South Carolina Court has done
here, on legislative judgments of
what constitutes a harm.17

prived of all economic value of his
property will depend on how "property" is defined. The "composition of
the denominator in our 'deprivation'
fraction,"' ante, at
, n 7, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 813, is the dispositive inquiry. Yet there is no "objective"
way to define what that denominator
The Court rejects the notion that should be. ffWe have long understood
the State always can prohibit uses it
that any land-use regulation can h*
deems a harm to the public without
characterized
as the 'total' deprivagranting compensation because "the
tion
of
an
aptly
defined
distinction between 'harm-prevententitlement.
.
.
.
Alternatively,
the
ing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulasame
regulation
can
always
be
chartion is often in the eye of the beholder/ 1 Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, acterized as a mere 'partial' withat 818. Since the characterization drawal from full, unencumbered
will depend "primarily upon one's ownership of the landholdinglfi afevaluation of the worth of competing fected by the regulation. . . ." Miuses of real estate," ante, at
, chelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum L
120 L Ed 2d, at 819, the Court de- Rev 1600, 1614 (1988).
cides a legislative judgment of this
The Courts decision in Keystone
kind no longer can provide the de- Bituminous Coal illustrates this
sired "objective, value-free basis" for principle perfectly. In Keystone, the
upholding a regulation. Ante, at Court determined that the "support
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 819. The Court, estate" was "merely a part of the
however, fails to explain how its
entire bundle of rights possessed by
proposed common law alternative
the owner." 480 US, at 501, 94 L Ed
escapes the same trap.
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. Thus, the
The threshold inquiry for imposi- Court concluded that the support
tion of the Court's new rule, "depri- estate's destruction merely elimivation of all economically valuable nated one segment of the total propuse," itself cannot be determined erty. Ibid. The dissent, however,
objectively. As the Court admits, characterized the support estate as a
whether the owner has been de- distinct property interest that was
17. The Court argues that finding no taking
when ihe legislature prohibits a harmful use,
such as the Court did in Mugler and the
South Carolina Supreme Court did in the
instant case, would nullify Pennsylvania Coal.
See ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 817. Justice
Holmes, the author of Pennsylvania Coal,
joined Miller v Schoene, 276 US 272, 72 L Ed
568, 48 S Ct 246 .1928), six years later. In
Miller, the Court adopted the exact approach
of the South Carolina Court: It found the
cedar trees harmful, and their destruction not
a taking, whether or not they were a nuisance. Justice Holmes apparently believed
that such an approach did not repudiate his
eariier opinion. Moreover, this Court already

has been over this ground rive years ago, and
at that point rejected the assertion that Pennsylvania Coal was inconsistent with Mugler,
Hadacheck. Miller, or the others in the string
of "noxious use' cases, recognizing instead
that the nature of the State's action is critical
in takings analysis. Keystone Bituminous
Coal. 480 US, at 490, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct
1232.
18. See also Michelman. Property, Utility,
and Fairness, Comments on the Ethical Foundations at "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv
L Rev 1165, 1192-1193 <1967i; Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 Yale LJ 36, 60
(1964)
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^hollv destroyed. Id., at 519, 94 L
Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. The Court
:ould agree on no 'Value-free basis"
:o resolve this dispute.
Even more perplexing, however, is
,he Court's reliance on common-law
principles of nuisance in its quest for
i value-free taking jurisprudence. In
determining what is a nuisance at
:ommon law, state courts make exactly the decision that the Court
5nds so troubling when made by the
South Carolina General Assembly
today: they determine whether the
ise is harmful. Common-law public
and private nuisance law is simply a
determination whether a particular
ise causes harm. See Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52
Va L Rev 997, 997 (1966) ("Nuisance
is a French word which means nothing more than harm"). There is
lothing magical in the reasoning of
udges long dead. They determined a
larm in the same way as state
udges and legislatures do today. If
udges in the 18th and 19th centunes can distinguish a harm from a
benefit, why not judges in the 20th
century, and if judges can, why not
egislators? There simply is no reason to believe that new interpretations of the hoary common law nuisance doctrine will be particularly
-'objective" or Value-free."19 Once
)ne abandons the level of generality
)f sic utere tuo ut alienum non laelas, ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
$23, one searches in vain, I think,
or anything resembling a principle
n the common law of nuisance.
19. 'There is perhaps no more impenetrable
ungie in the entire law than that which
lurrounds the word 'nuisance' It has meant
ill things to all people and has been applied
ndiscnminately to everything from an alarmng advertisement to a cockroacn baked in a
)ie ' W Keeton, D Dobbs, R Keeton, D
>wen, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of
n
orts 616 (5th ed 1984/ -footnotes omitted) It

m
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c
Finally, the Court justifies its new
rule that the legislature may not
deprive a property owner of the only
economically valuable use of his
land, even if the legislature finds it
to be a harmful use, because such
action is not part of the "long
recognized" "understandings of our
citizens." Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d,
at 820. These "understandings" permit such regulation only if the use is
a nuisance under the common law.
Any other course is "inconsistent
with the historical compact recorded
in the Takings Clause." Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 820. It is not
clear from the Court's opinion where
our "historical compact" or "citizens'
understanding" comes from, but it
does not appear to be history.
The principle that the State
should compensate individuals for
property taken for public use was
not widely established in America at
the time of the Revolution.
"The colonists . . . inherited . . . a
concept of property which permitted extensive regulation of the use
of that property for the public
benefit—regulation that could
even go so far as to deny all productive use of the property to the
owner if, as Coke himself stated,
the regulation 'extends to the public benefit . . . for this is for the
is an area of law that "straddles the legal
universe, virtually defies synthesis, and generates case law to suit every taste " W Rodgers,
Environmental Law §2 4, at 48 (1986) (footnotes omitted) The Court itself has noted that
"nuisance concepts" are "often vague and
indeterminate " Milwaukee v Illinois, 451 US
304, 317 68 L Ed 2d 114, 101 S Ct 1784
(1981)
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public, and every one hath benefit
by it/ "
F. Bosselman, D. Callies & J. Banta,
The Taking Issue 80-81 (1973), quoting The Case of the King's Prerogative m Saltpetre, 12 Co Rep 12-13
1I6O6) (hereinafter Bosselman). See
also Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale U 694, 697, n 9
(1985).20

Yeates 362, 373 (Pa 1802). There was
an obvious movement toward establishing the just compensation principle during the 19th century, but
"there continued to be a strong current in American legal thought that
regarded compensation simply as a
'bounty given . . . by the State' out
of 'kindness' and not out of justice."
Horwitz 65 (quoting Commonwealth
v Fisher, 1 Pen & W 462, 465 (Pa
1830)). See also State v Dawson, 3
Hill 100, 103 (SC 1836)).22

Even into the 19th century, state
Although, prior to the adoption of
governments often felt free to take the Bill of Rights, America was reproperty for roads and other public plete with land use regulations deprojects without paying compensa- scribing which activities were contion to the owners.21 See M. Horwitz, sidered noxious and forbidden, see
The Transformation of American Bender, The Takings Clause: PrinciLaw, 1780-1860, pp 63-64 (1977) ples or Politics?, 34 Buffalo L Rev
(hereinafter Horwitz); Treanor, 94 735, 751 (1985); L. Friedman, A HisYale LJ, at 695. As one court de- tory of American Law 66-68 (1973),
clared in 1802, citizens "were bound the Fifth Amendment's Taking
to contribute as much of [land], as Clause originally did not extend to
by the laws of the country, were regulations of property, whatever
deemed necessary for the public con- the effect.23 See ante, at
, 120 L
venience." M'Clenachan v Curwin, 3 Ed 2d, at 812. Most state courts
20. See generally Sax. 74 Yale LJ, at 56-59
"The evidence certainly seems to indicate
that the mere fact that government activity
destroyed existing economic advantages and
power did not disturb [the English theorists
wno formulated the compensation notion) at
all " Id , at 56 Professor Sax contends that
even Blackstone. 'remembered champion of
the language of private property," did not
believe that the compensation clause was
meant to preserve economic value Id , at 5859
21. In 1796, the Attorney General of South
Carolina responded to property holders' demand for compensation when the State took
their land to build a ioad by arguing that
''there is not one instance on record, and
certainlv none within the memory of the
oldest man now living, of any demand being
made for compensation lor the soil or freehold
of the lands " Lindsav v Commissioners, 2 SC
L 38. 49(1796)
22. Only the constitutions * f Vermont and
Massachusetts required that compensation be
Daid *hen private propertv was taken tor

public use. and although eminent domain was
mentioned in the Pennsylvania constitution,
its sole requirement was that property not be
taken without the consent of the legislature
See Grant. The "Higher Law" Background of
the Law of Eminent Domain, in 2 Selected
Essays on Constitutional Law 912, 915-916
(1938) By 1868, five of the original States ttill
had no just compensation clauses in their
constitutions fbid
23. James Madison, author of the Taking
Clause, apparently intended it to apply only
to direct, physical takings of property by the
Federal Government. See Treanor. The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale LJ, 694, 711 (1985) Professor
Sax argues that although "contemporaneous
commentary upon the meaning of the compensation clause is in very short supply," 74
Yale Li at 58. the "few authorities that are
available ' indicate that the clause was "designed to prevent arbitrary government action " not to protect economic value Id , at
58-60
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agreed with this narrow interpretation of a taking. "Until the end of
the nineteenth century . . . jurists
heid that the constitution protected
possession only, and not value." Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth
Century Contract Clause: The Role
of the Property-Privilege Distinction
and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S Cal L Rev 1, 76 (1986);
Bosselman 106. Even indirect and
consequential injuries to property
resulting from regulations were excluded from the definition of a taking. See Bosselman 106; Callender v
Marsh, 1 Pick 418, 430 (Mass 1823).

120 L Ed 2d

231 US 761, 58 L Ed 470, 34 S Ct
325 (1913). More recent cases reach
the same result. See Consolidated
Rock Products Co. v Los Angeles, 57
Cal 2d 515, 370 P2d 342, appeal
dism'd. 371 US 36, 9 L Ed 2d 112, 83
S Ct 145 (1962); Nassr v Commonwealth, 394 Mass 767, 477 NE2d 987
U985); Eno v Burlington, 125 Vt 8,
209 A2d 499 (1965); Turner v County
of Del Norte, 24 Cal App 3d 311, 101
Cal Rptr 93 (1972).
In addition, state courts historically have been less likely to find
that a government action constitutes
a taking when the affected land is
undeveloped. According to the South
Carolina court, the power of the legislature to take unimproved land
without providing compensation was
sanctioned by "ancient rights and
principles." Lindsay v Commissioners, 2 SC L 38, 57 (1796). "Except for
Massachusetts, no colony appears to
have paid compensation when it
built a stateowned road across unimproved land. Legislatures provided
compensation only for enclosed or
improved land." Treanor, 94 Yale
LJ, at 695 (footnotes omitted). This
rule was followed by some States
into the 1800s. See Horwitz 63-65.

Even when courts began to consider that regulation in some situations could constitute a taking, they
:ontinued to uphold bans on particuar uses without paying compensation, notwithstanding the .economic
mpact, under the rationale that no
me can obtain a vested right to
njure or endanger the public.1" In
he Coates cases, for example, the
Supreme Court of New York found
to taking in New York's ban on the
nterment of the dead within the
ity, although "no other use can be
nade of these lands." Coates v City
f New York, 7 Cow 585, 592 (NY
827). See also Brick Presbyterian
!hurch v City of New York, 5 Cow
38 (NY 1826); Commonwealth v Aler, 7 Cush 53, 59, 104 (Mass 1851);
t. Louis Gunning Advertisement
o. v St. Louis, 235 Mo 99,
, 137
W 929, 942 (1911), appeal dism'd,

With similar result, the common
agrarian conception of property limited owners to "natural" uses of
their land prior to and during much
of the 18th century. See id., at 32.
Thus, for example, the owner could

24. For this reason, the retroactive applicaon of the regulation to formerly lawful uses
as not a controlling distinction in the past.
^Jor can it make any difference that the
ght is purchased previous to the passage of
e by-law," for M[e)very nght, from an abso
te ownership in property, down to a mere
sement, is purchased and holden subject to
e restriction, that it shall be so exercised as

not to injure others Though, at the time, it
be remote and inoffensive, the purchaser is
bound to know, at his peril, that it may
become otherwise" Coates v City of New
York, 7 Cow 585, 605 (NY 1827). See also
Brick Presbyterian Church v City of New
York, 5 Cow 538, 542 (NY 1826); Commonwealth v Tewksbury, 11 Mete 55 (Mass 1846);
State v Paul, 5 RI 185 (1858)
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build nothing on his land that would
alter the natural flow of water. See
id., at 44; see also, e.g., Merritt v
Parker. 1 Coxe 460. 463 (NJ 1795).
Some more recent state courts still
follow this reasoning. See. e.g., Just
v Marinette Countv, 56 Wis 2d 7,
201 NW2d761, 768 < 1972).
Nor does history indicate any common-law limit on the State's power
to regulate harmful uses even to the
point of destroying all economic
value. Nothing in the discussions in
Congress concerning the Taking
Clause indicates that the Clause was
limited by the common-law nuisance
doctrine. Common law courts themselves rejected such an understanding. They regularly recognized that
it is "for the legislature to interpose,
and by positive enactment to prohibit a use of property which would
be injurious to the public." Tewksbury, 11 Mete, at S7.25 Chief Justice
Shaw explained in upholding a regulation prohibiting construction of
wharves, the existence of a taking
did not depend on "whether a certain erection in tide water is a nuisance at common law or not." Alger,
7 Cush. at 104; see also State v Paul,
5 RI 185, 193 (1858); Commonwealth
.- Parks. 155 Mass 531. 532, 30 NE
L74 a892) (Holmes, J.) f"[T]he legisature may change the common law
is to nuisances, and may move the
ine either way, so as to make things
misances which were not so, or to
nake things lawful which were nuiances").
25. More recent state court decisions agree,
ee ev;., Lc;ne v Mr Vernon. 38 NY2d 344,
42 NE2d 571, 573 <1976>: Commonwealth v
aker 160 Pa Super 640. 53 A2d 829. 830
94726. The Court asserts that all early A merlin experience, prior to and after passage of
,e Bill of Rights, and any case law prior to
^97 are "entirely irrelevant" in determining
nat is ' the historical compact recorded in
e Takings Clause ' Ante, at
. n 15. 120

In short, I find no clear and accepted ''historical compact" or "understanding of our citizens" justifying the Court's new taking doctrine.
Instead, the Court seems to treat
history as a grab-bag of principles, to
be adopted where they support the
Court's theory, and ignored where
they do not. If the Court decided
that the early common law provides
the background principles tor interpreting the Taking Clause, then regulation, as opposed to physical confiscation, would not be compensable.
If the Court decided that the law of
a later period provides the background principles, then regulation
might be compensable, but the Court
would have to confront the fact that
legislatures regularly determined
which uses were prohibited, independent of the common law, and independent of whether the uses were
lawful when the owner purchased.
What makes the Court's analysis
unworkable is its attempt to package
the law of two incompatible eras and
peddle it as historical fact.26
V
The Court makes sweeping and, in
my view, misguided and unsupported changes in our taking doctrine. While it limits these changes
to the most narrow subset of govern-

L Ed 2d, at 820. Nor apparently are we to find
this compact in the early federal taking cases,
which clearly permitted prohibition of harmful uses despite the alleged loss of all value,
whether or not the prohibition was a common-law nuisance, and whether or not the
prohibition occurred subsequent to the purchase. See supra, at
,
,
120 L Ed 2d, at 833-834, 836-837, and n 16. I
cannot imagine where the Court finds its
"historical compact." if not in history.

841

U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ment regulation—those that eliminate all economic value from land—
these changes go far beyond what is
necessary to secure petitioner Lucas'
private benefit. One hopes they do
not go beyond the narrow confines
the Court assigns them to today.
I dissent.

Justice Stevens, dissenting.
Today the Court restricts one
judge-made rule and expands another. In my opinion it errs on both
counts. Proper application of the
doctrine of judicial restraint would
avoid the premature adjudication of
an important constitutional question. Proper respect for our precedents would avoid an illogical expansion of the concept of "regulatory
takings."
I
As the Court notes, ante, at
,
120 L Ed 2d, at 809, South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act
has been amended to permit some
construction of residences seaward
of the line that frustrated petitioner's proposed use of his property.
Until he exhausts his right to apply
for a special permit under that
amendment, petitioner is not entitled to an adjudication by this Court
of the merits of his permanent takings claim. MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v County of Yolo, 477 US 340,
351, 91 L Ed 2d 285, 106 S Ct 2561
(1986).
It is also not clear that he has a
viable "temporary takings" claim. If
1. In this regard, it is noteworthy that
petitioner acquired the lot about 18 months
before the statute was passed; there is no
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we assume that petitioner is now
able to build on the lot, the only
injury that he may have suffered is
the delay caused by the temporary
existence of the absolute statutory
ban on construction. We cannot be
sure, however, that that delay
caused petitioner any harm because
the record does not tell us whether
his building plans were even temporarily frustrated by the enactment
of the statute. 1 Thus, on the present
record it is entirely possible that
petitioner has suffered no injury-infact even if the state statute was
unconstitutional when he filed this
lawsuit.
It is true, as the Court notes, that
the argument against deciding the
constitutional issue in this case rests
on prudential considerations rather
than a want of jurisdiction. I think
it equally clear, however, that a
Court less eager to decide the merits
would follow the wise counsel of
Justice Brandeis in his deservedly
famous concurring opinion in Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 341, 80 L Ed 688, 56
S Ct 466 (1936). As he explained, the
Court has developed "for its own
governance in the cases confessedly
within its jurisdiction, a series of
rules under which it has avoided
passing upon a large part of all the
constitutional questions pressed
upon it for decision." Id. at 346, 80 L
Ed 688, 56 S Ct 466. The second of
those rules applies directly to this
case.
"2. The Court will not 'anticipate
a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.' Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co.
v Emigration Commissioners, 113
evidence that he ever sought a building permit from the local authorities.
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US 33, 3P .23 L Ed 899, 5 S Ct
352]; [citing five additional cases].
I t is not the habit of the Court to
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the
case.' Burton v United States 196
US 283, 295 [49 L Ed 482, 25 S Ct
243]/' Id., at 346-347, 91 L Ed 2d
285, 106 S Ct 2561.

Court's formulation of the exception
to that rule is too rigid and too
narrow.
The Categorical Rule

As the Court recognizes, ante, at
,120 L Ed 2d, at 812, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US 393,
67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 28 ALR
1321 (1922), provides no support for
its—or,
indeed, any—categorical
Cavalierly dismissing the doctrine
rule.
To
the contrary. Justice
of judicial restraint, the Court today
Holmes
recognized
that such absotersely announces that "we do not
think it prudent to apply that pru- lute rules ill tit the inquiry into
dential requirement here." Ante, at "regulatory takings." Thus, in the
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 811. I respect- paragraph that contains his famous
fully disagree and would save consid- observation that a regulation may go
eration of the merits for another "too far" and thereby constitute a
day. Since, however, the Court has taking, the Justice wrote: "As we
reached the merits, I shail do so as already have said, this is a question
of degree—and therefore cannot be
well.
disposed of by general propositions."
Id. at 416, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158,
II
28 ALR 1321. What he had
In its analysis of the merits, the "already. . said" made perfectly
Court starts from the premise that clear that Justice Holmes regarded
this Court has adopted a "categori- economic injury to be merely one
cal rule that total regulatory takings factor to be weighed: "One tact for
must be compensated," ante, at
, consideration in determining such
120 L Ed 2d, at 819, and then sets limits is the extent of the diminuitself to the task of identifying the tion [of value.] So the question deexceptional cases in which a State pends upon the particular facts." Id.
may be relieved of this categorical at 413, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 28
obligation. Ante, at
, 120 ALR 1321.
„L Ed 2d, at 820. The test the Court
Nor does the Court's new categoriannounces is that the regulation
cal
rule find support in decisions
must do no more than duplicate the
following
Mahon. Although in dicta
result that could have been achieved
we
have
sometimes recited that a
under a State's nuisance law. Ante,
law
"effects
a taking if [it] . . . deat
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 821. Under
nies
an
owner
economically viable
this test the categorical rule will
use
of
his
land,"
Agins v Tiburon,
apply unless the regulation merely
447
US
255,
260,
65
L Ed 2d 106, 100
makes explicit what was otherwise
S
Ct
2138
<1980),
our
rulings have
an implicit limitation on the owner's
rejected
such
an
absolute
position.
property rights.
We have frequently—and recently—
In my opinion, the Court is doubly held that, in some circumstances, a
in error. The categorical rule the law that renders property valueless
Court establishes is an unsound and may nonetheless not constitute a
unwise addition to the law and the taking. See, e.g., First English Evan843
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gelical Lutheran Church of Glendale the rebuilding of houses that were
v County of Los Angeles, 482 US "destroyed beyond repair by natural
304, 313, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct causes or by fire." 1988 SC Acts 634,
2378 (1987); Goldblatt v Hempstead, § 3; see also Esposito v South Caro369 US 590, 596, 8 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S lina Coastal Council, 939 F2d 165,
Ct 987 '1962;; United States v Cal- 167 (CA4 1991 ).2 Thus, if the homes
tex, 344 US 149. 155, 97 L Ed 157, adjacent to Lucas1 lot were destroyed
73 S Ct 200 (1952); Miller v Schoene, by a hurricane one day after the Act
276 US 272, 72 L Ed 568, 48 S Ct took effect, the owners would not be
246 (1928); Hadachek v Sebastian, able to rebuild, nor would they be
239 US 394, 405, 60 L Ed 348, 36 S assured recovery. Under the Court's
Ct 143 (1915); Mu^ier v Kansas, 123 categorical approach, Lucas (who
US 623, 657, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 has lost the opportunity to build)
(1887); cf. Ruckelshaus v Monsanto recovers, while his neighbors (who
Co., 467 US 986, 1011, 81 L Ed 2d have lost both the opportunity to
815, 104 S Ct 2862 (1984); Connolly v build and their homes) do not rePension Benefit Guaranty Corpora- cover. The arbitrariness of such a
tion, 475 US 211, 225, 89 L Ed 2d rule is palpable.
166, 106 S Ct 1018 (1986). In short,
as we stated in Keystone Bituminous
Moreover, because of the elastic
Coal Assn. v DeBenedictis, 480 US nature of property rights, the
470, 490, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct Court's new rule will also prove un1232 (1987), "'Although a compari- sound in practice. In response to the
son of values before and after' a rule, courts may define "property"
regulatory action 'is relevant, . . . it broadly and only rarely find regulais by no means conclusive.' "
tions to effect total takings. This is
In addition to lacking support in the approach the Court itself adopts
past decisions, the Court's new rule in its revisionist reading of venerais wholly arbitrary. A landowner ble precedents. We are told that—
whose property is diminished in notwithstanding the Court's findings
value 95% recovers nothing, while to the contrary in each case—the
an owner whose property is dimin- brewery in Mugler, the brickyard in
ished 100% recovers the land's full Hadacheck, and the gravel pit in
</alue. The case at hand illustrates Goldblatt all could be put to "other
uhis arbitrariness well. The Beach- uses" and that, therefore, those
front Management Act not only pro- cases did not involve total regulatory
libited the building of new dwellings takings.3 Ante, at
, n 13, 120 L
n certain areas, it also prohibited Ed 2d, at 819-820.
2. This asj.»ect of the Act was amended in
990 See SC Code § 4&-39-290(B) (Supp 1990).
3. Of course, the same could easily be said
n this case: Lucas may put his land to "other
ises"—fishing or camping, for example—or
nay sell his land to his neighbors as a buffer,
n either event, his land is far from "value?ss. '
This highlights a fundamental weakness in
le Court's analysis: its failure to explain why
nly the impairment of 'economically benefi-
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cial or productive use," ante, at
, 120 L
Ed 2d, at 813 (emphasis added), of property is
relevant in takings analysis. I should think
that a regulation arbitrarily prohibiting an
owner from continuing to use her property for
bird-watching or sunbathing might constitute
a taking under some circumstances; and, conversely, that such uses are of value to the
owner. Yet the Court offers no basis for its
assumption that the only uses of property
cognizable under the Constitution are developmental uses.
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On the other hand, developers and
investors may market specialized estates to take advantage of the
Court's new rule The smaller the
estate, the more likely that a regulators change will effect a total taking
Thus, an investor may, for example,
purchase the right to build a multifamily home on a specific lot, with
the result that a zoning regulation
that allows only single-family homes
wouid render the investor's property
interest 'Valueless "4 Li short, the
categorical rule will likely have one
of two effects Either courts will alter the definition of the 'denominator" in the takings "fraction," rendering the Court's categorical rule
meaningless, or investors will manipulate the relevant property interests, giving the Court's rule sweeping effect To my mind, neithei of
these results is desirable or appropriate, and both are distortions of
our takings jurisprudence

hshed that a 50% diminution in
value does not by itself constitute a
taking See Euclid v Ambler Realty
Co, 272 US 365, 384, 71 L Ed 303,
47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016 (1926)
(75ro diminution in value) Thus, the
landowner's perception of the regulation cannot justify the Court's new
rule

Finally, the Court's justification
for its new categorical rule is remarkably thin The Court mentions
in passing three arguments in support of its rule, none is convincing
First, the Court suggests that "total
deprivation of feasible use is, from
the landowner's point of view, the
equivalent of a physical appropriation " Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
814 This argument proves too much
From the "landowners point of
view," a regulation that diminishes
a lot's value by 50% is as well "the
equivalent' of the condemnation ot
half of the lot Yet it is well estab-

Finally, the Court suggests that
"regulations that leave the owner
without economically beneficial
use
carry with them a
heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form
of public service " Ibid As discussed
more fully below, see infra, Part III,
I agree that the risks of such singling out are of central concern in
takings law However, such risks do
not justify a per se rule for total
regulatory takings There is no necessary correlation between "singling
out" and total takings a regulation
may single out a property owner

4 This unfortunate possibility is created by
the Co art b subtle revision of the total regu
latorv takings dicta In past decisions we
have stated that a regulation effects a taking
if it denies an owner economically viable use
of his land
Agins v Tiburon 447 US 255
260 b5 L Ed 2d 10b 100 S Ct 2138 (1980)

(emphasis added) indicating that this total
takings test did not apph to other estates
Todav however the Court suggests that i
regulation ma\ effect a total taking of nn\
real propertv interest See ante at
n 7
120 L Fd 2d at 81*814

Second, the Court emphasizes that
because total takings are 'relatively
rare" its new rule will not adversely
affect the government's ability to "go
on " Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at
814 This argument proves too little
Certainly it is true that defining a
small class of regulations that are
per se takings will not greatly hinder important governmental functions—but this is true of any small
class of regulations The Court s suggestion only begs the question of
why regulations of this particular
class should always be found to effect takings
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without depriving him of all of his
property, see e.g., Nollan v California Coastal Comm'n, 483 US 825,
837, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 3141
(1987); J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v Atkinson, 121 NH 581, 432 A2d 12
(1981); and it may deprive him of all
of his property without singling him
out, see e.g., Mugler v Kansas, 123
US 623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273
(1887); Hadachek v Sebastian, 239
US 394, 60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143
(1915). What matters in such cases is
not the degree of diminution of
value, but rather the specificity of
the expropriating act. For this reason, the Court's third justification
for its new rule also fails.
In. short, the Court's new rule is
unsupported by prior decisions, arbitrary and unsound in practice, and
theoretically unjustified. In my opinion, a categorical rule as important
as the one established by the Court
today should be supported by more
history or more reason than has yet
been provided.
The Nuisance Exception
Like many bright-line rules, the
categorical rule established in this
case is only "categorical" for a page
or two in the U. S. Reports. No
sooner does the Court state that "total regulatory takings must be compensated," ante, at
, 120 L Ed
2d, at 819, than it quickly establishes an exception to that rule.
The exception provides that a regulation that renders property valueless is not a taking if it prohibits
uses of property that were not "previously permissible under relevant
property and nuisance principles."
Ante, at
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 821.
The Court thus rejects the basic
holding in Mugler v Kansas, 123 US
346

120 L Ed 2d

623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887).
There we held that a state-wide statute that prohibited the owner of a
brewery from making alcoholic beverages did not effect a taking, even
though the use of the property had
been perfectly lawful and caused no
public harm before the statute was
enacted. We squarely rejected the
rule the Court adopts today:
"It is true, that, when the defendants . . . erected their breweries,
the laws of the State did not forbid the manufacture of intoxicating liquors. But the State did not
thereby give any assurance, or
come under an obligation, that its
legislation upon that subject
would remain unchanged. [T]he
supervision of the public health
and the public morals is a governmental power, 'continuing in its
nature/ and 'to be dealt with as
the special exigencies of the moment may require/ . . . 'for this
purpose, the largest legislative discretion is allowed, and the discretion cannot be parted with any
more than the power itself/ " Id.,
at 669, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S a 273.
Under our reasoning in Mugler, a
state's decision to prohibit or to regulate certain uses of property is not
a compensable taking just because
the particular uses were previously
lawful. Under the Court's opinion
today, however, if a state should
decide to prohibit the manufacture
of asbestos, cigarettes, or concealable
firearms, for example, it must be
prepared to pay for the adverse economic consequences of its decision.
One must wonder if Government
will be able to "go on" effectively if
it must risk compensation "for every
such change in the general law."
Mahon, 260 US, at 413, 67 L Ed 322,
43 S Ct 158, 28 ALR 1321.
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The Court's holding today effectively freezes the State's common
law, denying the legislature much of
its traditional power to revise the
lav, governing the rights and uses of
property. Until today, I had thought
that we had long abandoned this
approach to constitutional law. More
than a century ago we recognized
that "the great office of statutes is to
remedy defects in the common law
as they are developed, and to adapt
it to the changes of time and circumstances." Munn v Illinois, 94 US 113,
134, 24 L Ed 77 (1877). As Justice
Marshall observed about a position
similar to that adopted by the Court
today:
"If accepted, that claim would represent a return to the era of Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 [49
L Ed 937, 25 S Ct 539] (1905),
when common-law rights were
also found immune from revision
by State or Federal Government.
Such an approacn would freeze
the common law as it has been
constructed by the courts, perhaps
at its 19th-century state of development. It would allow no room
for change in response to changes
in circumstance The Due Process
Clause does not require such a
result." Prune Yard Shopping Center v Robins, 447 US 74, 93, 64 L
Ed 2d 741, 100 S Ct 2035 il980)
(concurring opinion).

and evolution—both moral and practical. Legislatures implement that
new learning; in doing so they must
often revise the definition of property and the rights of properly owners. Thus, whi n the Nation came to
understand that slavery was morallv
wrong and mandated the emancipation of all slaves, it, in eifect, redefined "property." On a lesser scale,
our ongoing self-education produces
similar changes in the rights of
property owners: New appreciation
of the significance of endangered
species, see, e.g., Andrus v Allard,
444 US 51, 62 L Ed 2d 210, 100 S Ct
318 (1979); the importance of wetlands, see, e.g., 16 USC § 3801 et seq.
[16 USCS §§3801 et seq.]; and the
vulnerability of coastal lands, see,
e.g., 16 USC § 1451 et seq. [16 USCS
§§ 1451 et seq.], shapes our evolving
understandings of property rights.

Arresting the development of the
common law is not only a departure
from oar prior decisions; it is also
profoundly unwise. The human condition is one of constant learning

Of course, some legislative redefinitions of property will eifect a taking
and must be compensated—but it
certainly cannot be the case that
every movement away from common
law does so. There is no reason, and
less sense, in such an absolute rule.
We live in a world in which changes
in the economy and the environment
occur with increasing frequency and
importance. If it was wise a century
ago to allow Government ff 'the largest legislative discretion'" to deal
with " 'the special exigencies of the
moment,' " Mugler, 123 US, at 669,
31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273, it is imperative to do so today. The rule that
should govern a decision in a case of
this kind should focus on the future,
not the past.5

5. Even measured in terms of efficiency, the
Court's rule is unsound. The Court today
effectively establishes a form of insurance
against certain changes in landuse regulations Like other forms of insurance, rhe

Court's rule creates a 'moral hazard" and
inefficiencies. In the face of uncertainty about
changes in the law, developers will ovennvest,
safe m the knowledge that if the law changes
adversely, they will be entitled to compensa-
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The Court's categorical approach
rule will, I fear, greatly hamper the
efforts of local officials and planners
who must deal with increasingly
complex problems in land-use and
environmental regulation. As this
case—in which the claims of an individual property owner exceed $1
million—well demonstrates, these officials face both substantial uncertainty because of the ad hoc nature
of takings law and unacceptable penalties if they guess incorrectly about
that law.6

120 L Ed 2d

The rigid rules fixed by the Court
today clash with this enterprise:
"fairness and justice" are often disserved by categorical rules.
Ill
It is well established that a takings case "entails inquiry into [several factors:] the character of the
governmental action, its economic
impact, and its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations." Prune Yard, 447 US, at 83,
64 L Ed 2d 741, 100 S Ct 2035. The
Court's analysis today focuses on the
last two of these three factors: the
categorical rule addresses a regulation's "economic impact," while the
nuisance exception recognizes that
ownership brings with it only certain "expectations." Neglected by
the Court today is the first, and in
some ways, the most important factor in takings analysis: the character
of the regulatory action.

Viewed more broadly, the Courts
new rule and exception conflict with
the very character of our takings
jurisprudence. We have frequently
and consistently recognized that the
definition of a taking cannot be reduced to a "set formula" and that
determining whether a regulation is
a taking is "essentially [an] ad hoc,
factual inquir[y]." Penn Central
Transportation Co. v New York City,
438 US 104, 124, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98
The Just Compensation Clause
S Q 2646 (1978) (quoting Goldblatt v "was designed to bar Government
Hempstead, 369 US 590, 594, 8 L Ed from forcing some people alone to
2d 130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962)). This is bear public burdens which, in all
unavoidable, for the determination fairness and justice, should be borne
whether a law effects a taking is by the public as a whole." Armultimately a matter of "fairness and strong, 364 US, at 49, 4 L Ed 2d
justice," Armstrong v United States, 1554, 80 S Ct 1563. Accordingly, one
364 US 40, 49, 4 L Ed 2d 1554, 80 S of the central concerns of our takCt 1563 (1960), and "necessarily re- ings jurisprudence is "preventing]
quires a weighing of private and the public from loading upon one
public interests." Agins, 447 US, at individual more than his just share
261, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138. of the burdens of government." Motion. See generally Farber, Economic Analysis
and Just Compensation, 12 Int'l Rev of Law &
Econ 125(1992)
6. As the Court correctly notes, in regula?
tory takings, unlike physical takings, courts
have a choice of remedies. See ante, at
,n
17, 120 L Ed 2d, at 822. They may "invalidate the] excessive regulation" or they may
"allofw] the regulation to stand and ordefr]
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the government to afford compensation for
the permanent taking." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v Countv of Los
Angeles, 482 US 304, 335, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107
S Ct 2378 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also id., at 319-321, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct
2378. In either event, however, the costs to
the government are likely to be substantial
and are therefore likely to impede the development of sound land-use policy.

LUCAS v SO. CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
11992) 120 L Ed 2d 798

companies, the Subsidence Act affected all surface owners—including
the coal companies—equally. See
Keystone, 480 US, at 486, 94 L Ed
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. Perhaps the
most familiar application of this
principle of generality arises in zonFor example, in the case of so- ing cases. A diminution in value
led 'developmental exactions/' caused by a zoning regulation is far
have paid special attention to the less likely to constitute a taking if it
k that particular landowners is part of a general and comprehenght "b[el singled out to bear the sive land-use plan, see Euclid v Amrden" of a broader problem not of ber Realty Co., 272 US 365, 71 L Ed
own making. Nollan, 483 US, at 303, 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016
>, n 4, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct (1926); conversely, "spot zoning" is
H; see also Pennell v San Jose, far more likely to constitute a tak> US 1, 23, 99 L Ed 2d 1, 108 S Ct ing, see Penn Central. 438 US, at
> H988). Similarly, in distinguish- 132, and n 28, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S
between the Kohler Act (at issue Ct 2646.
Mahon) and the Subsidence Act
The presumption that a permaissue in Keystone), we found sigcant that the regulatory function nent physical occupation, no matter
the latter was substantially how slight, effects a taking is wholly
ader. Unlike the Kohler Act, consistent with this principle. A
ch simply transferred back to the physical taking entails a certain
face owners certain rights that amount of "singling out."8 Consisy had earlier sold to the coal tent with this principle, physical oc-

ngahela Navigation Co. v United
ates, 148 US 312, 325, 37 L Ed
3, 13 S a 622 (1893). We have,
grefore, in our takings law freently looked to the generality of a
^uiation of property.7

This principle of generality is well-rooted
ir broader understandings of the Constin as designed in part to control the "miss of faction." See The Federalist No. 10, p
i. Wills ed 1982) (J. Madison),
i analogous concern arises in First
ndment law. There we have recognized
an individual's rights are not violated
i his religious practices are prohibited
r a neutral law of general applicability,
example, in Employment Division, Dement of Human Resources of Oregon v
1, 494 US 872, 879-880, 108 L Ed 2d 876,
I Ct 1595 (1990), we observed:
•ur} decisions have consistently held that
ight of free exercise does not relieve an
iduai of the obligation to comply with a
and neutral law of general applicability
le ground that the law proscribes lor
nbes> conduct that his religion pre>s ior proscribes).' United States v Lee,
JS 252. 263, n 3 [71 L Ed 2d 127, 102 S
)51] il982) (Stevens. J., concurring in
lenti.
. In Prince v Massachusetts,
S 158 [88 L Ed 645, 64 S Ct 438] U944),
?id that a mother could be prosecuted

under the child labor laws for using her children to dispense literature in the streets, her
religious motivation notwithstanding. We
found no constitutional infirmity in excluding
[these children] from doing there what no
other children may do.' id., at 171 [88 L Ed
645, 64 S Ct 438]. In Braunfeld v Brown, 366
US 599 [6 L Ed 2d 563, 81 S Ct 1144] (1961)
(plurality opinion), we upheld Sunday-closing
laws against the claim that they burdened the
religious practices of persons whose religions
compelled them to refrain from work on other
days. In Gillette v United States, 401 US 437,
461 [28 L Ed 2d 168, 91 S Ct 828] (1971), we
sustained the military Selective Service System against the claim that it violated free
exercise by conscripting persons who opposed
a particular war on religious grounds."
If such a neutral law of general applicability may severely burden constitutionally protected interests in liberty, a comparable burden on property owners should not be considered unreasonably onerous.
8. See Levmore. Takings, Torts, and Special
Interests, 77 Va L Rev 1333, 13524354 (1991).
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cupations by third parties are more
likely to effect takings than other
physical occupations. Thus, a regulation requiring the installation of a
junction box owned by a third party,
Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 US 419, 73 L Ed 2d
868, 102 S a 3164 (1982), is more
troubling than a regulation requiring the installation of sprinklers or
smoke detectors; just as an order
granting third parties access to a
marina, Kaiser Aetna v United
States, 444 US 164, 62 L Ed 2d 332,
100 S Ct 383 (1979), is more troubling than an order requiring the
placement of safety buoys in the
marina.

the objection would be much more
formidable.,, Commonwealth v Alger, 61 Mass 53, 102 (1851).

9. See Zalkin. Shifting Sands and Shifting
Doctrines: The Supreme Court's Changing
Takings Doctrine and South Carolina's
Coastal Zone Statute, 79 Cal L Rev 205, 216217, nn 46-47 (1991) (collecting statutes).
10. This provision was amended in 1990.

See SC Code § 48-39-29<XB) (Supp 1990).

In considering Lucas' claim, the
generality of the Beachfront Management Act is significant. The Act
does not target particular landowners, but rather regulates the use of
the coastline of the entire State. See
SC Code § 48-39-10 (Supp 1990). Indeed, South Carolina's Act is best
understood as part of a national effort to protect the coastline, one initiated by the Federal Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972. Pub L 92583, 86 Stat 1280, codified as
amended at 16 USC § 1451 et seq.
[16 USCS §§ 1451 et seq.]. Pursuant
In analyzing takings claims, courts to the Federal Act, every coastal
have long recognized the difference State has implemented coastline regbetween a regulation that targets ulations.9 Moreover, the Act did not
one or two parcels of land and a single out owners of undeveloped
regulation that enforces a state-wide land. The Act also prohibited owners
policy. See, e.g., A.A. Profiles, Inc. v of developed land from rebuilding if
Ft. Lauderdale, 850 F2d 1483, 1488
their structures were destroyed, see
(CA11 1988); Wheeler v Pleasant
10
Grove, 664 F2d 99, 100 (CA5 1981); 1988 SC Acts 634 § 3, and what is
Trustees Under Will of Pomeroy v equally significant, from repairing
Westlake, 357 So 2d 1299, 1304 (La erosion control devices, such as seaApp 1978); see also Burrows v walls, see SC Code § 48-39-29(XBX2)
Keene, 121 NH 590, 432 A2d 15. 21 (Supp 1990). In addition, in some
(1981); Herman Click Realty Co. v situations, owners of developed land
St. Louis County, 545 SW2d 320, were required to "renourisfh] the
324-325 (Mo App 1976); Huttig v beach . . . on a yearly basis with an
Richmond Heights, 372 SW2d 833, amount . . . of sand . . . not . . .
842-843 (Mo 1963). As one early less than one and one-half times the
court stated with regard to a water- yearly volume of sand lost due to
1988 SC Acts 634 §3, p
front regulation, "If such restraint erosion."
11
were in fact imposed upon the estate 5140. In short, the South Carolina
of one proprietor only, out of several Act imposed substantial burdens on
estates on the same line of shore, owners of developed and undevel-
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11. This provision was amended in 1990;
authority for renourishment was shifted to
local governments. See SC Code § 48-39-360(A)
(Supp 1990).
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oped land alike. This generality
indicates that the Act is not an effort to expropriate owners of undeveloped land.
Admittedly, the economic impact
of this regulation is dramatic and
petitioner's investment-backed expectations are substantial. Yet, if
anything, the costs to and expectations of the owners of developed land
are even greater: I doubt, however,
that the cost to owners of developed
land of renounshing the beach and
allowing their seawalls to deteriorate effects a taking. The costs imposed on the owners of undeveloped
land, such as petitioner, differ from
these costs only in degree, not in
kind.
The impact of the ban on developmental uses must also be viewed in
light of the purposes of the Act. The
legislature stated the purposes of the
Act as ''protecting], preserving], restoring] and enhancing] the beach/
dune system" of the State not only
for recreational and ecological purposes, but also to "protec[t] life and
property." SC Code § 48-39-260(1)(a)
(Supp 1990). The State, with much
science on its side, believes that the
"beach/dune system [acts] as a
buffer from high tides, storm surge,
[and] hurricanes." Ibid. This is a
traditional and important exercise of
the State's police power, as demonstrated by Hurricane Hugo, which in
1989, caused 29 deaths and more
than $6 billion in property damage
in South Carolina alone.13
In view of all ot these factors, even
12. In this regard, the Act more closely
resembles the Subsidence Act in Keystone
than the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coal Co
v Mahon, 260 US 393, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct
158, 28 ALR 1321 (1922), and more closely
resembles the general zoning scheme in Euclid v Amber Realty Co., 272 US 365, 71 L Ed

assuming that petitioner's property
was rendered valueless, the risk inherent in investments of the sort
made by petitioner, the generality of
the Act, and the compelling purpose
motivating the South Carolina Legislature persuade me that the Act did
not effect a taking of petitioner's
property.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Statement of Justice Souter.
I would dismiss the writ of certiorari in this case as having been
granted
improvidently.
After
briefing and argument it is abundantly clear that an unreviewable
assumption on which this case comes
to us is both questionable as a conclusion of Fifth Amendment law and
sufficient to frustrate the Court's
ability to render certain the legal
premises on which its holding rests.
The petition for review was
granted on the assumption that the
state by regulation had deprived the
owner of his entire economic interest in the subject property. Such was
the state trial court's conclusion,
which the state supreme court did
not review. It is apparent now that
in light of our prior cases, see, e.g.,
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v
DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 493-502,
94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (1987);
Andrus v Allard, 444 US 51, 65-66,
62 L Ed 2d 210, 100 S Ct 318 (1979);
Penn Central Transportation Corp. v
New York City, 438 US 104, 130-131,
303. 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016 (1926) than the
specific landmark designation in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v New York City, 438 US
104, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978)
13. Zalkin, 79 Cal L Rev, at 212-213.
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57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978),
the trial court's conclusion is highly
questionable. While the respondent
now wishes to contest the point, see
Brief for Respondent 45-50, the
Court is certainly right to refuse to
take up the issue, which is not fairly
included within the question presented, and has received only the
most superficial and one-sided treatment before us.
Because the questionable conclusion of total deprivation cannot be
reviewed, the Court is precluded
from attempting to clarify the concept of total (and, in the Court's
view, categorically compensable) taking on which it rests, a concept
which the Court describes, see ante,
at
n 6, 120 L Ed 2d, at 813, as
so uncertain under existing law as to
have fostered inconsistent pronouncements by the Court itself. Because that concept is left uncertain,
so is the significance of the exceptions to the compensation requirement that the Court proceeds to recognize. Thi3 alone is enough to show
that there is little utility in attempting to deal with this case on the
merits.
The imprudence of proceeding to
the merits in spite of these unpromising circumstances is underscored
by the fact that, in doing so, the
Court cannot help but assume something about the scope of the uncertain concept of total deprivation,
even when it is barred from explicating total deprivation directly. Thus,
when the Court concludes that the
application of nuisance law provides
an exception to the general rule that
complete denial of economically beneficial use of property amounts to a
compensable taking, the Court will
be understood to suggest (if it does

8S2
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not assume) that there are in fact
circumstances in which state-law
nuisance abatement may amount to
a denial of all beneficial land use as
that concept is to be employed in
our takings jurisprudence under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The nature of nuisance law, however, indicates that application of a
regulation defensible on grounds of
nuisance prevention or abatement
will quite probably not amount to a
complete deprivation in fact. The
nuisance enquiry focuses on conduct,
not on the character of the property
on which that conduct is performed,
see 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts
§821B (1979) (public nuisance); id.,
§822 (private nuisance), and the
remedies for such conduct usually
leave the property owner with other
reasonable uses of his property, see
W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, &
D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on
Law of Torts § 90 (5th ed 1984) (public nuisances usually remedied by
criminal prosecution or abatement),
id., § 89 (private nuisances usually
remedied by damages, injunction or
abatement); see also, e.g., Mugler v
Kansas, 123 US 623, 668-669, 31 L
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887) (prohibition on use of property to manufacture intoxicating beverages "does
not disturb the owner in the control
or use of his property for lawful
purposes, nor restrict his right to
dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use . . . for
certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests"); Hadacheck v Sebastian, 239 US 394, 412,
60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143 (1915)
(prohibition on operation of brickyard did not prohibit extraction of
clay from which bricks were produced). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine property that can be used only to
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REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Earl D. TANNER and Mary Louise Tanner, his wife, David V. Trask, Grant S.
Kesler, and Larry V. Lunt, Defendants,
Cross-Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant
and Cross-Defendant
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Earl D. TANNER and Mary Louise Tanner, his wife; David V. Trask; Grant S.
Kesler, and Larry V. Lunt, Defendants
and Appellants.
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
TRASK & BRITT, a professional corporation; Grant S. Kesler; Larry V. Lunt;
and Capitol Life Insurance Co., a corporation, Defendants and Appellants.
Nos. 17692, 19348 and 19684.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 19, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 17, 1987.
City redevelopment agency brought actions to acquire properties within blighted
area. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, David B. Dee and Peter F. Leary,
JJ., found that agency did not misrepresent
or mislead condemnees into waiving claims
and abandoning litigation challenging agency's jurisdiction to condemn their properties, and awarded compensation. Cases
were consolidated on appeal. The Supreme
Court, Hall, CJ., held that: (1) agency was
not required to present proof of conditions
precedent to condemnation, where con-

demnee signed stipulations waiving
claims and defenses to authority of agen
to condemn their properties and withdn
condemnation funds which had been depc
ited in court; (2) juror's cursory inspects
of subject premises did not mandate reve
sal of jury verdict, where numerous phot
graphs of building were received into e\
dence at trial; and (3) refusal to alio
condemnees to call agency's consultant t
testify as expert witness regarding valu
of property was not prejudicial error, an
where consultant's testimony would nc
have substantially affected outcome.
Affirmed.
1. Stipulations «=»14(4)
City redevelopment agency was not required to present proof of conditions precedent to condemnation in condemnation compensation trial where condemnees signed
stipulations waiving all claims and defenses
to authority of agency to condemn their
property, and withdrew condemnation
funds agency had deposited with court.
U.C.A.1953, 11-19-23.9. 78-34-9.
2. Estoppel e=>92(4)
Once property owner chooses to withdraw money deposited by state in obtaining
condemnation order, owner waives all objections and defenses to action and to taking of his property, except any claim to
greater compensation. U.C.A.1953, 78-349.
3. Appeal and Error <3=>931(1)
Where there is dispute and disagreement in evidence, reviewing court will assume that trial judge believed those
aspects and fairly drew inferences to be
derived therefrom which gave his decision
support.
4. Trial <&=>344
Affidavits filed by third persons are
not competent to impeach jury verdict.
5. Eminent Domain <s=>262(5)
Juror's cursory view of premises which
formed basis of eminent domain proceedings did not warrant reversal of jury verdict, where numerous photographs of both
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inside and outside of building were received
into evidence at trial, condemnees were still
using building as of time compensation proceeding was brought, and jury's verdict
was fully supported by evidence.
6. Eminent Domain e=»262(5)
Refusal to allow condemnees to call
consultant for city redevelopment agency
to testify as expert witness regarding value of condemned property was harmless
error, if any, where consultant did not have
independent opinion as to value of property, at least two other appraisors who actually appraised property testified as to its
value, and other appraisors were available.
7. Appeal and Error e=> 1056.1(1)
Exclusion of evidence is harmless unless excluded evidence would probably
have had substantial influence in bringing
about different verdict or finding.
Harold A. Hintze, Provo, and William D.
Oswald, Salt Lake City, for Redevelopment
Agency.
Robert S. Campbell and E. Barney Gesas, Salt Lake City, for defendants Tanner,
Trask, Kesler, and Lunt
Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for Trask
& Britt.
HALL, Chief Justice:
These cases, consolidated for purposes of
appeal, emanate from action of the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City (the
RDA) to acquire appellants' properties.
The Tanner group in case No. 19348 and
the Trask group in case No. 19684 appeal
separate trial court determinations that the
RDA did not misrepresent or mislead appellants into waiving claims and abandoning
litigation challenging the RDA's jurisdiction to condemn their properties. Case No.
17692 involves a condemnation compensation trial and raises claims of jury misconduct and trial court error in denying appel1. Utah Neighborhood Development Act, 1st
Spec. Sess., ch. 5, 1969 Utah Laws 1134 (codified
as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-19-1 to
-35 (1986)). While amendments were made to
this act in 1983, they do not affect the resolution
of these appeals.

lants' request to call the RDA's consultant
to testify as an "expert witness." For
reasons enumerated below, we affirm the
trial court's determination in each of the
three appeals.
I
In 1969, the Utah legislature enacted the
"Utah Neighborhood Development Act" *
Under the provisions of this act, municipal
redevelopment agencies are created and
empowered in part to undertake "redevelopment projects" within areas determined
to be "blighted."2 Acquisition and redevelopment of "blighted" property contributes to the health of the community and
may be accomplished by various means,
including eminent domain.3
Pursuant to this act, Salt Lake City's
Board of Commissioners (the Commission)
was designated to act as the City's RDA.
In June 1977, the Commission enacted an
ordinance specifying I8V2 blocks of downtown Salt Lake City, Utah, as a "blighted"
area. Appellants' real properties are situated on Block 53 (between Third and
Fourth South and State Street and Second
East) and are included within the project
area. In early 1979, the RDA began the
statutory process necessary for the acquisition of Block 53. A "redevelopment plan"
for Block 53 was finally published and put
into effect by the Commission in June 1979.
In July 1979, the Tanner group and the
Trask group filed separate actions in Third
District Court challenging the authority of
the RDA to condemn their properties.
Shortly thereafter, the RDA commissioned a private architectural firm to develop a "master plan" report for Block 53.
Apparently, the purpose of this report was
to provide recommendations and guidelines
to private developers choosing to bid on the
acquisition and redevelopment of the block.
In October 1979, the RDA met with appellants at the architect's office to review
2. id
3. Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-23.9(2) (1986).

drawings and a scale model of the "master
plan." Representations made by the RDA
at and subsequent to that meeting are at
issue herein.
In November 1979, the RDA offered the
Trask group $277,400 and the Tanner
group $394,000 for their respective properties. Both groups declined, and further
negotiation continued for approximately
two months. In January 1980, the RDA
commenced condemnation proceedings
against appellants' properties. Thereafter,
the parties entered into stipulations wherein the RDA agreed to deposit with the
court 100 percent of a higher estimate of
the market value of the properties for appellants' immediate withdrawal and use.
In exchange, appellants stipulated to the
RDA's immediate possession of the properties and agreed to dismiss their lawsuits
and waive all claims and challenges (except
the issue of just compensation) to the
RDA's authority to condemn. Pursuant to
these stipulations, both trial courts entered
orders of immediate occupancy for the
RDA, and appellants withdrew the monies
the RDA deposited with the courts. The
parties thereafter proceeded to trial on the
issue of "just compensation."
In August 1980, a jury awarded the Tanner group $357,000 as just compensation
for their property. This sum was less than
the $417,640 appellants originally received
and resulted in a $60,640 refund to the
RDA. Subsequently, the Trask group stipulated that the $294,044 offered by the
RDA was in fact just compensation for
their property.
Thereafter, the Tanner group filed appeal No. 17692, claiming jury misconduct
and error by the court in refusing appellants' request to call the RDA's consultant
to testify as an expert witness. While that
appeal was pending, both the Trask group
and the Tanner group alleged that the
RDA misrepresented and abandoned its
original plans for the use of their properties. Accordingly, appellants filed several
motions below, including motions to vacate
4. 649 P.2d 5 (Utah 1982).

the orders of immediate occupancy and to
dismiss the condemnation proceedings.
Therein, appellants sought to withdraw
their stipulations to the RDA's occupancy
and right to condemn their properties.
Upon motions to this Court, we stayed the
parties' pending appeals and remanded the
cases to the trial courts for evidentiary
proceedings on the issues of misrepresentation and mistake. We also issued an order
of mandamus in Tanner v. District Judges
of Third Judicial District Court* Thereafter, both trial courts conducted evidentiary hearings and subsequently denied appellants' requests for relief, thereby sustaining the condemnation awards and the binding effect of the stipulations. Appeals in
cases No. 19348 and No. 19684 followed.5

II
Cases No. 19348 and No. 19684
Both the Tanner group and the Trask
group argue on appeal that since the RDA
failed to follow statutory prerequisites to
condemning their properties, the trial
courts had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the lawsuits and dismissal of the
condemnation actions was required. However, as discussed below, the dispositive
issue presented by these appeals is whether appellants were induced by mistake or
misrepresentation into signing stipulations
waiving all claims and defenses to the
RDA's authority. The conclusions of the
trial courts in favor of the RDA are not
clearly erroneous and preclude this Court
from substituting its judgment for that of
the trial courts.
[1] Each "Order of Immediate Occupancy" based upon the parties' stipulations
provided in pertinent part:
[T]he Court having carefully examined
the pleadings and the written Stipulation
pertaining thereto referred to above,
and, having determined that plaintiff has
5. Due to their similarity, we deal with the issues
raised in cases No. 19348 and No. 19684 simultaneously.
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the right of eminent domain W and that
the purpose for which the property of
defendants sought by plaintiff herein to
be condemned is for a public purpose ^
and that the property is located within a
redevelopment project area which is
blighted, and that the project area is
detrimental or inimical to the public
health, safety or welfare, and that the
immediate occupancy thereof is necessary and proper; and, the parties having
expressly reserved for future adjudication only the issue of the amount of just
compensation to be paid Defendants, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 78-34-9, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended:
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. Subject to and in accordance with
the "Stipulation for Order of Immediate
Occupancy/' a copy of which is attached
hereto and by reference made a part
hereof, Plaintiff be and is hereby authorized to occupy the property belonging to
Defendants above-named described in the
Complaint on file herein . . . [descriptions
of particular property] which said properties are sought for uses by the public in
connection with and as part of the C.B.D.
Neighborhood Development Project authorized and approved by the Salt Lake
City Commission on June 21, 1979.
2. Plaintiff is hereby permitted to
take immediate possession of said properties and continue in possession of the
same pending further hearing and trial
on the issue of just compensation which
is the only issue which may be raised in
this action
3. Plaintiff has tendered into court
and deposits with the Clerk of the Court
herewith for the benefit of Defendants
the sum of [$294,044 for the Trask group

and $417,640 for the Tanner group] being
100% of the amount of just compensation
based upon two independent appraisals
which Plaintiff has caused to be made of
the premises, adjusted to the date of
taking.
5. Defendants may withdraw the [total sums indicated above] deposited with
the Clerk of the Court for the use and
benefit of Defendants without prejudice
to any claim they may wish to assert for
additional just compensation in the trial
of the matter
(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to these orders, the RDA deposited with the courts
100 percent of the agreed sums. Appellants subsequently withdrew these monies
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9
(1977), which provides in pertinent part:
Upon the application of the parties in
interest, the court shall order that the
money deposited in the court be paid
forthwith for or on account of the just
compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. A payment to a defendant as
aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses
excepting his claim for greater compensation.^!
(Emphasis added.) j?he explicit effect of
the parties' stipulations (fnS)withdrawal of
funds ^pursuant to section 78-34-9 was to
relieve the RDA of prpgpnfjrig proof that
the conditions precedent to condemnation
under section 11-19-23.9 had been met
Indeed, the plain language of both stipulations reflects the acknowledgment of all
parties that the RDA was entitled to immediate occupancy. Because the stipulations
do not recite the existence of controversy
as to either the RDA's authority to take
the properties or the RDA's compliance
with statutory prerequisites to condemning

6. Under the provisions of the Utah Neighbor- 7. Redeveloping areas to terminate urban blight
is a public purpose. See Tribe v. Salt Lake City
hood Development Act, the RDA may condemn
Corp., 540 P.2d 499, 503-04 (Utah 1975); see
property through the procedures of eminent doalso Berman v. Parker, 348 VS. 26, 33-34, 75
main. Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-23.9 (1986); see
also Redevelopment Agency v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d S.Ct. 98, 102-103, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954).
47, 48 (Utah 1974); Redevelopment Agency v. 8. This Court has heretofore indicated the appliMitsui Inv., Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1371 n. 2 (Utah cability of section 78-34-9 to redevelopment
1974).
law. See, e.g., Mitsui Inv., Inc., 522 P.2d at 1372
& n. 3.
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the same, appellants did not preserve any
such issues for future determination. Consequently, in the appropriate exercise of
discretion, the trial courts accepted the
stipulations and entered the appropriate orders of occupancy. For all intents and
purposes, the taking was then complete.
The fact that the stipulations only preserved the issue of just compensation for
trial is not surprising. Whenever issues
pertaining to authority or jurisdiction to
condemn exist at the time an order of immediate occupancy is sought, the best interests of all concerned, including the
court, dictate that those issues be resolved
prior to issuance of the order. Otherwise,
the condemnor runs the risk of defeat and
the resultant loss of funds expended in
preparing the property for its new use.
Similarly, the condemnee runs the risk of
irreparable harm to the property if the
condemnor is permitted to occupy and alter
the property to accommodate the new use.
The specific facts of the instant case illustrate this conclusion. The RDA's planned
use for the properties apparently included
development and construction of new buildings and plazas. In view of the magnitude
of this project and the resultant significant
change in the nature of the existing properties, it is incomprehensible that the parties
would stipulate and agree to orders of immediate occupancy if legitimate issues of
authority and compliance with statutory
procedures remained to be resolved.9
[2] In Utah State Road Commission v.
Friberg™ the parties entered into a stipulation that was incorporated into an order
establishing the state's right to condemn
and reserving for later determination the
amount of compensation to be awarded and
the date for assessing valuation.11 Therein, this Court noted, "A defendant may be
9. Utah State Ra\ Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d
821, 840 (Utah 1984) (Hail, CJ., dissenting).
10. 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984) (plurality opinion).
11. Id at 827.
12. Id. at 833 n. 10 (citing Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-34-9)."
13. See 6 J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 24.11[l][c], at 24-177 (3d ed. 1986)

barred from litigating the merits of tl
State's authority after an order of immed
ate occupancy has been granted if h
waives his right to litigate those issues o
he withdraws the money deposited by th
State in obtaining the order." 12 This lar
guage correctly states the established an<
applicable rule that once a property owne
chooses to withdraw the money depositee
by the State in obtaining the order, h<
waives all objections and defenses to th»
action and to the taking of his property
except any claim to greater compensation.1
Appellants would have us ignore this
rule by recognizing that the "term 'defenses' [in section 78-34-9] cannot include the
failure of the lower court[s] to acquire subject matter jurisdiction but rather is limited
to personal defenses of the landowner." In
other words, appellants contend that even
though they waived all claims and defenses
regarding the RDA's compliance with statutory procedures and authority to condemn, they can now raise those same
claims and defenses to show the trial
courts' lack of jurisdiction in these cases.
We disagree. Appellants apparently misunderstand both the language of and principles behind section 78-34-9 and the nature and result of their stipulations. The
stipulations are proof of the state's power
to expel appellants from their properties.
By entering into the stipulations and withdrawing the monies, appellants acknowledged that the jurisdictional conditions
precedent to the RDA's exercising the power to condemn were properly satisfied.
Therefore, the lower courts' jurisdiction in
that regard was not at issue.
To adopt appellants' arguments would be
to sanction abuse in settlement proceedings
by allowing parties (once they determine
that additional money is available) to invali(based upon the Uniform Eminent Domain
Code); 6 J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 26.31 (3d ed. 1986); 6A J. Sackman,
Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 28.321(2) (3d ed.
1985); 1A J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 4.6, at 4-37 (3d ed. 1985) (waiver and
estoppel); see also City of Durham v. Bates, 273
N.C. 336, 160 S.E.2d 60 (1968); State v. Jackson,
388 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1965).
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date stipulations by simply claiming that
issues they stipulated to can forever be
raised.14 Indeed, departing from the rule
in section 78-34-9 invites controversy in
every condemnation case and affords a
means for parties to manipulate the measure of the compensation, which the statutory provision attempts to prevent.
Therefore, upon accepting the benefits
under section 78-34-9, appellants in the
instant cases, absent misrepresentation.
are precluded fromattacking the Utah
Neighborhood Development Act, the jurisdiction of the courts to enter the order
granting the RDA possession of the properties, and the failure of the RDA to strictly comply with statutory prerequisites to
condemnation. Accordingly, we now turn
to the issue of misrepresentation and the
factual circumstances underlying the stipulations.
Ill
Appellants claim that the trial courts
erred by denying their motions in these
cases. Without marshalling all of the evidence in support of the trial courts' determinations,15 appellants summarily contend
that they were improperly induced to withdraw their challenges to the condemnation
proceedings by the RDA's own representations that their properties would be used
for a municipal office building and plaza
complex. These representations in turn allegedly persuaded appellants that the properties were being condemned for a public
use. Therefore, they contend that they
were led to believe that since the City could
condemn their properties if the RDA failed
in its attempt, they had no valid defense to
the RDA's condemnation action or possibility of success in their related lawsuits.
Consequently, they stipulated to the RDA's
authority to condemn. Appellants now
claim that the RDA's representations were
either false when made or have become
false because the RDA has abandoned the
14. In their briefs, appellants express a willingness to return the monies they withdrew if they
could be allowed to challenge the jurisdiction
and authority of the RDA to condemn their
properties. Such willingness is irrelevant here.

existence of an uncontroverted public use.
Accordingly, appellants argue that the stipulations should be dismissed and they
should be allowed to challenge the authority of and procedures followed by the RDA.
Also, appellants claim that the trial
courts erred by ignoring this Court's mandate in Tanner and by not finding clear
and convincing evidence of unilateral mistake or material misrepresentation requiring rescission of the stipulations. In short,
appellants would have us believe that the
lower courts arbitrarily disregarded and
failed to fairly examine evidence on remand
that plainly showed material misrepresentation and justifiable mistake that culminated in the stipulations to waive jurisdictional defenses. We are not persuaded.
First, the orders and opinion of this
Court on remand did not mandate a particular result. Rather, we instructed the trial
courts to take additional evidence and give
due consideration to that evidence before
reaching a conclusion.16 At the evidentiary
hearings, both trial courts heard extensive
evidence regarding appellants' contentions.
Appellants were given ample opportunity
to present their evidence and arguments
regarding mistake and misrepresentation.
That the trial courts below declined to
adopt appellants' contentions does not
prove that they failed to give due consideration to appellants' evidence. Upon our
review of the records, we conclude that the
trial courts did not fail to comply with our
orders and previous decision.
[3] Second, appellants' claims are predicated on our acceptance of their version of
the events which occurred and how the
trial courts should have perceived the circumstances as they existed. However, the
facts appellants advance in support of their
arguments are carefully chosen to the exclusion of other evidence in the records
supporting the lower courts' decisions.
Due to the trial court's advantaged posi15. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah
1987) (citing Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)).
16. See Tanner, 649 P.2d at 5-6.
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tion, the presumptions favor its judgtestimony of experts before arriving at
ment.17 Where there is dispute and disits verdict.
agreement in the evidence, we assume that
Upon review of the record, the trial judge's
the trial judge believed those aspects and
determination
is not clearly erroneous.
fairly drew the inferences to be derived
[4] First, a majority of the affidavits
therefrom which gave his decision support.18 To this end, neither trial judge offered by appellants should not have been
found credible the evidence appellants mar- considered. Specifically, appellants providshalled. Instead, the courts viewed the ed several affidavits of affiants who
evidence as supporting the determination "polled" the individual jurors. These affithat there were no material misrepresenta- davits purported to restate what jurors told
tions or mistakes underlying the stipula- the affiants after being contacted sometions. These conclusions are not clearly time subsequent to the trial.19 As early as
erroneous. Accordingly, the decisions of 1913, courts held that affidavits filed by
the trial courts are affirmed.
third persons were not competent to imWe have also examined appellants' other peach jury verdicts. In Maryland Casualobjections to the trial courts' determina- ty Co. v. Seattle Electric Co.,20 that court
tions and find them to be without merit held that "affidavits of third persons as to
unsworn statements of jurors tending to
show either the fact of misconduct or its
IV
effects upon the verdict cannot be received
Case No. 17692
for any purpose because they are of a
In this case, the Tanner group attacks purely hearsay character."21 Because apthe Third District Court's denial of their pellants' affidavits are primarily of this
motion for a new trial based upon alleged character, the trial judge could properly
jury misconduct and failure to allow the refuse to consider them.
RDA's consultant to testify as an expert
Second, appellants offered the affidavit
witness. In April 1981, appellants presentof
Don K. Green ("Juror Green") and coned affidavits alleging that several jurors
tended
that his view was manifestly prejuhad viewed the subject property during the
dicial
because
of the changed conditions of
trial on just compensation. Appellants
the
condemned
property and the surroundclaim that these unauthorized views were
ing
premises.
In
the past, this Court has
prejudicial grounds for a new trial. In
ruled
that
in
eminent
domain proceedings,
denying appellants' motion for a new trial
on the grounds of juror misconduct, the the jury is precluded from basing its verdict on self-obtained evidence not presented
court observed:
22
[W]hatever cursory visit was made to the at trial. However, many courts have held
condemned property was at most harm- that an unauthorized visit by a juror will be
less error, and did not prejudice this jury regarded as harmless where the visit did
which took considerable amount of time not disclose any evidence not already adin reviewing all of the photographs and mitted at trial23 Jury misconduct, there17. McBnde v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah
1978).
18. See Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736, 739
(Utah 1982).
19. Apparently, most jurors refused to sign affidavits admitting any unauthorized view.
20. 75 Wash. 430, 134 P. 1097 (1913).
21. Id at 437, 134 P. at 1099-1100. See also
State v. Marvin, 124 Ariz. 555, 559, 606 P.2d 406,

410 (1980) (en banc); Rowley v. Group Health
Coop., 16 Wasfa.App. 373, 379, 556 P.2d 250, 254
(1976).
22, State ex rel Road Commn v. White, 22 Utah
2d 102, 103, 449 P.2d 114 (1969).
23. See, e.g„ Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 154
Mont. 414, 432-33, 465 P.2d 314, 324 (1970);
Winters v. Hassenbusch, 89 S.W.2d 546, 552-53
(Mo.CtApp.1936); Reed v. L Hammel Dry
Goods Co., 215 Ala. 494, 497, 111 So. 237, 239-40
(1927).
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fore, must be judged on the individual facts
and circumstances of the case.24
In the instant case, review of Juror
Green's affidavit indicates that he experienced no more than a cursory view of the
subject premises. Indeed, "[he merely]
went inside the building along the hall of
the first floor and then went out of the
building. He then looked down the alley
and looked at the side of the building." In
contrast, numerous photographs of both
the inside and outside of the building were
received into evidence at trial, after the
court determined that they adequately depicted the property on the day of its taking.
Appellants, however, cite this Court's decision in State ex rel Road Commission v.
White25 as determinative of this issue. In
White, individuals had "razed the frame
house and extensively had demolished the
interiors of the other buildings/'26 Therefore, because of one juror's unauthorized
view of the property, "the jury well may
have been influenced adversely with respect to an objective valuation of the property as of the time of taking." w White is
distinguishable because that property had
been vandalized and burned after the owner had vacated and before the compensation hearing. In contrast, appellants herein were still using the building in question
as of the time of this just compensation
proceeding.28 Apparently, then, it had not
significantly deteriorated and was not suffering from nonuse. Moreover, appellant
Kesler himself testified at trial that the
pictures admitted into evidence accurately
reflected the property at the time of its
taking, as well as at the time of trial. So,
contrary to the assertion of appellants, the
condition of the property had not changed
significantly from the date of its taking
until the date of trial.
[5] Accordingly, the jury's verdict in
this case was fully supported by the evidence, and the observations made by the
offending juror did not add to the evidence
24. See White, 22 Utah 2d at 103, 449 P.2d at 115.
25. 22 Utah 2d 102, 449 P.2d 114.
26. 22 Utah 2d at 103, 449 P.2d at 114.
27. Id.

properly received and considered by the
jury. Therefore, any error was harmless,
and this reason for a new trial must fail.
Finally, appellants contend that the trial
court erred in not allowing them to call the
RDA's consultant to testify as an expert
witness regarding the value of the property. By means of a motion in limine, the
RDA excluded consultant Raymond Fletcher from giving subpoenaed testimony on
the basis of the attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine. Apparently, Fletcher had not actually appraised appellants' property and did not have an independent opinion as to its value. Rather, he
had been retained as a confidential adviser
to review the independent appraisals and
consult with the RDA in preparation for
the condemnation suit
[6,7] Appellants argue that because
Fletcher's opinion as to the value of the
property was higher than that of the appraiser who actually testified for the RDA,
the value of the property was "low-balled"
and appellants had no way to effectively
contradict that evidence. In short, appellants claim that Fletcher's testimony could
have been used to show that the value of
appellants' land was greater than the
amount the RDA was offering. The court
granted the RDA's motion in limine to exclude Fletcher's testimony, apparently on
the grounds that he had not actually appraised the property and was not an expert
witness in that sense, but rather had
worked as a consultant and confidential
advisor to the RDA and its attorney. We
pass over the potential attorney-client and
work product problems that the RDA contends might have arisen had Fletcher testified, because we are satisfied that even if
exclusion of the evidence was erroneous,
the judgment still could not be reversed.
The exclusion of evidence is harmless unless the excluded evidence would probably
have had a substantial influence in bring28. Respondent notes in its brief that after the
order of immediate occupancy was entered, the
subject property was leased back to defendants.
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ing about a different verdict or finding.29
Upon viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict,80 there
is no reasonable likelihood that a different
result would have followed from permitting
the jury to consider the testimony of
Fletcher as to the appraised value of the
property; at least two other appraisers
who actually appraised the property testified as to its value.81 Nor have appellants
shown that other appraisers were unavailable. Indeed, the record indicates that at
least one other individual who actually appraised the property was not called by appellants to testify.
Appellants have not shown, and we do
not believe, that Fletcher's testimony
would have substantially affected the outcome. Therefore, exclusion of his testimony was not prejudicial error.
V
Conclusion
In sum, the determinations of the trial
courts are not clearly erroneous, and there
is no basis for reversing the judgments.
Accordingly, the orders are in all respects
affirmed.
STEWART, Associate CJ., HOWE
and DURHAM, JJ., and GEORGE E.
BALLIF, District Judge, concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., having disqualified
himself, does not participate herein;
Ballif, District Judge, sat

Chad A. SPOR, Ray Spor, Paul C. Spor,
Spor Brothers Motor Company, a Utah
corporation, Spors, Inc., a Utah corporation, and Gold-Spor Mining Company, a Wyoming corporation, Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
v.
CRESTED BUTTE SILVER MINING,
INC., a Colorado corporation, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, and Appellant,
v.
CANDELARIA METALS, INC., a Nevada
corporation, Third-Party Defendant.
No. 19403.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 25, 1987.
In action which sought declaration of
rescission or termination of preincorporation contract, the Fourth District Court,
Millard County, David Sam, J., granted
summary judgment in favor of first contracting party and second party appealed.
The Supreme Court, Stewart, Associate
CJ., held that genuine issues of material
fact regarding whether prepayment of loan
between parties was intended to satisfy all
obligations of both parties under agreement, thus constituting either rescission or
accord and satisfaction of entire agreement, precluded grant of summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Contracts e»252, 253
Mutual rescission is like contract to
undo prior contract and must include at
least offer and acceptance and evidence
mutual meeting of minds to rescind; this
may take form of simple offer and acceptance or demand followed by agreement or

29. Hi!! v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah
1983); Gittmor, 657 P.2d at 743.
30. Hill 658 P.2d at 1209.

31. The fact that appellants' own appraiser testified that the property was worth $850,000 refutes appellants' argument that without Fletcher's testimony, they had no way to contradict
the estimate of the RDA's appraiser.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
David Franklin YOUNG, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 890424.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 17, 1993.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy
R. Hanson, J., of first-degree murder and
theft and was sentenced to death, and he
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J.,
held that: (1) death statute is constitutional; (2) court acted within discretion in ordering defendant to be shackled during
portions of penalty phase; (3) prosecutor
was entitled to introduce additional aggravating circumstances at penalty phase that
were not charged or proven in the guilt
phase; (4) defendant's pro se answer to
civil complaint filed by victim's sister was
properly admitted; (5) court properly allowed prosecutor to present rebuttal argument at penalty phase; (6) court properly
rejected proffered instruction that jury
could consider sympathy at penalty phase;
(7) court should have upheld defendant's
challenge for cause to juror who stated
that death penalty was always appropriate;
(8) jury should have been permitted to consider possible verdict of guilty and mentally ill; and (9) defendant was entitled to
present allocution by way of statement to
jurors prior to deliberation at penalty
phase.
Reversed and remanded.
Zimmerman, Durham and Stewart, JJ.,
concurred in part and dissented in part and
filed opinions.
Hall, C.J. and Howe, Acting, C.J., disr
sented in part.
1. Homicide <s=>357(9)
Aggravating circumstance of death
penalty statute that the homicide was committed for personal or pecuniary gain gave
adequate notice to defendant that it applied

to the killing of the victim and taking of
her purse, money, credit cards, and truck.
(Per Chief Justice Hall, with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring in
the result.) U.C.A.1953, 76-5-202(l)(f).
2. Homicide <s=>343
In view of fact that jury found firstdegree murder with aggravating circumstances that the murder occurred during
attempt to commit rape and for pecuniary
gain, any error in applying to defendant
aggravating circumstance that defendant
had previous felony conviction was harmless with respect to determination that defendant was eligible for death penalty.
(Per Chief Justice Hall, with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring in
the result.) U.C.A.1953, 76-5-202(l)(d, f, h).
3. Constitutional Law <£=>55
Doctrine of separation of powers prohibits state of Utah from requiring federal
courts to review Utah conviction. (Per
Chief Justice Hall, with one Justice concurring and one Justice concurring in the result.)
4. Criminal Law <s=>1206.1(2)
Death penalty under Utah statutory
scheme is constitutional. (Per Chief Justice Hall, with one Justice concurring and
one Justice concurring in the result.)
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-202.
5. Jury e»33(l.l, 2.10)
Defendant has right to impartial jury
drawn from fair cross section of community.
6. Jury <&=>33(1.1)
To establish prima facie violation of
right to jury that represents fair cross section of community, defendant must show
that excluded group represented distinctive
group in community, that group was not
fairly and reasonably represented in jury
venires, and that underrepresentation is
due to systematic exclusion of group during jury selection process.
7. Jury ^33(1.10)
Geographical distribution and socioeconomic status are not distinctive classifications or groups for Sixth Amendment fair
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XIX. MERGING OF THEFT
CONVICTION
[68] Defendant claims that his conviction for theft should merge with his murder conviction because theft is a lesser
included offense of first degree murder
under the aggravating circumstance that
the murder was committed for personal or
pecuniary gain. A defendant cannot be
convicted of both first degree murder and a
lesser included offense of that crime.221
We have determined that one crime is a
lesser included offense of another "where
the two crimes are 'such that the greater
cannot be committed without necessarily
having committed the lesser.'"222 This
court examined the relationship between
lesser included offenses and the aggravating circumstances under the first degree
murder statute in the case of State v. Shaffer.m Although we held in Shaffer that
the defendant's conviction of robbery
merged with his conviction of murder under aggravating circumstance (h) in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-202, we stated that a
defendant could be convicted of a crime
that might also serve as the basis for an
aggravating circumstance if the prosecution did not rely on that crime for proof of
the aggravating circumstance.224
[69] In determining whether the State
relied on proof of the theft for its proof of
the aggravating circumstance, it becomes
necessary to examine what was actually
proved at trial.225 The jury convicted defendant of theft of a motor vehicle. The
jury also convicted him under the aggravating circumstances in subsections (d) (rape),
221. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3).
222. State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)
(quoting State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah
1983)).
223. 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986).

(h) (prior felony), and (f) (pecuniary or other personal gain). Evidence at trial was
sufficient to prove aggravating factors (d)
and (h) and also sufficient to prove that in
addition to the victim's motor vehicle, defendant took her credit cards, her purse,
and her money.226 This additional evidence
independently supports a finding of murder
for gain under subsection (f). The crime of
murder in the first degree under subsection
(f) could have been proved absent the theft
conviction. The trial court correctly determined that the theft conviction should not
merge with the first degree murder conviction.
XX. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Defendant claims that the cumulative ef• fect of errors during the guilt and penalty
phases of his trial require a new penalty
hearing. The doctrine of cumulative error
allows for a new trial when standing alone,
no error is severe enough to warrant a new
trial, but when considered together, the
errors denied the defendant a fair trial.227
This court ascribes to the doctrine of cumulative error, but we do not believe that the
doctrine warrants a new trial or penalty
hearing in this case. Although defendant
has claimed many errors on appeal, we
have determined that tho majority of his
claims do not constitute error; the remainder are merely harmless error. We have
examined the effect of the harmless errors
and determine that the cumulation of these
errors did not result in a fundamentally
unfair trial.228 Therefore, the doctrine of
in leaving the state. This evidence could be
used to support a finding of "other personal
gain" under subsection (f). While we have not
defined "other personal gain," it seems clear
that the purposes of escape and prevention of
identification would fit within the plain meaning of those terms.

225. Hill 674 P.2d at 97.

227. State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987);
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah
1986).

226. The evidence, including defendant's own
statements in his confession and in the pro se
answer introduced in the penalty phase, also
indicated that he killed the victim in order to
prevent her from identifying him and to aid him

228. See generally State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
499-500 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (discussing harmlessness of several errors
in light of confession and other evidence of guilt
and gruesomeness of crime).

224. Id. at 1314 n. 3.
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cumulative error doos tu.t afford Jeieiiua'i
g t deienuam irt appropri22
J uinres." {Emphasis added.)
relief. *
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We have duly renewed defendant < otht-r
•«t
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rvuuiMTr necessity. Young's
claims of error raided m Uie runtev «»f int
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shackling amounted to #,n impoints above »'•<• '"
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230
.nie
comment
on the evidence and
merit.
ss
rights by creating
Associate I'hiel ..-;iiv Hw*^ concurs in
this opinion, and *•- *VUJJ J a:'! rm the convicts n and sentemv Hk-*t wr, a majority
Because of the inherently prejudicial im' N- i-nurt. in ':.t ^pinions that follow, pact of appearing shackled before the jury,
r e v rbf i*\ n r\> * >»* . ",-w *r.-..
: : '! !i troom shack 1 ing is permitte i : i ml;s '"'J a
a
last resort." See Illinois v Allen 39 7
> I* Assoeiai*
'
-v '^ r
U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25
I ,.Ed.2d 353 (1970). In all the cases I ha\ e
DURHAM, Justice:
xamined, reviewing courts have required a
I dissent from parts II, IV, X, Ah
showing
of necessity before tolerating a
and XVII.A of the lead opinion. 1 du>M-;.in part from part VI of the lead op.n«»n \ trial court's decision to shackle. Se 3 • 3 §,,
concur in the result reached in part VIII of Spam v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 1 28 (9th
the lead opinion but dissent from its ratio- Cir.1989), cert denied, 495 U.S. 910, 1,1,0
nale The first three parte of this opinion S.Ct 1937, 109 L.Ed.2d 300 (1990); Elledge
address issues arising from the penalty v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1452 (11th Cir.
phase of Young's trial. The next two parts 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 1.014, 108 S.Ct.
address issues arising from the guilt phase 1487, 99 L.Ed.2d 715 (1988); Tyars v. Finof the trial. The ensuing two parts discuss ner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1983);
jury selection issues. The final part ana- People v, Duran, 16 Cal.3d 282, 290, 127
lyzes the constitutionality of Utah's statu- Cal.Rptr. 618, 623, 545 P.2d 1322, 1327
tory scheme for narrowing the class of (1976); Bello v. State, 547 So.2d 914, 918
1
defendants eligible for the death penalty. (Fla.1989). Thus, I agree with the Ninth
Circuit that "a trial judge may . . impose
restraints only when 'confronted with disI. SHACKLING OF DEFENDANT
ruptive, contumacious, [and] stubbornly deDURING PENALTY PHASE
fiant defendants/ ... Shackling . . . must
(lead opinion part XII)
be limited to cases urgently demanding
Young argues that the trial court violat- that action." Tyars, 709 F.2d at- 1284
ed his rights under the Eighth and Four- (quoting Alien, 397 1 J S at 343, 90 S.Ct. at
teenth Amendments when it required him,
1060-61).
to remain in shackles in the presence of the
Furthermore, before a court may shackle
jury during the penalty phase. I concur
with the lead opinion that "it is within the a disruptive defendant,, it must first "pursound discretion of the trial court to deter- sue less restrictive alternatives." Spain,
mine the safety measures necessary to in- 883 F.2d at 721; see also Tyars, 709 F.2d
sure the security of the courtroom and its at 1284. Lesser restraints could include
occupants. These safety measures may in- increasing courtroom security personnel,
,229. See, e.g., Stale v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 2SS
(Utah 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110
S.Ct. 1837, 108 L.Ed.2d 965 (1990); Bishop, 75 1
P.2d at 489; Rammel, 721 P.2d at 498, 501-02
23 101 S ' , ' • ' „, Cartel , 776 P 2d 886, 896 ( " u i
1985 ).
1. Even Duckett v. Stale, 104 Nev. 6, 752, * .*
752, 755 (1988), upon which the lead opinion
relies, admits that physical restraints at sentenc-

= ng may not be imposed absent necessity. Furlore, although Duckett upheld a senten :
».* -.age shackling order, it, did not, as the lead
Vimon suggests, hold that the constitutional,
>ight to be free of shackles did not exist at
sentencing; it held only that the constitutional
ight to be free of prison garb, established in
i sielle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691,
48 1 F.d 2d 126 (1976), did not exist at Sentencing.
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HIGHWAYS

27-12-160

1-15 designated as Veterans' Memorial Highway.
(1) There is established the Veterans' Memorial
Highway composed of the existing Interstate Highway 15 from the Utah-Idaho border to the Utah-Ari
zona border.
(2) The department shall designate Interstate 15
as the "Veterans' Memorial Highway" on all future
state highway maps.
if»i
27-12-161. Legacy Loop Highway.
(1) There is established Legacy Loop Highway
comprising the existing highway from Route 15 south
of St. George, northerly on Route 18 to Route 56 at
Beryl Junction, then easterly on Route 56 to Interstate Highway 15 in Cedar City.
(2) The Department of Transportation shall designate the portions of the highways identified in Subsection (1) as the Legacy Loop Highway on all future
state highway maps.
JIJMM
CHAPTER 13
COLLEC TOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION ,- ! C I
(Repealed b> I <aws 1975, ch. 76 § 47; 1982
• h 30, § 5 )
27 13 1 to 27 13-10.

Repealed

1 186

cities pursuant to rules and regulations of the state
Department of Transportation developed in cooperation with the counties and participating cities. It is
the further intention of the legislature that the fundi
P<*i mitted to be expended pursuant to this act be
deemed additional to funds normally used by counties
and participating cities for sidewalk construction and
shall not be used in substitution for local sidewalk
construction funds.
1975 u* &JU
27 14-3. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Construction" means the function of constructing or reconstructing a sidewalk with or
without curb and gutter and shall include land
acquisition, engineering or inspection and may
be more fully defined by the rules and regulations of the Department of Transportation.
(2) "Participating city" means any city having
at least third class status.
(3) "Curb and gutter" means the area between
the roadway and sidewalk designed for water
runoff and safety of pedestrian and vehicular
traffic.
(4) "Pedestrian safety devices means any device or method designed to foster the safety of
pedestrian traffic,
1975 <ut 8JJ >
27 1 1 4

CHAFIKK 14
SIDEWALK: CONSTRUCTION
Section
27 1 1 i
27 14 .1
27 14 1:
.2 j 1 1

2 7 1 i 8.

Citation.
f!
,rpose.
- 1 •>

Designated county and city sidewalks —
Construction on easements granted by
transportation department.
Funding priorities by county and city officials — Factors.
Pedestrian safety to be considered in
highway planning.
Rules and regulations — Transportation
department — Cooperation with the
county legislative body.
County or city granting exemption from
construction — Not eligible to utilize
funds under act.

Designated county and city sidewalks
— Construction on easements granted
by transportation department
(1) All sidewalks, including curbs and gutters
within the unincorporated areas of a county and
within nonparticipating cities or towns situated
within the county, shall be designated county sidewalks. All sidewalks within participating cities shall
be designated city sidewalks.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law
counties and participating cities may construct and
maintain curbs, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian
safety devices adjacent to the traveled portion of state
highways upon easements that may be granted by
the state Department of Transportation. The state
Department of Transportation shall cooperate with
counties and participating cities to accomplish pedestrian safety construction and maintenance.
1975 (lit 8 &)

27-14-5.

Funding pi i< n ities l»> cc mnty and cit)
officials
F, it :tors.
27-14-1. Citation.
U*
county legislative body of the counties and
This act shall be known and may he cited as the
the governing officials of participating cities may es' Utah Side walk Construction Act; "
197 5 < 1 »t s s », tablish funding priorities relating to construction of
curbs, gutters, sidewalks or other pedestrian safety
27 1 1 2. P111 pose.
construction, with funds permitted to be expended by
The legislature recognizes that adequate sidewalks
this act, based on factors including, but not limited to:
and pedestrian safety devices are essential to the gen(a) existing useable rights-of-way;
eral welfare of the citizens of the state. It is the opin(b) auto-pedestrian accident experience;
ion of the legislature that existing sidewalks within
(c) average daily automobile traffic;
the state, especially in the most populated areas, are
(d) average daily pedestrian traffic
not adequate to service the walking public with a
(e) average daily school age pedestrui
*
result of creating unnecessary hazards to pedestrian
and
and vehicular traffic. It is the intent of this act to
(f) speed of automobile traffic.
provide a means whereby a portion of the funds re(2) Ail construction performed pursuant to this act
ceived by the counties and participating cities as B
and C road funds may be used for the construction of shall be barrier free to wheelchairs at crosswalks and
intersections.
i m
curbs, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this act.
2 7 - 1 4 fi
Pedestrian safety to be considered, in
he legislature deems it to be in the best interest of
highway planning.
the state if pedestrian safety construction is to be
Pedestrian
safety consideration* shall be included
performed on slate highways that it be performed unin all state highway engineering and planning where
der the direction of the counties and participating
pedestrian traffic would be a significant factor on all
rne

27-12 Hi. Acquisition of rights-of-way and other
real property.
The department may acquire any real property or
interests in reai property necessary for temporary,
present, or reasonable future state highway purposes
by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise Highway purposes as used in this
chapter includes:
(1) rights-of-way, including those necessary
for state highways within cities and towns;
(2) the construction, reconstruction, relocation, improvement, and maintenance of the state
highways and other highways, roads, and streets
under the control of the department;
(3) limited access facilities, including rights oi
access, air, light, and view and frontage and service roads to highways,
(4) adequate drainage in connection with any
highway, cut, fill, or channel change and the
maintenance of any highway, cut, fill, or channel
change;
(5) weighing stations, shops, offices, storage
buildings and yards, and road maintenance »r
construction sites;
(6) road material sites, sites for the manufacture of road materials, and,access i otitis - the
sites;
(7) the maintenance of an unobstructed view
of any portion of a highway to promote the safety
of the traveling public;
(8) the placement of traffic signals, directional
signs, and other signs, fences, curbs, barriers,
and obstructions for the convenience of the traveling public;
(9) the construction and maintenance of storm
sewers, sidewalks, and highway illumination;
(10) the construction and maintenance of livestock highways; and
(11) the construction and maintenance of road
side rest areas adjacent to or near any highway
1891
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.111 l')H IA
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l#

lei est >hall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall
have been paid into court Upon the application of tat
partieb in interest, the court shall order the money
deposited in the court be paid forthwith for or on ac* aunt of the just compensation to be awarded in tf»
pioceedmg A payment to a defendant as aforrw^
shall be held to be an abandonment by such 1 trim
dant of all defenses excepting his claim for giuiui
compensation If the compensation finally awarded it
i espect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shtU «•
teed the amount of the money so received the court
shall ent^r judgment against the plaintiff for tot
amount of the deficiency If the amount oi money at
received by the defendant is greater than the arooua*
finally awarded, the court shall enter judgmett
against the defendant for the amount of the excel*
Upon the filing of the petition for immediate occ*
pancy the court shall fix the time within which, at*
78-34-7. W h o m a y a p p e a r a n d d e f e n d .
the terms upon which, the parties in possession an**
All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming be required to surrender possession to the piaini»
an interest in, any of the property described in the The court >hall make such orders in respect to enaia>
complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, brances, liens, rents, assessments, insurance aal
though not named, may appear, plead and defend, otht r c har^es, if any, as shall be jufat and equitable.
each in respect to his own property or interest, or that
claimed by him, in the same manner as if named in
the complaint
i»53 78-34-10 i ompenhation and damage* — H**
assessed.
78-34-8. Povveis of ourt or judgi
The courl, jury or releree must hear such legal **+
The court or judj ihtteot shall hav* po^ei
dence as may be offered by any of the parties to **
(1) to heai i n ^ rleteinunp ill idverse or con- proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and tr
flicting claims to the property sought to be con- sess
demned, and to the damages therefor, and
(1) the value ot the property sought u> be a *
(2) to determine the respective rights of differdemned and all improvements thereon appaf*
ent parties seeking condemnation of the same
taining to the realty, and of each and every atp*
property
issi
rate estate or interest therein, and if it constat* *
different parcels, the value of each parcel and «
78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action
each estate or interest therein shall be sepaiaM
— Deposit paid into court — Proceassessed
dure for payment of compensation.
(2) if the property sought to be condemned «**
The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof,
stitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the **•
at any time after the commencement of suit, on notice
ages which will accrue to the portion not ao****
to the defendant, if he is a resident of the state, or has
to be condemned by reason of its severance 6**
appeared by attorney in the action, otherwise by servthe portion sought to be condemned and the o*>
ing a notice directed to him on the clerk of the court,
struction of the improvement in the manna* p+
lor an order permitting the plaintiff to occupy the
posed by the plaintiff.
premises sought to be condemned pending the action,
(3) if the property, though no part theiW •
including appeal, and to do such work thereon as may
taken, will be damaged by the construction d Jt»
he required The court or a judge thereof shall take
proposed improvement, the amount of aucn •*•*
proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the
ages
premises sought to be condemned and of the damages
(4) separately how much th** purl** ^
which will accrue from the condemnation, and of the
sought to be condemned and t at I t slat* in latef
reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall
est therein, will be benefited, it at alt, oj **•
grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of
construction of the improvement proposed by • »
the case and the relative damages which may accrue
plaintiff. If the benefit shall be equal U> the «•*
to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court or
ages assessed under Subdivision (2) of la* •*
judge shall enter its order requiring the plaintiff as a
tion, the owner of the parcel shall be alto*** *
condition precedent to occupancy to file with the clerk
compensation except the value of the part**
of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75% of the
taken; but if the benefit shall be lest th*» • »
condemning authority's appraised valuation of the
damages so assessed, the former shall be e>
property sought to be condemned. The amount thus
ducted from the latter, and the remainder afctl
fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only, and
be the only damages allowed in addition at •*
shall not be admissible in evidence on final hearing.
value of the portion taken.
The rights of the just compensation for the land so
(5) As far as practicable compensation aaaatl*
taken or damaged shall vest in the parties entitled
assessed
for each source of damages septfit*^
thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained
and awarded as provided in Section 78-34-10 and established by judgment therein, and the said judgment 78-34 II Whin right to daflimfjti I"11 * *"
shall include, a** part of the just compensation
have accrued
awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the
For the purpose of assessing compeniatwai «a#
amount finally awarded as the value of the property damages, the right thereto shall be deemedfct•*•
and damages, from the date of taking actual posses- accrued at the date of the service of summon*, atal m
sion thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy, actual value at that date shall be the meaauftatf***
whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment, but in- pensation for ill ornnpHi i u« u * iu i-*-— •*
12) ihe names of all owners and claimant* ot
the property, if known, or a statement that they
are unknown, who must be styled defendants
\3) a statement of the right of the plaintiff
14) if a right of way is sought, the complaint
must bhow its location, general route and termini and must be accompanied by a map thereof,
so far as the same is involved in the action or
proceeding
(5) a description of each piece of land sough! to
be taken, and whether the same includes the
whole or only part of an entire parcel or tract All
parcels lying in the county and required lor the
same public use may be included in the same or
separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the court may consolidate or separate
them to suit the convenience of parties
1853
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When right to damages deemed I*
have accrued.

l*i»i
purpose of assenting compensatum —damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to ua*«
accrued at the date of the service of summons, and )M
actual value at that date shall be the measure of ax*
pen&ation for all property to be actually taken, *f*
fc basis of damages to property not actually taken,
tot injuriously affected, in all cases where such danv
jt* are allowed, as provided in the next preceding
action [Section 78-34-101. No improvements put
fon the property subsequent to the date of service of
amnions shall be included in the assessment of commsatton or damages.
IMS

23. [Irrevoca
J.

Declaration of Rights
State Boundaries
Ord inane*
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XII. Corporations
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XVII. Water Rights
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XXII. Miscellaneous
XXIII. Amendment - • *
m
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Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we,
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate
the principles of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
MM
ARTICI,*, I

DECLARATION " II Kit J ! I S
Section
1. (Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
3, {Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4, (Religious liberty — No property qualification to
vote or hold office.)
5, (Habeas corpus.]
6. (Right to bear arms.!
1 (Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable]
9. [Excessive bail and fine-; r..u ^.10. [Trial by jury.]
11. (Courts open — Redress oi miiine*
12. (Rights of accused persons
[Rights of accused persons , Proposeo ,
13. (Prosecution by information or indictment
Grand jury.]
14. {"Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel 1
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Excepnor '
17. (Elections to be free — Soldiers von n
18. [Attainder — Ex post <Vtr Ip.w. contracts. ]
19. [Treason defined — Prooi
20. [Military subordinate to the rivi; p«mei ,
21. (Slavery forbidden.]
XL. (Private property for public use. I

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

hirHe*\l

[Uniform ,
.. „ .awb.,
(Rights retained by people.]
[Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
[Fundamental rights.]
[Declaration of the rights of crime victims.! (Proposed.)

Section 1, [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for t h e abuse of that
right.

isiMi

Sec. 2

I" h 11 political power inherent in the people.)
All political power is inherent in the people; and all
free governments are founded on their authority for
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the
right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may require,
isse
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of 4 i ^
Federal Union and the Constitution of tbr JW
States is the supreme law of the land.
Sec, 4. [Religious liberty — No property q».:
cation to vote or hold office.)
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed.
The State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property
qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896

Sec. 5, [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety requires it.
isse
Sec. 6, [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear
arms for security and defense of self, family, others,
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use
of a r m s .

Sec

1984 (2nd S.S.)

process of law.)

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or propertv y.it hoii* due process of law.
i886
(1,
able v«.vK^

uses bailable.]
• charged with a crime shall be bail-

CONSTITUTION OF UTA «
Sec. 19. [Treason defined - Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies
or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
convicted of treason unless, on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act.
^
ISM
Sec. 20.

[Military subordinate to the civil
power,]
The military shall 'be in strict subordination to the
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be
quartered in any house without the consent of the
owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to be
prescribed by law.
1896

A^ HI

!

his section shall exi.«*
-'-her crimes or acts, n, j t ,,nu
juvenile offenses, as the Legislature may provwi**
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to ent.»-.«
and define this section by statute.
[ 19941
xRTlCLK 1!
1 ATE BOUNDARIES
Section
1. [State boundaries.!

Section 1. [State boundaries."!
The boundaries of the State of I Jtah shall be as
follows:
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Beginning at a point formed b\ «.h*- •**»•««-.•• Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
the thirty-second degree ot longu 4d« ^ t a „«...
* punishment for crime, whereof the party shall
Washington, with the thirty-seventh degree of north
been dulv convicted, shall exist within this
latitude; thence due west along said thirty-seventh
1896
degree of north latitude to the intersection of the
same with the thirty-seventh degree of longitude
^
J*,. [Private property for public use.]
west from Washington; thence due north along said
* ate property shall not be taken or damaged for
thirty-seventh degree of west longitude to the interu<=e without iust compensation,
1896
section of the same with the forty-second degree of
north latitude; thence due east along said forty-sec<ev 23
Irrevocable franchises forbidden.!
ond degree of north latitude to the intersection of the
\ii law- MHII be passed granting irrevocably any
same with the thirty-fourth degree of longitude west
*-,i * h:-* '• ivtlecf* or immunity.
mm
from Washington; thence due south along said thirtyfourth degree of west longitude to the intersection of
*v, 1% Uniform operation of laws.]
the same with the forty-first degree of north latitude;
••*- of a general nature shall have uniform
thence due east along said forty-first degree of north
operati1896
latitude to the intersection of the same with the
thirty-second degree of longitude west from WashingSec. 25. *Higi..
i
e.|
nt
ton; thence due south along said thirty-second degree
- enumerai
be construed
1896
A\T or den\ ,,.,.* i < t .* ied by the people
mm of west longitude to the place of beginning.
aei

fr

Provisions mandatory and prohibi
lory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are de
clared to be otherwise.
1896
•»**« i'i
t u n d a mental rights.]
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is
^s«ential to t h e security of individual rights and t h e
.'TvTnt^ >f free g o v e r n m e n t .
1898
'Sec. 28.

[Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] [Proposed.]
(1) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process, victims of crimes have these
rights, as defined by law:
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and
dignity» and to be free from harassment and
abuse throughout the criminal justice process;
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present
at, and to be heard at important criminal justice
hearings related to the victim, either in person or
through a lawful representative, once a criminal
information or indictment charging a crime has
been publicly filed irt court; and
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose
of imposing an appropriate sentence, receive and
consider, without evidentiary limitation, reliable
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense except that this subsection does not apply
to capital cases or situations involving privileges.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as
creating a cause of action for money damages, costs,
or attorney's fees, or for dismissing any criminal
charge, or relief frnm on« —;- ; «'

ARTICLE III
ORDINANCE
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden J
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of
lands — Exemption.]
[Territorial debts assumed.]
[Free nonsectarian schools,]
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of
this State:
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.}
First: — Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is
guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be
molested in person or property on account of his or
her mode of religious worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited.
1896
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation
of lands — Exemption.]
Second: — The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that they forever disclaim all right
and title to the unappropriated public lands lying
within the boundaries hereof, and to all lands lying
within said limits owned or held by any Indian or
Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall
have been extinguished by the United States, the
same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of
the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the
Congress of the United States. The lands belonging to
citizens of the United States, residing without this
State shall nevot 1 «» *>«—J -A *
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u m i a u bi'ATEb CONSTITUTION
CHARLES COTESWORTH
PlNCKNEY,
CHARLES PINCKNEY,
PIERCE BUTLER.

Georgia

WILLIAM FEW,
ABR BALDWIN.

In Convention Monday September 17th 1787.
Present The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr.
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved,
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof
to the United States in Congress assembled.
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention,
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States which shall
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication the
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and
Representatives elected: That the Electors should
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place assigned;
that the Senators should appoint a President of the
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and
counting the Votes for President; and, that after he
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this
Constitution.
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention.
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary.

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII
AMENDMENT I
[Religious and political freedom.)
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
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AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment)
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

RONALD A fIRNllY
SfCtfTARY

2410 West 2100 South
Soil lake City, Utah 84119

W. D. Hurley,

October 24, 1975

The Honorable Stanley Green, Mayor
City of Centerville
470 North 400 West
Centerville, Utah
84014
Sear Mayor Gjeen:
This office has received two letters from Mr. L. Val Roberts,
Attorney at Law, pertaining to the desire of residents to install
curb and gutter on the west side of Main Street, north of Parrish
Lane. It is our understanding that Centerville has an ordinance
requiring installation of sidewalk where curb and gutter has been
placed.
Inasmuch as the standard state right-of-way of 66 feet was in
question, Mr. BJorn Wang, District R/W Design Engineer, was asked to help
resolve the problem. It appears the state does not have a 33 foot
righc-of-way west of the monument line through the area in question,
but that placement of the curb and gutter with the back of curb
25.5 feet from the monument line (standard for 66' right-of-way)
would be well within the state right-of-way.
•

Mr, Edward D. Julio, District Traffic Engineer, and I, made an
on-the-site inspection to determine the possibility of shifting the
curb and gutter easterly to provide room for the parking strip and
sidewalk on existing right-of-way. It is our opinion that shift
should not be made due to the width of the present roadway and the
set-back of the existing curb and gutter north of the area.
We regret that we could not be more helpfull in providing a
solution, however, the department does not have funds for obtaining
additional right-of-way in that area at the present time. We do
appreciate your concern for upgrading and providing a safe traffic
condition on state highways.

cc:

W.
L.
B.
E.

AJS:tb

D. Hurley
y
Val Roberts
Wang
D. Julio

Andrew J.
Contract Claims & U t i l i t y Officer
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FARMINGTON, UTAH, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1994

2

* * * * *

3

THE COURT:

We are in chambers in the matter in

4

Utah Department of Transportation vs. Joseph Val Ray Roberts

5

and Verle Roberts, his wife.

6

Mr. Ward is here on behalf of the Department of

7

Transportation.

8

his wife.

9

asked to visit with the Court in chambers.

Case number 920700170.

Mr. Roberts is here representing himself and

Mr. Roberts is a member of the bar.

10

What can I help you with, gentlemen?

11

MR. WARD:

Counsel has

Your Honor, I have a couple of

12

concerns.

13

it appears to me as though Mr. Jackman is $1,000 or less on

14

his appraisal unless he's changed.

15

appraisal.

16

representing that, I am just talking in generalities.

17

would like to know where we are going with this.

18
19
20

Number one, after the taking of the depositions,

We are 2,000 on our

I am not getting to the penny, and I am not

Mr. Roberts has —

I

when his deposition was taken,

he's testified to 275,000.
THE COURT:

Well, let me just say at this point,

21

first of all, I think I will say right now, and this is where

22

we are going, and I think I've equivocated about it on this.

23

The only issue before the Court is the value of the property

24

and any severance damage.

25

hear, period.

Those are the only issues we will

5

spent a good deal of time researching.
THE COURT:

I have indicated before, the only

issues before this Court at this time, Mr. Roberts, are value
of the take before and after, and severance damage.

It has

nothing to do with the title to the property as far as where
the line was located.

That has been resolved by stipulation,

and it's over and done.
MR. ROBERTS:

As to the value of the severance

damages, that figure that I gave of 103,000 versus 275,000
won't necessarily encompass the value associated with the
loss of the use of the land on the south boundary of the
driveway, because it's so narrow you can't do anything with
it but grow weeds, and it would also include the loss of
the land taken by the backfill and the berm along the west
edge of the property, and it would also include the loss of
the benefits from the nine-foot-high private hedge or
eight-foot-high private hedge and the loss of the large
willow tree.
THE COURT:

So you've included in your change of

value all of your severance damages?
MR. ROBERTS:

That's what I've tried to do, your

Honor, to the best of my ability.

I am not otherwise

competent to, except as a property owner, to testify as to
what the individual value of any particular severance damage
may be.

I couldn't even tell you

—
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1

MR. WARD:

2

MR. ROBERTS:

3
4|
5
6

Okay.
For that limited purpose, we don't

object.
Q.

(BY MR. WARD)

So your original appraisal was

based upon what, Mr. Hoi brook?
A.

The fact that the property necessary for

7

construction of this project was already in the State

8

right-of-way.

9

Q.

How much was that appraisal?

10

A.

$900.

11

Q.

What was that based upon?

12

A.

Well, it was based on a minimum value for the

13

taking and the easement.

14

schedules, there is a minimum value that is paid no matter

15

how much property we take or whether we take any.

16

to get a deed and an instrument, there is a $250 minimum paid

17

to the property owner, and for the temporary easement it

18

would have been $100.

19

even though it was in the right-of-way, for landscaping trees

20

at the time, and it came to a total of $900 at that time.

21

Under the State acquisition

If we need

And then I did give him some credit,

MR. ROBERTS:

Your Honor, I am going to object to

22

his testimony that the improvements were in the right-of-way

23

since your Honor has —

24

that the testimony is a fact that it was that way and it is

25

objectionable.

it's been offered only to explain
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1

be considered as property taken.

2

So the fact that there is a berm behind that wall

3

only is relevant insofar as it may constitute a diminution in

4

the value of the remainder.

5

testimony that the construction of the berm behind the wall,

6

the wall, the elevation of the driveway or any of those items

7

which may have altered somewhat the access to defendant's

8

property in any way diminished the value of the remainder.

9

There is absolutely no evidence to support that argument.

10

In this case, there is no such

There has been evidence offered by Mr. Roberts of

11

a value of the property at the time of the take to be

12

$275,000.

13

but the Court finds that the best evidence is that that was

14

not the highest and best use.

15

no basis to support that value in the property.

16

I assume he bases that on some commercial value,

Even assuming it was, there is

As to his testimony as to the value remaining

17

after the take, the Court would find that the $103,000

18

estimate presented by Mr. Roberts is without support or

19

foundation, and although as a property owner he has

20

competency to testify relative to value, the question of the

211 weight to be accorded to that testimony is for the Court, and
22

the Court finds that based upon his experience, his basis for

23

his estimates and general knowledge in that area, that his

24

estimate in that regard is basically not competent.

25

The Court further notes that there has been

75

evidence relative to a grade behind the retaining wall not
being provided in the plans, and possibly not in conformity
with the guidelines of the building code and even department
standards.

The Court makes no finding as to why it ended up

in that manner.

However, there has been some evidence in

that regard, but I have heard absolutely no evidence to the
effect that it in any way affected the value of the remainder
so as to constitute severance damage.
The Court will, however, order that the fill be
placed to bring the grade up to as it's required by the
plans.

The Court will allow that either to be done by

Mr. Roberts and reimburse him a reasonable amount or require
that the city complete that.
Mr. Roberts, how do you want it?

Do you want to

do it or do you want them to do it?
MR. ROBERTS:
Honor, they can do it.
THE COURT:
have.

If those are the choices, your
I would prefer a different choice.
That is the only alternative you

The Court will order that the city is to bring the

grade up to and equal to that provided by the plans.
are to slope the berm back over a three-foot area.

They
They are

to provide the fill sufficient to do that and sod sufficient
to sod that from the west side of the retaining wall to a
point three feet back from the wall.

I calculate that that

is 394 square feet of sod, and I estimate 28 cents a square
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

2

STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY

3
4

UTAH DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION
Case No. 920700170

5
6
7
8

Plaintiff
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
-vsJOSEPH VAN RAY ROBERTS
Defendant

9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled matter came on

11

for hearing before the Hon. RODNEY PAGE, Judge of the above

12

entitled Court on November 17, 1992.

13
14

WHEREUPON the following proceedings were had and the
following testimony was adduced, to wit:

15
16
17

A p p e a r a n c e s ;

18

STEVE LEWIS, ESQ.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Attorney for Plaintiff;
J. VAL ROBERTS, ESQ.,
Attorney for Defendant.
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THE COURT:

One that requires it certain as to

the sidewalk if federal funds are involved, and if you can
show me the law, I'll take a look at that time and then we
will look at whether federal funds are involved.
MR. ROBERTS:

All right.

That again is Title 29

of the federal code.
THE COURT:

Submit it in the proper form and I

will take a look at it.
MR. WARD:

You have 10 days to do it.
Your Honor, it's our position that the

order of occupancy has been granted.

He drew down on the

money, the 7824.
THE COURT:

Hasn't the money been drawn down?

MR. ROBERTS:
MR. WARD:
or something.

No.

That is another issue.

The money has been drawn down, 7824.12

The only issue left is how much.

I mean if he

had a question, he should have raised that at the time of the
order of occupancy.

We are not going to relitigate the

design of the highway because that is not what the statute
provides.

When he draws down on the money, your Honor, and

there is a Supreme Court case on this, Qgden vs. UDOT when he
draws down on the money and doesn't reserve anything, the
only issue left is how much do we owe him.
THE COURT:

Mr. Roberts, that would be correct,

MR. ROBERTS:
money.

Except we didn't draw down on the

In fact, both the letter and the statute which

6

requires the state to pay
THE COURT:

Did you withdraw the money?

MR. ROBERTS:
MR. WARD:

No, your Honor.

That is wrong, your Honor.

THE COURT:

It's still in the file.

MR. ROBERTS:
together.

—

No.

Let me tell you how it came

We were in two hearings together.

In fact, Ted

Lewis, attorney for the State Tax Commission, knew about
money being paid into this account three or four days before
I did, and he called me and said they are going to pay
another $500.

What do you want to do with it?

"I don't want anything done with it.

And I said,

It stays this way

because of the very statute."
THE COURT:

Did the State come in and take the

money?
MR. ROBERTS:

The State came in and took it.

We

don't have the 75 percent that is required.
THE COURT:
MR. ROBERTS:
offense to it.

Did you stipulate that they could?
No, sir.

I said I don't have an

There is nothing I can do about it.

I did

not stipulate.
THE COURT:
MR. ROBERTS:

Did you appear?
I did appear at two hearings, your

Honor, before yourself.
THE COURT:

Did you consent to their withdrawal?

7

1

MR. ROBERTS:

2

THE COURT:

3

No, your Honor.
I see.

We will need to look at what

the minute entry says in those.

4

MR. ROBERTS:

5

MR. WARD:

Absolutely no consent at all.

We take the position, your Honor, some

6

of what he says is true.

7

they picked up the money, and if he had wanted to make

8

reservations, he should have made them at that time reserving

9

certain issues, and I'm unaware of that he did any of that.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. ROBERTS:

12
13
14
15

We had a tax lien against him and

We will look at that.
They were reserved too.

If we need

to, we will ask the court reporter to do a transcript.
THE COURT:

Find those dates and I will have her

look at those.
MR. ROBERTS:

Now, that is another issue.

As far

16

as we are concerned, both our rights to parol process, equal

17

protection of the law, and our sewer lines have been rich,

18

because we have not received the money.

19

passed from one State agency to the other.

20

are at on that.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. ROBERTS:

It's just been
That's where we

Okay.
Now, the other major problem is the

23

18 foot of the construction easement.

No one has been

24

willing to take the foot-and-a-half-high mound of earth that

25

they left behind away and put the sod back the way it was.

8

in value?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Are you aware, Mr. Jones, that the parties have

entered into a stipulation to pay compensation?
MR. ROBERTS:

Objection, relevance as to the

survey.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

I think that has already

been stipulated to, Counsel.
MR. WARD:

I was asking if he knew that, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

It's irrelevant whether he knows that

or not.
MR. WARD:

All right.

No further questions, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Redirect, Mr. Roberts?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR, ROBERTS:
Q.

Mr. Jones, at your deposition, I believe you

testified that there were, in addition to I think what you
referred to as the east boundary by description, there were
two other lines establishing the east boundary of the
defendant's property.
A.

Is that not so?

In my deposition, I believe I indicated that

there were two possibilities of the west line of the
right-of-way.

If, in fact, you assume some things, one of

45

1

which was that if you assume that the old existing wells that

2

were drilled many years ago along the west side of this

3

street were contained with private property, then that west

4

line would be approximately six feet east of where it's

5

indicated on the Centerville plats now.

6

Q.

Does that show on this survey?

7

A.

Not on this one.

8

the other plat.

9

Q.

This plat here?

10

A.

Yes.

11

THE COURT:

It shows on the other survey,

I think we are going now where I am

12

not going to allow to us go, Mr. Roberts.

13

to go litigate where your east boundary line is, period.

14

That has been stipulated and decided, and I am not hearing

15

any evidence in that regard other than what I've

16

inadvertently let in at this point.

17

That is not an issue.

18

else, but we will hear no more about that.

19

We are not going

So we are finished.

Go on if you want to go to something

MR. ROBERTS:

It's the inadvertence that I

20

believe prejudices the defendants' case in making a record on

21

what the overall circumstances are surrounding the

22

right-of-way from date of beginning to present taking.

23

THE COURT:

Mr. Roberts, you entered into a

24

stipulation and agreed where that boundary line was, and you

25

are bound by .that stipulation, and therefore, it's not a
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1

question of litigation.

2

go from there.

3

Now, I won't tell you again.

MR. ROBERTS:

I appreciate the Court's

4

utilization of inadvertence.

5

witness.

6

MR. WARD:

7

MR. ROBERTS:

8

THE COURT:

9

No other questions for this

No further questions, your Honor.
Now, the issue then becomes
Wait a minute.

this witness?
MR. ROBERTS:

11

THE COURT:

12

May this witness be excused?

13

MR. ROBERTS:

15
16

No further.

This depends on what Mr. Campbell

is going to testify to.
THE COURT:

That is your problem.

18

THE COURT:

19

(Witness excused.)

20

MR. ROBERTS:

21

privately, your Honor?

22

THE COURT:

25

May this

witness be excused?
MR. ROBERTS:

24

He has no questions.

You may step down.

17

23

—

Are you through with

10

14

Let's

Subject to re-call.

All right.

You may be excused.

May I speak with the witness

You may.

(Whereupon a discussion was held off the record.)
MR. ROBERTS:
other commitments.

Yes, your Honor, this witness has

He will, however, be available on the
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MR. ROBERTS:
THE COURT:

I have no other witnesses.
You rest subject to calling

Mr. Aposhian?
MR. ROBERTS:

And subject to, depending on what

is testified to.
THE COURT:

Well, you have a right to rebuttal.

MR. ROBERTS:

Yes, rebuttal witnesses, that's

fine.
THE COURT:
MR. WARD:

We will call Mr. Dean Hoi brook.

THE COURT:
please.

You may proceed.

Mr. Hoi brook, would you step up,

If you would raise your right hand and face the

clerk.
PEAN W. HQIPRQOK
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff, being
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

PIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. WARD:
Q.

State your name and your address and occupation

if you would, Mr. Holbrook.
A.

Dean W. Holbrook.

Bountiful, Utah.

360 North 700 East,

Right now, I'm retired.

I was at the

time of this acquisition the chief of right-of-way of the
Utah Department of Transportation, and as such, I'm
representing them here today.

203

appraisal of the subject property?
A.

Yes.

In fact, they are defined in the report

itself.
Q.

When were you first retained to make an appraisal

of the subject property?
A.

Well, I got involved with this acquisition back

in 1990 and came out and took a look at it, and it went on
for a period of time.

The initial appraisal, per se, was

done in 1992, and I made it at that time.
Q.

Did you have occasion to talk with the landowner?

A.

Oh, yes, many times.

Q.

Did you explain to him what you were doing there?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ultimately make an initial appraisal?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What was that based on?

A.

My initial appraisal was —

My initial appraisal was based —
1992.

just a moment here.

was made in April of

It was made based on the fact that the property that

was needed for this acquisition was jalxaady in the State

MR. WARD:

Your Honor, I'm only offering this to

explain the difference in the two appraisals.
trying to go into

I am not

—

THE COURT:

I understand.
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MR. WARD:

Okay.

MR. ROBERTS:

For that limited purpose, we don't

object.
Q.

(BY MR. WARD)

So your original appraisal was

based upon what, Mr. Hoi brook?
A.

The fact that the property necessary for

construction of this project was already in the State
81 right-of-way.

9

Q.

How much was that appraisal?

10

A.

$900.

11

Q.

What was that based upon?

12

A.

Well, it was based on a minimum value for the

1

13

taking and the easement.

14

schedules, there is a minimum value that is paid no matter

15

how much property we take or whether we take any.

16

to get a deed and an instrument, there is a $250 minimum paid

17

to the property owner, and for the temporary easement it

18

would have been $100.

19

even though it was in the right-of-way, for landscaping trees

20

at the time, and it came to a total of $900 at that time.

21

Under the State acquisition

If we need

And then I did give him some credit,

MR. ROBERTS:

Your Honor, I am going to object to

22

his testimony that the improvements were in the right-of-way

23

since your Honor has —

24

that the testimony is a fact that it was that way and it is

25

objectionable.

it's been offered only to explain
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1

THE COURT:

I am not receiving it for the truth

2

of the matter asserted in here as to the location of the

3

right-of-way, only to explain the reasons for his valuation.

4

MR, WARD:

5

MR. ROBERTS:

6

used, truth of the matter asserted.

7

MR. WARD:

8

THE COURT:

9

I just didn't want it.
That is the term I should have

There has been a change, your Honor.
I understand.

Q.

(BY MR. WARD)

11

A.

The condemnation case was filed.

12

Q.

Then you were made aware of the stipulation of

10

13

Then the condemnation case was

filed?

the parties?

14

A.

That's right.

15

Q.

That stipulation necessitated a revision of your

16

appraisal?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

In that the parties stipulated that six feet

19

would be taken and paid for?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Did you make a new appraisal, Mr. Holbrook?

22

A.

Yes, I did.

23

Q.

Tell us about that appraisal.

24

A.

Well, of course, the difference being that we

25

were now going to pay for the property as defined in the
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